Lozada-Manzano v. United States
| Decision Date | 19 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 15-2601 (RAM) |
| Parties | GABIEL LOZADA-MANZANO, ET AL. Plaintiffs v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Pending before the Court are plaintiffs Gabiel Lozada-Manzano and his parents Cesar Lozada and Belkis Manzano's (collectively, "Plaintiffs") Motion Requesting Summary Judgment ("MSJ") and Plaintiff's [sic] Uncontested Material Facts and of Law ("SUMF"). (Docket Nos. 126 and 127). Also pending before the Court is Defendant United States of America's ("Defendant" or "the Government") Answers to Plaintiff's Statements of Uncontested Material Facts, Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross Motion For Summary Judgment ("Cross-MSJ") which included additional uncontested facts. (Docket No. 131). Having considered the parties' submissions, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' MSJ at Docket No. 126 and GRANTS Defendant's Cross-MSJ at Docket No. 131. Judgment of dismissal with prejudice shall be entered accordingly.
On May 22, 2013, a Grand Jury indicted Plaintiff Gabiel Lozada-Manzano ("Lozada-Manzano") in Criminal Case No. 13-292 of two counts: (1) 18 U.S.C § 2191(1) and 2191(2) (); and (2) 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (). (Docket No. 3). The indictment arose from Lozada-Manzano's alleged brandishing of a firearm during the carjacking of a green 1998 Mitsubishi Montero following the home invasion of Mr. Alejandro Caloca Calbo's (Mr. Caloca") house. Id. at 1-2. Ten months later, at a hearing before United States Magistrate Judge Camille Vélez-Rivé, Lozada-Manzano's counsel stated his intention to file a motion to dismiss the indictment and a notice of alibi. (Docket No. 50). The minutes of the hearing reflect that counsel "presented conditions of bail which could be set[,]" conditions of release were set, and an Appearance Bond was subsequently filed. (Docket Nos. 51 and 52).
On March 18, 2014, Lozada-Manzano's counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss Indictment. (Docket No. 48). Defendant did not respond. On March 31, 2014, Lozada-Manzano's counsel filed a Notice of Alibi and Defendant responded on April 17, 2014. (Docket Nos. 53 and55). On May 6, 2014, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the case against Lozada-Manzano without prejudice "in the interest of justice." (Docket No. 59). On May 7, 2014, United States District Judge Daniel Dominguez granted the motion pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a) and Judgment of Dismissal was entered that same day. (Docket Nos. 60 and 61).
On October 21, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against the Government pursuant to the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and for malicious prosecution per the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. 2671, et seq. and Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, 32 L.P.R.A. §§ 5141 and 5142. (Docket. No. 1). Plaintiffs aver that "negligently supervised federal officials tried to bring about the wrongful conviction and imprisonment of plaintiff Lozada-Manzano in the Federal District Court[.]" Id. at 1. Because of this alleged wrongful conviction, Lozada-Manzano was imprisoned for ten (10) months until the Court dismissed the charges against him. Id. at 2. Plaintiffs request $7,7000,000 in damages arising from Lozada-Manzano's purported wrongful arrest, prosecution, and incarceration. Id.
On September 21, 2016, the Government filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and failure to state a cognizable claim for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Docket Nos. 15 and 16). United States District Judge Carmen Cerezo granted it in part and denied it in part. (Docket No. 38). She dismissed the constitutional claims given that United States Supreme Court precedent holds "that the FTCA does not waive the government's sovereign immunity for constitutional torts." Id. at 1. The Order also held that "all of the allegations involving a purported 'negligent investigation' by particular, but unnamed, law enforcement agents were geared to establish the constitutional torts" which were "just dismissed." Id. at 2. Thus, the only remaining claims are those for malicious prosecution under the FTCA. Id. at 3. The Order was silent as to the Article 1802 and 1803 claims. Partial Judgment dismissing the constitutional claims was entered on August 4, 2017. (Docket No. 39).
The case was transferred to the undersigned on June 20, 2019. (Docket No. 87). On July 24, 2020, Plaintiffs filed an MSJ and SMUF alleging that the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") and the United States Attorney's Office maliciously prosecuted Lozada-Manzano by fabricating evidence against him or failing to disclose exculpatory evidence. (Docket Nos. 126 and 127). Plaintiffs argue that these actions, coupled with purported misrepresentations to the Grand Jury, were done to indict and convict Lozada-Manzano. (Docket No. 126 at 2). However, officers such as Task Force Officer Lester Pérez-Difre ("T.F.O. Pérez-Difre") allegedly knew that Lozada-Manzano had been arrested an hour earlier in connection to the carjacking of a Toyota Corolla. Id. at 10, 14-15.
On September 9, 2020, Defendant replied and filed its Cross-MSJ. (Docket No. 131). It avers that most of Plaintiffs' material facts and accompanying exhibits are either inadmissible because they are hearsay, or because they are subjective characterizations of what allegedly occurred during and after the home invasion. Id. at 1-7 and 15. Defendant also claims that Lozada-Manzano's 2013 indictment was based on probable cause because it was grounded on three positive photographic identifications by three minor victims on three separate dates. Id. at 20 and 22-23. Lastly, the Cross-MSJ posits that Plaintiffs cannot prove that the Government submitted false evidence to the Grand Jury. Id. at 23. Plaintiffs replied on September 23, 2020. (Docket Nos. 134-135).
Summary judgment is proper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) if a movant shows "no genuine dispute as to any material fact" and that they are "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." A dispute is genuine when "the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the non-moving party." Alicea v. Wilkie, 2020 WL 1547064, at *2 (D.P.R. 2020) (quotation omitted). A fact is material if it "may potentially 'affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.'" Carlos Rivera Cuevas, et al. v. Municipality of Naranjito, et al., 2021 WL 359979, at *2 (D.P.R. 2021) (quoting Albite v. Polytechnic Univ. of Puerto Rico, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 3d 191, 195 (D.P.R. 2014)).
The movant bears the initial burden of proof that there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Feliciano-Munoz v. Rebarber-Ocasio, 970 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Yet, the non-movant may "defeat a summary judgment motion by demonstrating, through submissions of evidentiary quality, that a trialworthy issue persists." Robinson v. Town of Marshfield, 950 F.3d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, "a court should review the record in its entirety and refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence." Carlos Rivera Cuevas, et al., 2021 WL 359979, at *2 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). The First Circuit Court of Appeals ("First Circuit") has been clear that "[e]ven in cases where elusive concepts such as motive or intent are at issue, summary judgment may be appropriate if the nonmoving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Turner v. Wall, 2020 WL 5543935, at *1 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990)).
Local Rule 56 also governs summary judgment. See L. CV. R. 56. Per this Rule, a nonmoving party must "admit, deny or qualify the facts supporting the motion for summary judgment by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party's statement of material facts." Id. Adequately supported facts "shall be deemed admitted unless controverted in the manner prescribed by the local rule." Advanced Flexible Circuits, Inc. v. GE Sensing & Inspection Techs. GmbH, 781 F.3d 510, 520 (1st Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). The Rule also allows a non-movant to present additional facts "in a separate section." L.CV. R. 56 (c). Parties may not incorporate numerous additional facts within their opposition. See Martinez v. United States, 2020 WL 5039242, at * 2 (D.P.R. 2020) (citations omitted). Litigants ignore Rule 26 at their peril. Id.
After analyzing Plaintiffs' SUMF (Docket No. 127), Defendant's additional facts (Docket No. 131) and Plaintiffs' reply to said facts (Docket No. 135), and only crediting material facts that are properly supported by a record citation and uncontroverted, the Court makes the following findings of facts:2
Home Invasion and Carjacking of Mitsubishi Montero
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