Lucas v. Prisoner Review Bd.

Decision Date24 October 2013
Docket NumberDocket No. 2–11–0698.
Citation376 Ill.Dec. 482,999 N.E.2d 365,2013 IL App (2d) 110698
PartiesShaun B. LUCAS, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. PRISONER REVIEW BOARD; Kenneth D. Tupy, Freedom of Information Officer, Prisoner Review Board; and Lisa Weitekamp, Freedom of Information Officer, The Department of Corrections, Defendants–Appellees.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Affirmed.

Shaun B. Lucas, of Bridgeview, appellant pro se.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Timothy K. McPike, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees.

OPINION

Justice McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Shaun B. Lucas, appeals from the trial court's June 22, 2011, order dismissing, with prejudice, his complaint against defendants, the Prisoner Review Board (PRB), Kenneth D. Tupy, and Lisa Weitekamp, alleging violations of the Illinois Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 5 ILCS 140/1.1 et seq. (West 2010). We affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On April 9, 1999, Lucas was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/12–14.1(a)(1) (West 1998)). He was sentenced to a term of 12 1/2 years' imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC). As part of a prerelease sex-offender evaluation, a report was generated that included an excerpt from a letter written by the fiancé of the victim. The letter was originally sent to the PRB. The PRB forwarded a copy to the DOC and it was placed in Lucas's “master file.”

¶ 4 Lucas then decided to sue the letter's author for libel. On August 18, 2010, Lucas filed under the FOIA a request that the PRB allow him to inspect [a]ny and all progress reports submitted to the [PRB] via [the DOC] Clinical Services.” Additionally, he requested that he be allowed to inspect [o]bjection letters from the victim, her fiancé, relatives and friends, and from the State.”

¶ 5 In response, Tupy, the PRB's information officer, denied the first request pursuant to sections 1610.30(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2) of title 20 of the Illinois Administrative Code (20 Ill. Adm.Code 1610.30(b)(1)(A), (b)(2) (1985)). Section 1610.30(b)(1)(A) provides that the PRB can deny evidence to inmates where the evidence is specifically found to include information that, if disclosed, would damage the therapeutic relationship between the inmate and a mental health professional. Additionally, section 1610.30(b)(2) provides that the PRB will not provide direct access to any documents submitted to it that bear the signature of a mental health professional or clinical services employee of the DOC.

¶ 6 Tupy denied the second request pursuant to section 1610.30(b)(1)(B) of title 20 of the Illinois Administrative Code (20 Ill. Adm.Code 1610.30(b)(1)(B) (1985)) and section 7 of the FOIA (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(a), (c)(vii), (e) (West 2010)). Tupy's response stated that section 7(1)(a) provides the information is specifically prohibited from disclosure by federal or state law or rules and regulations adopted under federal or state law.”

¶ 7 Additionally, on August 18, Lucas requested that the DOC provide him a copy of the victim's objection letter, which had been forwarded to the DOC from the PRB. On August 25, Weitekamp, the DOC's information officer, denied Lucas's request for the objection letter pursuant to section 3–5–1(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Corrections Code), which provides that [a]ll files shall be confidential and access shall be limited to authorized personnel of the respective Department. Personnel of other correctional, welfare or law enforcement agencies may have access to files under rules and regulations of the respective Department.” 730 ILCS 5/3–5–1(b) (West 2010). Weitekamp also relied on section 7(1)(a) of the FOIA, which exempts from inspection and copying [i]nformation specifically prohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations adopted under federal or State law.” 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) (West 2010).

¶ 8 Lucas filed a four-count complaint in the trial court, seeking: (1) a declaratory judgment that the objection letter was not exempt from production under the FOIA and was accessible to Lucas as a public record (count I); (2) a declaratory judgment that the clinical services report was not exempt from production under the FOIA and that Lucas had a right to review the document (count II); (3) injunctive relief stating that Lucas was entitled to inspect and copy all public records (count III); and (4) a writ of mandamus ordering defendants to provide the requested documents for Lucas to review, copy, or challenge (count IV). He also sought monetary damages, attorney fees, and reimbursement of costs. Regarding the letter, Lucas sought “full disclosure of this record for the purpose of initiating civil litigation against it's [ sic] author for the common law tort of libel.” Further, Lucas asserted that [t]his information is necessary to the prosecution of [his] suit for libel, both to perfect his claims and for the identification of any real parties in interest” in order to “deliver summons to the author.” In his complaint, Lucas quoted extensively from the “objection letter” sent by “John/Jane Doe.”

¶ 9 On February 7, 2011, pursuant to section 2–619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2–619.1 (West 2010)), defendants moved for dismissal under sections 2–615 and 2–619 of the Code. See 735 ILCS 5/2–615, 2–619, 2–619.1 (West 2010) (section 2–619.1 providing for combined motions seeking relief under sections 2–615 and 2–619).

¶ 10 On February 9, Lucas's motion for substitution of judge as a matter of right was granted. On June 22, arguments on defendants' motion to dismiss were heard; the motion was granted and Lucas's complaint was dismissed in its entirety with prejudice.

¶ 11 Lucas timely appealed.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 Defendants sought dismissal pursuant to section 2–615 and section 2–619 of the Code. “A section 2–615 motion attacks the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's claims, while a section 2–619 motion admits the legal sufficiency of the claims but raises defects, defenses, or other affirmative matter, appearing on the face of the complaint or established by external submissions, that defeats the action.” Aurelius v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 384 Ill.App.3d 969, 972–73, 323 Ill.Dec. 739, 894 N.E.2d 765 (2008). As explained below, we conclude that the complaint was subject to dismissal under section 2–619, based on the affirmative matter that the records requested were exempt from disclosure under the FOIA (5 ILCS 140/7 (West 2010)). Accordingly, we need not consider the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Aurelius, 384 Ill.App.3d at 978, 323 Ill.Dec. 739, 894 N.E.2d 765.

¶ 14 Section 2–619 provides in pertinent part:

(a) Defendant may, within the time for pleading, file a motion for dismissal of the action or for other appropriate relief upon any of the following grounds. If the grounds do not appear on the face of the pleading attacked the motion shall be supported by affidavit:

* * *

(9) That the claim asserted against defendant is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim.” 735 ILCS 5/2–619(a)(9) (West 2010).

A dismissal pursuant to section 2–619 is reviewed de novo. Central Laborers' Pension Fund v. Nicholas & Associates, Inc., 2011 IL App (2d) 100125, ¶ 16, 353 Ill.Dec. 747, 956 N.E.2d 609. When reviewing an order granting dismissal on this basis, we may consider all facts presented in the pleadings, affidavits, and depositions found in the record, and the pleadings and supporting documents must be interpreted in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. This court may affirm the trial court's grant of a section 2–619 motion on any proper basis found in the record. CNA International, Inc. v. Baer, 2012 IL App (1st) 112174, ¶¶ 31, 47, 367 Ill.Dec. 116, 981 N.E.2d 441.

¶ 15 Whether the records are exempt from disclosure under the FOIA (5 ILCS 140/7 (West 2010)), as defendants claim, is a matter of statutory construction, and our review proceeds de novo. Stern v. Wheaton–Warrenville Community Unit School District 200, 233 Ill.2d 396, 404, 331 Ill.Dec. 12, 910 N.E.2d 85 (2009). Where, as here, the requesting party challenges the public body's denial of a FOIA request, the public body must demonstrate that the records requested fall within the claimed exemption. Id. at 406, 331 Ill.Dec. 12, 910 N.E.2d 85; see 5 ILCS 140/11(f) (West 2010) (“Any public body that asserts that a record is exempt from disclosure has the burden of proving that it is exempt by clear and convincing evidence.”).

¶ 16 Lucas's arguments conflate the two separate documents requested (clinical services report and objection letter), even though different considerations apply to each. We will differentiate between the two for the purposes of our analysis.

¶ 17 A. Clinical Services Report

¶ 18 Under section 3(a) of the FOIA, the PRB is obligated to disclose the report to Lucas, “except as otherwise provided in Section 7 of this Act.” 5 ILCS 140/3(a) (West 2010). Section 7(1)(a) provides an exemption for [i]nformation specifically prohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations implementing federal or State law.” 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) (West 2010).

¶ 19 In turn, section 1610.30(b)(1)(A) of title 20 of the Illinois Administrative Code prohibits disclosure of the report if it includes the signature of a mental health or clinical services employee of the DOC.

¶ 20 Further, section 1610.30(b)(2) provides:

“An inmate who wishes to review a document submitted to the Board which bears the signature of a mental health or clinical services employee of the Department of Corrections must request that review through the Department of Corrections pursuant to Department Regulations (20 Ill. Adm.Code 107). The Board will not provide direct access to any documents in this category.”...

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