Lucas v. Riordan

• Decision Date: 03 April 2001
• Docket Number: (AC 20137)
• Citation: 771 A.2d 270,62 Conn. App. 566
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: MONA LUCAS v. ROBERT RIORDAN ET AL.

62 Conn. App. 566

771 A.2d 270

MONA LUCAS v. ROBERT RIORDAN ET AL.

(AC 20137)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 18, 2001.

Officially released April 3, 2001.

Lavery, C. J., and Mihalakos and Shea, Js. Norman A. Pattis, with whom, on the brief, was John R. Williams, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Robert E. Young, with whom, on the brief, were James N. Tallberg and Barbara A. Frederick, for the appellees (defendants).

Opinion

LAVERY, C. J.

The plaintiff, Mona Lucas, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion of the defendants, Robert Riordan and Steve Wydra, to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the case because of her failure to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing the action. We agree with the plaintiff and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

According to the allegations of the plaintiffs complaint, which for purposes of this appeal we assume to be true,¹ the plaintiff was, at the time of the events giving rise to this action, a police officer in the Milford police department (department). Throughout her tenure as an officer, the plaintiff has enjoyed a reputation as an honest and honorable police officer. On November 24, 1998, the defendants² alleged to the chief of the department that the plaintiff was a thief. As a result of this allegation, the department conducted an intensive investigation, eventually concluding on January 22, 1999, that the plaintiff had not engaged in any wrongdoing.

The plaintiff thereafter brought this action against the defendants on May 4, 1999, alleging slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress. On June 24, 1999, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs entire complaint on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, alleging that because the plaintiff had failed to file a grievance under her collective bargaining agreement or to seek arbitration of the dispute, she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, thus depriving the court of jurisdiction over her complaint. On September 2, 1999, the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that because the plaintiff had failed to pursue the administrative remedy provided by the grievance process before resorting to the courts, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint. This appeal followed.

"The standard of review of a motion to dismiss is ... well established. In ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.... A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.... Because the exhaustion [of administrative remedies] doctrine implicates subject matter jurisdiction, [the court] must decide as a threshold matter whether that doctrine requires dismissal of the [plaintiffs] claim.... We first note that, because [a] determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hyllen-Davey v. Plan & Zoning Commission, 57 Conn. App. 589, 592, 749 A.2d 682, cert. denied, 253 Conn. 926, 754 A.2d 796 (2000).

The defendants argue before this court that the trial court properly found that the plaintiff had not exhausted her administrative remedies because the collective bargaining agreement under which the plaintiff is employed by the department includes a procedure for resolving grievances. That procedure, contained in article XII of the collective bargaining agreement, includes, in § 1 (a), a definition of a grievance.³ We consider this definition as a statement by the parties of the issues that the grievance process covers. Thus, by implication, all other issues are not covered.

The plaintiff, in her memorandum in opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss, unequivocally set forth the parameters of her complaint. She claimed that "[s]he [did] not sue her employer; she [did] not sue any supervisor. Indeed, the plaintiff was treated with complete fairness by her supervisors throughout the entire course of this...