Lozynsky v. Hutchinson, 62091
| Decision Date | 25 September 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 62091,62091 |
| Citation | 285 S.E.2d 70,159 Ga.App. 715 |
| Parties | LOZYNSKY v. HUTCHINSON. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Michael J. Gorby, Gene A. Major, Atlanta, for appellant.
Patrick F. Henry, Jr., H. Fielder Martin, Atlanta, M. Kathleen Lewis, Atlanta, for appellee.
Ms. Lozynsky appeals the grant of summary judgment to Hutchinson, whom Lozynsky had impleaded as third-party defendant in a lawsuit filed against her by Gwen Hairston. Held :
The pleadings, depositions and affidavits show conclusively that appellant Karla Lozynsky was driving her Volkswagen "bug" eastbound; she had her left turn signal on and had slowed to approximately 5 m. p. h. and had turned left several feet into the left lane when a motorcycle driven westbound by appellee Hutchinson swerved or drove around her vehicle, hit a pothole on the side of the highway and flipped or fell over, depositing Hutchinson and Miss Hairston in the ditch. Hutchinson and Hairston, after exchanging a few words with appellant, remounted the motorcycle and drove away. Beyond these facts the material facts, while not necessarily in dispute, are in issue. Ga.Code Ann. § 81A-156 (c). Appellant Lozynsky testified that when she first saw the appellee's motorcycle, after she had begun to turn and was perhaps one-third of her "bug's" car length into the left lane, she saw the appellee's motorcycle approaching some 5 or 6 Volkswagen-car lengths away; and that the appellee had room and time to pass her safely. She testified the appellee was driving approximately 25-30 m. p. h. and that the speed limit in that area was 25 m. p. h. The appellee and Miss Hairston stated the speed limit in that area was 45 m. p. h., and that the appellee was driving 40 or 45 m. p. h. Appellee stated he first saw the appellant's vehicle about 100 yards away from it; Miss Hairston saw the appellant's left turn signal from a distance, but both the appellee and Miss Hairston believed and assumed the appellant would stop and let them pass before turning left.
Questions of negligence and proximate cause are peculiarly questions for the jury except in clear, plain, palpable and undisputed cases. Inglett v. Ratliff, 150 Ga.App. 688, 258 S.E.2d 320. Only in the rare case where there is an admission of liability or an indisputable fact situation that clearly establishes liability, should summary judgment be granted. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jones, 236 Ga. 448, 224 S.E.2d 25. While there may appear to be...
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Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Folsom
...should summary judgment be granted. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jones, 236 Ga. 448 (224 S.E.2d 25) [1976]." Lozynsky v. Hutchinson, 159 Ga.App. 715, 285 S.E.2d 70 (1981). Without considering whether a jury issue exists as to the constructive-knowledge question, we find that initially ......
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Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Folsom
...should summary judgment be granted. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jones, 236 Ga. 448 (224 SE2d 25) [1976]." Lozynsky v. Hutchinson, 159 Ga.App. 715, 285 S.E.2d 70 (1981). Without considering whether a jury issue exists as to the constructive-knowledge question, we find that initially a ......
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Miller v. Rieser
...side of live testimony, is ill-suited for the resolution except in "clear, plain, and palpable cases." Cf. Lozynsky v. Hutchinson, 159 Ga.App. 715, 285 S.E.2d 70 (1981). In this case, there is a long history of character, habits, and conduct showing an unconcerned attitude towards the child......
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Coweta County v. Adams
...of proximate cause are peculiarly reserved for jury determination except in clear, plain, and undisputed cases. Lozynsky v. Hutchinson, 159 Ga.App. 715, 285 S.E.2d 70 (1981); Lockhart v. Walker, 124 Ga.App. 241, 183 S.E.2d 503 (1971). This is not such a Finally, we reject the County's concl......