Lubbock Mfg. Co. v. Sames
Decision Date | 22 November 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 8159,8159 |
Citation | 575 S.W.2d 588 |
Parties | LUBBOCK MANUFACTURING CO., Appellant, v. William SAMES, III, Administrator of the Estate of Jesus Verduzco, Deceased, et al., Appellees. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Damon Ball, San Antonio, for appellant.
J. Patrick Hazel, Austin, for appellees.
This appeal involves the question of venue for an action brought against Lubbock Manufacturing Company (hereinafter called defendant), a resident of Lubbock County, Texas.
This suit was originally filed in Maverick County by William Sames, III, as Administrator of the Estate of Jesus Verduzco, deceased, and Francisca Cedillo Vidua de Verduzco, Individually, and as next friend of the minor children of Jesus Verduzco, deceased (hereinafter called plaintiffs) against this defendant, Fontaine Truck Equipment Company, Inc., Altamil Corporation, and Surtigas, S.A.
Defendant filed its plea of privilege, asserting its right to be sued in Lubbock County, the county of its residence. Plaintiffs filed their controverting plea, contending that venue was maintainable in Maverick County under the terms of Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 1995, subdivs. 4, 23, 27, 29a (Vernon 1964), and Subdivs. 9a, 31 (Vernon Supp.1978).
The trial court overruled defendant's plea of privilege. Subsequent to the hearing, but prior to the rendition of the order, this cause was transferred to Val Verde County, Texas, pursuant to Tex.R.Civ.P. 257, and such action was taken subject to and without prejudice to defendant's plea. Appellant makes no complaint to this action under Rule 257.
Jesus Verduzco, deceased, was the driver of a Surtigas, S.A., tractor-trailer which overturned in Eagle Pass, Maverick County, exploded, and killed several persons, including Jesus Verduzco. William Sames, III, was named Administrator of the Estate of Jesus Verduzco. William Sames, III, was a resident of Maverick County, and the administration of the Estate of Jesus Verduzco was pending in Maverick County. The tank-trailer which overturned and exploded was designed, manufactured, and sold by Lubbock Manufacturing Company, a private corporation, which maintained its place of residence in Lubbock County. None of the other defendants filed pleas of privilege.
The trial court did not file findings of fact and conclusions of law, and none were requested. Under these circumstances, the judgment of the trial court should be upheld if there is sufficient evidence of probative value in the record to sustain venue under any of the subdivisions pleaded. Banks v. Collins, 152 Tex. 265, 257 S.W.2d 97 (1953); Loomis v. Sharp, 519 S.W.2d 955 (Tex.Civ.App. Texarkana 1975, writ dism'd); Key v. Davis, 554 S.W.2d 60 (Tex.Civ.App. Amarillo 1977, no writ).
The cause of action asserted by plaintiff was based upon strict tort liability in that the tank-trailer was "defective in design and/or manufacture and that said defect existed at the time that said tank was introduced into the stream of commerce and said defect caused or contributed to cause the injuries and subsequent death of Jesus Verduzco, deceased. . . ."
Appellant's thirteenth and fourteenth points of error complain of the trial court's action in overruling the plea of privilege because there is no evidence, or insufficient evidence, that a cause of action arose in Maverick County.
It was stipulated by the parties that
Venue is maintainable in Maverick County under the provisions of Subdiv. 23 of art. 1995 if plaintiffs have proved a cause of action and if the cause of action, or a part thereof, arose in Maverick County.
The record reflects that the deceased was driving the truck and tank trailer along the highway near Eagle Pass, in Maverick County, when the truck took a sudden turn to the left and then a sudden turn back to the right and then overturned. The truck and tank, after the turnover, "traveled for a distance of 85 to 95 feet before the explosion and resulting fire."
One of plaintiff's expert witnesses testified that he found defects in the tank-trailer design in "basically three areas," and those three areas
Another witness testified the initial speed of the truck immediately preceding the events leading up to the overturn to be "from 67 to 70 miles an hour," and that the overturn speed to be 35 miles an hour.
Further testimony from an expert witness that "considering the reconstruction (of the accident), the center of gravity of the trailer, the radius of the curve and the speed at turnover," the radius of turn of the tractor was a reasonably foreseeable maneuver that might be engaged in by a driver or operator of a tractor of "this type and character," and that such turning maneuver "should be foreseeable by a reasonably prudent manufacturer." This witness further testified that, in considering the contents of the trailer, and the high center of gravity, the road condition available, and the environment of use of this tractor-trailer combination rendered the trailer as designed and constructed unreasonably dangerous. He also testified that the "truck-tractor semi-trailers, they have high CGs (centers of gravity), and so this makes them susceptible to turnover. . . ." With this susceptibility of turnover then the commodity being transported the liquefied petroleum gas adds to the unreasonably dangerous propensity and condition. "(S)o with this condition existing, then the to alleviate this or reduce it, the CG (center of gravity) of the trailer should be lowered in order to reduce its susceptibility to turnover."
An expert witness further testified that
There is other testimony that the center of gravity was very critical and that the The expert witness upon being asked, ". . . and the higher the center of gravity of a unit would it be axiomatic to say the greater its likelihood of overturn?" He answered,
Plaintiffs' cause of action was asserted as a strict tort liability case under the provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). The rule applies to unreasonably dangerous products whether the defect occurred in their production or their design. Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794 (Tex.1975); Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex.1974).
We have carefully reviewed all the evidence which consists of approximately seven hundred pages in the statement of facts, and we hold that such evidence is factually sufficient to support a finding by the trial court that a cause of action under the provisions of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A was proven in that the tank-trailer was defectively designed, that it was unreasonably dangerous to the user, and that the very nature of the tank-trailer was such that there had been no substantial change in the condition in which it was sold by the manufacturer. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court should not be disturbed. Banks v. Collins, supra; Loomis v. Sharp,supra; Key v. Davis, supra.
In addition to proving a cause of action, under the provisions of Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 1995, subdiv. 23, it is necessary to prove that such cause of action, or part thereof, arose in Maverick...
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