Lucien v. Williams
| Decision Date | 27 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | 20-CV-8020 (KMK) |
| Parties | LEONIDAS LUCIEN, Plaintiff, v. EMILY WILLIAMS, ACTING SUPERINTENDENT, FISHKILL CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Leonidas Lucien Elmont, NY Pro Se Plaintiff
Bahiya Lawrence, Esq. New York State Office of the Attorney General New York, NY Counsel for Defendants
Pro se Plaintiff Leonidas Lucien (“Plaintiff”) brings this Complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Fishkill Correctional Facility Acting Superintendent Emily Williams (“Williams”), and Offender Rehabilitation Coordinator Beverly Lockwood (“Lockwood”) (collectively “Defendants”). (Compl. (Dkt. No. 1); First Am Pet. (“FAP”) 1 (Dkt. No. 12).)[1] Before the Court is Defendants' Motion To Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Motion”). (See Not. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 29).) For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is granted.
As a threshold matter, the Court must determine the proper treatment of exhibits attached to the Declarations of Shawn Oliver (“Oliver Declaration”) and Bahiya Lawrence (“Lawrence Declaration”). (See Decl. of Shawn Oliver (“Oliver Decl.”) (Dkt. No. 23-2); Decl. of Bahiya Lawrence, Esq. (“Lawrence Decl.”) (Dkt. No. 23-4).) Generally, “[w]hen considering a motion to dismiss, the Court's review is confined to the pleadings themselves,” because “[t]o go beyond the allegations in the [c]omplaint would convert the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment pursuant to [Rule] 56.” Thomas v. Westchester Cnty. Health Care Corp., 232 F.Supp.2d 273, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citation omitted). However, “the Court's consideration of documents attached to, or incorporated by reference in the [c]omplaint, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken, would not convert the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Bellin v. Zucker, 6 F.4th 463, 473 (2d Cir. 2021) (); Hu v. City of N.Y., 927 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2019) .
“Moreover, ‘where a document is not incorporated by reference, the court may nevertheless consider it where the complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect, thereby rendering the document integral to the complaint.'” Alvarez v. County of Orange, 95 F.Supp.3d 385, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (alteration omitted) (quoting DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010)). As the Second Circuit has reiterated, “a plaintiff's reliance on the terms and effect of a document in drafting the complaint is a necessary prerequisite to the court's consideration of the document on a dismissal motion; mere notice or possession is not enough.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002) (emphasis omitted).
The Court finds that Plaintiff's Certificates of Release to Post-Release Supervision (“PRS Certificate”) and to Parole Supervision (“Parole Certificate”), attached as Exhibit A to the Oliver Declaration (See Oliver Decl. Ex. A (“PRS & Parole Certificates”) (Dkt. No. 23-3)), are integral to Plaintiff's Complaint because Plaintiff is clearly aware of their terms and effect and, in fact, argues in his Complaint that he remains imprisoned beyond the completion of his court-imposed sentence, (see Compl. ¶ 15). See Garcia v. Falk, No. 09-CV-2045, 2011 WL 12688998, at *3 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2011), report and recommendation adopted as modified sub nom. Garcia v. Alk, No. 09-CV-2045, 2015 WL 1469294 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2015) (); cf. Thompson v. Racette, No. 11-CV-1372, 2012 WL 12884469, at *1 n.4 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2012), aff'd, 519 Fed.Appx. 32 (2d Cir. 2013) (considering plaintiff's DOCCS medical records, although “not attached to the [c]omplaint,” because they were integral to plaintiff's claim that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs).
The remaining exhibits attached to Oliver Declaration-(1) Plaintiff's New York Sex Offender Registration Form, (see Oliver Decl. Ex. B (Dkt. 23-3)), (2) Plaintiff's Parolee Chrono Report, (see id. Ex. C (Dkt. 23-3), and (3) the Residential Address Inquiry results, (see id. Ex. D (Dkt. No. 23-3))-are not integral to Plaintiff's Complaint because he has not relied on either document's terms or effect in framing his Complaint. Berkley v. City of New Rochelle, No. 21-CV-578, 2022 WL 784018, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2022) ( documents not integral to complaint because plaintiff had not relied on them in her complaint).
Finally, although not integral to the Complaint, the Court may take judicial notice of the decision of the New York Appellate Division, Second Department in Plaintiff's state habeas corpus claim challenging his continued confinement. See also Kamdem-Ouaffo v. Pepsico, Inc., 160 F.Supp.3d 553, 562 n.11 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 657 Fed.Appx. 949 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ().
On August 5, 2015, Plaintiff was sentenced to four years in prison and five years of supervised release after being convicted of committing Rape in the Second Degree. As part of his sentence, Plaintiff was also designated as a Level 1 Sex Offender under the New York State Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”), N.Y. Correct. Law § 168. (Compl. ¶ 14.)[2] On February 9, 2019, Plaintiff was released from Woodbourne Correctional Facility (“Woodbourne”) to begin his supervised release at Fishkill Residential Treatment Facility (the “RTF”). While residing at the RTF, Plaintiff was denied access to social media. (Compl. ¶¶ 15, 20-21.) Plaintiff also asserts that “[D]efendants . . . practice[d] passive assistance [and] work[ed] at a snail[']s pace” in assisting him with finding housing. (Compl. ¶ 28.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have an “unwritten policy” or “travel ban restriction” that prisoners should be released to “their county of conviction or former residence,” (FAP ¶ 6), and that this unwritten policy prevented him from being released to a SARA-compliant address in Albany, New York that housed other sex offenders, (id. ¶ 7). Plaintiff was released from the RTF on March 1, 2022 to an apartment in Elmont, New York.
Although Plaintiff does not provide this information in his Complaint, prior to his release, Plaintiff signed a Parole Certificate which included several provisions related to his status as a sex offender required by the Sexual Assault Reform Act (“SARA”), Executive Law § 259-c(14). (PRS & Parole Certificates 3-5.) Specifically, Plaintiff was required to propose housing that was not within one thousand feet of a school. (Id at 5.) Plaintiff also agreed to a “Sex Offender Housing Condition” that required him to “propose a residence” that complied with requirements of SARA “to be investigated by [DOCCS] and [to] assist [DOCCS] in any efforts it may make on [his] behalf to develop a residence.” (Id.) Further, Plaintiff agreed that he would “be transferred to and participate in the programs of a residential treatment facility . . . until such time as a residence [had] been approved and such address [had] been verified” to comply with SARA. (Id.)
In his Complaint, Plaintiff requests “a preliminary injunction directing [D]efendants to refrain from retaliatory acts [for] pursuing this cause of action[,]” “a permanent injunction directing [D]efendants to provide Plaintiff documentary proof asserted in this action and . . . that reasonably will lead to discoverable admissible evidence in preparation for trial by jury,” and $1,000,000 in compensatory damages. (Compl. at 12.)[3]Plaintiff has also requested “a preliminary injunction . . . absolving [McGrath] and [Royce's] travel-ban restriction[] and delivery of Plaintiff to Mr. Doug ClarK [sic]. . .” (FAP ¶ 7.)
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on September 25, 2020. (See Compl.) On September 29, 2020, then Chief Judge Colleen McMahon (“Judge McMahon”) directed Plaintiff to pay his filing fees or file for in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status. (See Order Directing Payment of Fees or IFP Appl. and Prisoner Authorization (Dkt No. 2).) On October 15, 2020, Plaintiff filed his IFP Application and Prisoner Authorization forms. (Dkt. Nos. 3, 4.) On January 27, 2021, Judge McMahon authorized Plaintiff to proceed IFP. (See Order Granting IFP Appl. (Dkt. No. 6).) On June 17, 2021, the Court issued an Order of Service directing that the U.S. Marshals serve Defendants Williams and Lockwood, (see Order of Service (Dkt. No. 9)), and Defendants were served on December 7, 2021, (Dkt. Nos. 15, 16). On July 8, 2021, Defendant filed his First Amended Petition (the “FAP”). (See FAP.)[4...
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