Loyacono v. Travelers Ins. Co.

Decision Date19 June 2014
Docket NumberNo. 2011–CT–00271–SCT.,2011–CT–00271–SCT.
Citation163 So.3d 932
PartiesKathryn LOYACONO v. The TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

David Neil McCarty, Robert Farley Wilkins, Benjamin Houston Wilson, attorneys for appellant.

Louis G. Baine, III, Thomas Y. Page, Jackson, R.E. Parker, Jr., Vicksburg, attorneys for appellee.

EN BANC.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DICKINSON, Presiding Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. In this personal-injury case, the parties stipulated to the defendant's fault and proceeded to trial on injury and causation. The jury awarded the plaintiff zero dollars. The Mississippi Court of Appeals found that the jury's determination of damages conflicted with the overwhelming weight of the evidence. We disagree, but we affirm the Court of Appeals' decision to reverse and remand for a new trial on damages because the trial judge admitted irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence of the plaintiff's husband's income.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. While driving on July 25, 2005, Kathryn Loyacono observed Watacha Shelby backing her car toward Loyacono on the same road. Loyacono brought her vehicle to a stop, but Shelby backed into the front of her vehicle. Following the accident, Loyacono proceeded by ambulance to the emergency room, complaining of neck and back pain. She was released the same day after being diagnosed with a muscle strain.

¶ 3. At the time of the accident, Shelby lacked liability insurance, but Loyacono possessed an uninsured-motorist policy through Travelers Insurance. Accordingly, Loyacono filed suit against Shelby and Travelers, seeking to recover the policy limit of $2.5 million. Prior to trial, the circuit judge entered an order acknowledging that the parties had agreed that Shelby had proximately caused the accident and that the Travelers policy covered any injuries Loyacono suffered. Thereafter, the parties proceeded to trial, submitting the issues of injury and the causation thereof to the jury.

¶ 4. Both sides presented expert testimony at trial. All three experts—one for the plaintiff and two for the defense—agreed that Loyacono had suffered a muscle strain as a result of the accident. The plaintiff's expert attributed years of back and neck pain, loss of earning capacity, and numerous medical treatments to the accident. The defense experts opined that the muscle strain would result only in minor pain for a short time following the accident and attributed the additional pain and medical treatment to a preexisting back condition.

¶ 5. After being instructed on the defendant's fault in the accident and charged with determining whether Loyacono had suffered any injury as a result of the accident, the jury awarded zero dollars to the plaintiff. Loyacono appealed, arguing that the trial court had erred by denying her motions for a directed verdict on causation, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative, a new trial on damages, because the jury's verdict conflicted with the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Loyacono also argued that she had suffered prejudice because of an agreement between Shelby and Travelers, that the trial court had erred by allowing references to her husband's income, that defense counsel had committed discovery violations, that defense counsel had committed misconduct, that the trial court had erred by failing to inquire into potential juror misconduct, that the trial court had erred by refusing certain jury instructions, and that the trial court had erred by granting certain jury instructions.

¶ 6. We assigned the case to the Mississippi Court of Appeals. After reviewing the evidence presented at trial, the Court of Appeals concluded that “the evidence of Shelby's fault for the accident and Loyacono's injury as a result of the accident was uncontradicted. However, the evidence conflicted regarding the extent of Loyacono's injury as a result of this accident.”1 The court then noted that all experts agreed that Loyacono had suffered a muscle strain as a result of the accident and reversed and remanded for a new trial on damages.2 We granted certiorari.

ANALYSIS
I. Whether the jury returned a verdict against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

¶ 7. On certiorari, Travelers argues that the Court of Appeals erred by finding that the jury had returned a verdict against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Travelers primarily relies on this Court's opinion in Herring v. Poirrier, which held that a jury may conclude, based on competent evidence, that a plaintiff suffered no injury as a result of an automobile accident, despite the fact that the trial judge directed a verdict on the defendant's fault in causing the accident.3 While we find that this case presents a different evidentiary issue than that addressed in Herring, we agree that the Court of Appeals erred by finding that the jury had returned a verdict against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

¶ 8. On appeal, Loyacono argued that she had presented uncontradicted evidence at trial showing that she had suffered some injury as a result of the accident. Accordingly, she argued that the trial judge should have granted a directed verdict on causation of her injury, a judgment not withstanding the verdict, or a new trial on damages. The Court of Appeals determined that experts for both sides agreed that Loyacono had suffered a muscle strain as a result of the accident and found that the trial court had erred by failing to grant a new trial on damages.

¶ 9. Motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) ‘challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence.’4 We review such motions de novo, and “if a verdict for the nonmoving party can possibly be supported by the evidence—when viewed in the light most favorable to that party—then” neither a directed verdict nor a JNOV is appropriate.5 A motion for a new trial, on the other hand, may be granted when the jury returns a verdict against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.6 A jury award in particular “will not be ‘set aside unless so unreasonable as to strike mankind at first blush as being beyond all measure, unreasonable in amount and outrageous.’7

¶ 10. In Herring v. Poirrier, this Court affirmed a jury's decision to award zero dollars in damages when the trial judge granted a directed verdict on fault in the automobile accident.8 In that opinion, we stated that “the jury's refusal to award damages to Herring could be based either on the jury's finding that Herring was not injured or that the damages that Herring alleged were not caused by the accident.”9 We noted that the defendant produced expert testimony opining that the accident was not the proximate cause of any injury and that the plaintiff's expert had acknowledged that his initial evaluation of the plaintiff showed no injury.10 But here, we are faced with the jury's decision to reject uncontradicted testimony.

¶ 11. The Court of Appeals' judgment—and the plaintiff's claims in support of the motions for directed verdict, JNOV, and new trial—center on the fact that the plaintiff's expert testified that she had suffered a muscle strain as a result of the accident and that the two defense experts agreed. While the defense experts testified that Loyacono's preexisting back condition caused the extensive medical care and loss of earning capacity for which she sought damages, the Court of Appeals concluded that the jury must award some damages due to the agreed testimony on Loyacono's muscle strain.

¶ 12. In the context of automobile collision cases, we have stated repeatedly that:

A plaintiff has the burden of proof, and must offer evidence that persuades the jury. The jury is not required to believe or trust the evidence submitted by the plaintiff, and is free to accept all, part, or none of the plaintiff's evidence. A defendant is not required to prove or rebut anything.
...
[Expert opinions are] not obligatory or binding on triers of fact but [are] advisory in nature. The jury may credit them or not as they appear entitled, weighing and judging the expert's opinion in the context of all of the evidence in the case and the jury's own general knowledge of affairs.11

Further, we have stated that uncontradicted evidence ordinarily should be taken as true by the trier of fact, unless that evidence is contradicted by the circumstances of the case or inherently improbable, incredible, or unreasonable.12

¶ 13. While the jury heard testimony that the plaintiff had suffered a muscle strain as a result of the accident, the jury also heard the plaintiff's expert concede on cross-examination that he lacked any knowledge about the accident itself. The jury also had before it photographic evidence that the accident had produced such a minimal impact that it had resulted in no more property damage than scratched paint. The circumstances of the accident, coupled with the jury's discretion to accept or reject expert testimony, provided sufficient grounds for the jury to conclude that Loyacono had suffered no injury as a result of the accident.

¶ 14. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred by finding that the jury rendered a verdict against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. That said, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly reversed and remanded for a new trial on damages.

II. Whether the trial court erred by allowing references to the plaintiff's husband's income.

¶ 15. Loyacono contends that the trial court erred by permitting defense counsel to inquire into her husband's income during cross-examination over her written pretrial motion and contemporaneous objection. She suggests that this evidence lacked any relevance to the case at hand and served only to prejudice the jury against a wealthy plaintiff. Travelers argues that Loyacono opened the door for this evidence on direct examination and that the evidence is relevant to her claim for loss of earning capacity.

¶ 16. We review a trial judge's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion, and we...

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