Lu v. Hulme
| Decision Date | 22 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. 12-11117-MLW |
| Parties | Friedrich Lu, Plaintiff, v. George Hulme and Trustees of the Boston Public Library, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Friedrich Lu, Boston, MA, pro se.
Caroline O. Driscoll, City of Boston Law Department, Boston, MA, for Defendants.
Mark L. Wolf
, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT LEGAL STANDARD...319
IV. FACTS...320
A. The Boston Public Library Appropriate Library Use Policy...320
B. The June 13, 2012 Incident...321
A. First Amendment Right...324
B. Equal Protection Claim...331
C. Procedural Due Process Claim...332
D. Massachusetts Civil Rights Act Claim...333
I. SUMMARY
Prose plaintiff Friedrich Lu brings this civil rights action against defendants George Hulme and the Trustees of the Boston Public Library (the "Trustees") pursuant to Section 1983 of the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
, and § 11I of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. G.L. c.12, § 11I. Lu, who is a homeless person, alleges that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when he was refused entrance to the Copley branch of the Boston Public Library (the "Library") with a wire shopping cart containing his belongings (the "cart").
The defendants have moved for summary judgment on all of Lu's claims. Lu opposes that motion. Lu has also filed a motion requesting that the court institute civil contempt proceedings against defense counsel for allegedly forging evidence.
Lu has a First Amendment right to enter the Library to read and write, among other things. At the same time, the defendants have a substantial interest in preserving Library property and ensuring that all patrons can use the Library. The Library has a written policy that excludes foul-smelling articles that will impede the Library use of other patrons. The undisputed facts in the record show that Lu was not permitted to bring his cart and its contents into the Library because a security guard determined that it was producing a strong offensive odor. Lu does not contest the guard's observation that the cart emitted a strong foul odor. The decision to exclude Lu from bringing his foul smelling cart into the Library was a narrowly-tailored restriction on Lu's right of access to the Library that served the Library's substantial interests in ensuring that the general public can use the facilities without interference by the conduct of others. Accordingly, preventing Lu from bringing his cart and its contents into the Library did not violate his First Amendment rights.
Other restrictions in the Library's written policy, such as the prohibition on wheeled devices, may present constitutional issues. However, in this case, the Library had a constitutionally valid reason to prevent Lu from bringing his cart and its contents into the Library. This is not an appropriate case in which to decide the constitutionality of those other restrictions.
Summary judgment is appropriate on Lu's remaining constitutional claims. Lu has not identified any similarly situated individual who was allowed Library access. Therefore, his equal protection claim fails as a matter of law. His procedural due process claim fails as a matter of law because the defendants gave Lu notice, an opportunity to be heard, and explained the reasons for his exclusion from the Library. Under the circumstances, these informal procedures satisfied the flexible requirements of due process.
The court is also granting summary judgment on Lu's Massachusetts Civil Rights Act ("MCRA") claim. The MCRA, like Section 1983
, requires proof that the defendants violated the plaintiff's statutory or constitutional right. On the evidence in this case, a reasonable factfinder could not conclude that the defendants violated any of Lu's statutory or constitutional rights.
Finally, the court is denying Lu's Motion for a Civil Contempt Proceeding. Lu's conclusory allegation that defense counsel forged the library's appropriate use policy is unsupported by any evidence and is not credible.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
On June 22, 2012, Lu filed a Verified Complaint and a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") against the Trustees in their official capacity and Hulme in his official and individual capacities. Lu alleged that the Library violated his constitutional rights by refusing to allow him to bring his cart and its contents into the Library. The defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
and opposed the requested TRO. The defendants argued that Lu was prevented from entering the Library in accordance with its Appropriate Library Use Policy, which they contended was a constitutionally valid regulation of the Library. Lu opposed the motion to dismiss.
On March 30, 2013, the court issued a Memorandum and Order that addressed, among other things, the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion for a TRO. SeeLu v. Hulme , 12–cv–11117–MLW, 2013 WL 1331028 (D.Mass. March 30, 2013)
. The court granted the defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to Lu's claim that the Library violated his right to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and denied it with respect to Lu's remaining claims. The court found that Lu's complaint did not state a substantive due process claim because he had failed to allege facts that would permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude that the defendants' actions were so egregious as to "shock the conscience." Id. at *8 (citing Gonzalez–Droz v. Gonzales–Colon , 660 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir.2011) ).
The court found that Lu had, however, stated a plausible claim for violations of his rights under the First Amendment, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the MCRA. With respect to his First Amendment claim, the court explained that Lu had a First Amendment right to access the library. Id. at *5
. The court observed that other courts disagreed over whether the library was a "designated public forum" or a "limited public forum" for First Amendment purposes, but found that it was unnecessary to decide which standard to apply. Id. Even assuming that Lu had been excluded in accordance with the written policy, the merits of Lu's First Amendment claim would depend on the reasonableness of the Library's policy. Id. at *7. The reasonableness of the policy "must be decided[ ] on an evidentiary record, on a motion for summary judgment or at trial, rather than on a motion to dismiss." Id.
With respect to Lu's equal protection claim, the court found that Lu had plausibly alleged that he and other homeless individuals had been selectively excluded from the Library based on their status in order to inhibit the exercise of their First Amendment right to access the Library. Id.
The court observed that Lu had arguably failed to provide sufficiently specific allegations of disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals. Id. However, because he was representing himself and his complaint was required to be liberally construed, and because Lu's First Amendment claim was not being dismissed, the court concluded that the defendants would not be prejudiced by continued litigation of the corollary equal protection claim. Id.
The court next observed that the parties had not "adequately addressed the issue of whether a protected liberty interest is implicated or the proper framework for analyzing Lu's procedural due process claim." Id. at *8
. Accordingly, the court denied the motion to dismiss Lu's procedural due process claim without prejudice. Id.
The court found that Lu had stated a plausible claim for damages under the MCRA. Id.
(citing Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp. , 393 Mass. 819, 823, 473 N.E.2d 1128 (1985) ). The court denied the TRO because Lu had not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of any of his claims. Seeid. at *10.
Finally, the court concluded that this was an exceptional case that justified the appointment of counsel for Lu. Id. at *11
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) ). The court ordered Lu to report whether or not he requested counsel be appointed to represent him in this case. Id. On May 15, 2013, Lu reported that he did not want appointed counsel and would continue to represent himself.
Subsequently, discovery disputes arose between the parties that were largely attributable to Lu's lack of legal training. In a March 3, 2014 Memorandum and Order, the court noted that, despite Lu's dedication to his case, these types of disputes were likely to continue to impede the case's progress if Lu proceeded prose . Accordingly, the court again ordered Lu to report whether he consented to the court appointing him counsel to represent him in the case. Lu again declined appointed counsel.
The court held a scheduling conference on April 14, 2014. At the outset of the hearing, the court again offered, and Lu again refused to accept, a court-appointed lawyer
In the ensuing months, several additional discovery disputes arose, some of which were referred to a magistrate judge and others of which were addressed by the court. The court held a scheduling conference on February 26, 2015. The parties told the court that there had been minimal discovery, although they had conducted Lu's deposition. The court then established a schedule for the submissions of any motions for summary judgment.
On April 3, 2015, the defendants moved for summary judgment on both counts of Lu's complaint. They argued that Lu was excluded because his shopping cart was full of foul-smelling articles, in accordance with the written Library Policy. They further...
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