Lucier v. Town of Norfolk

• Decision Date: 17 November 1923
• Citation: 122 A. 711,99 Conn. 686
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: LUCIER v. TOWN OF NORFOLK.

122 A. 711

99 Conn. 686

LUCIER v. TOWN OF NORFOLK.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

November 17, 1923

Appeal from Superior Court, Litchfield County; Isaac Wolfe, Judge.

Action by E. A. Lucier against Town of Norfolk, to recover damages of $10,000 for breach of contract of employment. Judgment for plaintiff for $35 damages, from which he appeals. No error.

Plaintiff is not entitled to assume, from a statement of the chairman of the transportation committee, that the school committee had awarded him the contract for transporting school children, that the committee had accepted his bid, as the chairman's language does not mean that, and even if it did plaintiff must inform himself of the exact terms of the vote, as the chairman acted as messenger and not as agent of the committee.

The trial court found that the plaintiff in 1920 conducted at Norfolk a garage and auto livery business, in the years beginning September, 1915, 1916, 1918, and 1919, and had transported school children from certain parts of that town to the Gilbert High School at Winsted and the Center School in Norfolk by means of automobiles and an auto bus, by virtue of a contract with the town school committee of said town. In 1919, he found it necessary to procure an auto bus of special length for use in this employment, and consulted the school committee with regard to its purchase and adaptation to the service required.

In response to a request for bids for thus transporting children for the school year of 1919-20, beginning in September, 1919 the plaintiff submitted a bid which was accepted before the beginning of the school year, and the plaintiff proceeded to render the services required. A written contract conforming to the previous oral agreement was executed between the plaintiff and defendant on October 6, 1919, and is Exhibit 1 in the case. This contract covered three distinct routes, the West Norfolk route, the Five-Mile River route, and the route from the village of Norfolk to Winsted. The rate fixed was $18 per day for transportation to Winsted, and $5 per day for the other two routes. By reason of the recent large expenditure for equipment, at the instance of the plaintiff a supplementary agreement in writing was appended to the contract, reading as follows:

" It is further agreed by and between the parties to the contract dated the 6th day of October, 1919, to which this is attached and of which this forms a part, Edward A. Lucier party of the first part, and the town school committee, party of the second part, that at the expiration of the school year of 1919 and 1920, this contract may be renewed if satisfactory to both parties, upon such terms and conditions as may at that time be agreed upon.

E. A. Lucier.

Norfolk Town School Committee,

By Henry C. Gidman, Chairman.

Mary O'Connell.

George Green."

During the school year 1919-20 the plaintiff performed the contract above mentioned.

The rule and custom of the school board provides for the appointment of a subcommittee, known as the transportation committee. In July, 1920, one Fisk Stevens was the duly appointed chairman of the committee last named, and was acting as such.

In July, 1920, the school committee, in writing, requested the plaintiff, among others, to submit bids for the transportation of school children, for certain described routes, for the coming school year, specifying that all bids submitted should provide liability insurance covering all routes, requesting a price per day and reserving the right to reject any and all bids, and further directing that all bids should be submitted to Fisk Stevens, as chairman of the transportation committee, on or before July 15, 1920. A bid of plaintiff was duly submitted to the school board, but as the school board decided not to open the South Norfolk school, the bid was not accepted by the board. Subsequently at the meeting at which it was voted to take no action on plaintiff's bid, because it was voted not to open the South Norfolk school, Fisk Stevens, as chairman of the transportation committee, requested plaintiff to submit a new bid, omitting transportation for the South Norfolk school and on August 12, 1920, plaintiff, in response to such request, submitted a bid, in writing, for such transportation, with the South Norfolk school omitted, for the compensation of $175 per week for each school week for the school year ending July, 1921. The bid of plaintiff was on August 17, 1920, presented by Fisk Stevens to the school board for action. The bid of plaintiff was the only bid received by the school board.

On August 17, the board, after an examination of bid of plaintiff duly passed the following vote:

" Voted to award the contract for transporting children to and from Gilbert School and to and from various points in town to Mr. E. A. Lucier for the sum of $35 per day."

On August 18, or thereabouts, Fisk Stevens went to plaintiff's place of business and informed him that the school board had voted to award him the contract for the transportation of the children for the ensuing school year and requested him to have his auto truck and touring cars in proper condition for such purpose, to have suitable drivers, and to secure the necessary liability insurance. Immediately thereafter plaintiff started to place his auto truck and touring cars in proper condition for such transportation, and also secured liability insurance, in the performance of which preparations plaintiff was required to make certain expenditures. On September 6 Fisk Stevens inquired of plaintiff if everything would be in readiness for the transportation of the children the following day, namely, September 7, the opening of the school year, and plaintiff replied that everything was in readiness, and on September 7 plaintiff sent his cars over the various designated routes and transported all children to school who required to be transported.

On the evening of September 7, at a formal meeting of the school board, it was duly voted that--

" Mr. Stevens be instructed to execute a contract with Mr. E. A. Lucier in regard to the transportation of the children."

On September 7, immediately following the passage of the vote by the school board, plaintiff was requested to come to the meeting place of the board, and upon his arrival he was informed of the passage of such vote by the board and a contract which had already been prepared which embodied the vote of the board of August 17, was presented to him for execution. Upon examining the instrument, plaintiff refused to sign the same, upon the ground that it was not in accordance with his bid for compensation at the rate of $175 per week, but provided for compensation at the rate of $35 a day, and he thereupon notified the school board that his cars would not go out to transport the children on the following day. Early in the morning of September 8 Fisk Stevens called at the place of business of plaintiff and asked him if he still persisted in his refusal to sign the contract and to transport the children, and plaintiff informed him that he would not execute the contract and that his cars would not start. Thereupon Fisk Stevens notified plaintiff that he need do nothing more about the transportation of children and that he would provide other transportation for them, and he thereupon did make other temporary arrangements for their carriage, and subsequently thereto said school board duly entered into a written contract with a third person for the transportation of the children for the school year.

Plaintiff did in fact send his cars over the prescribed routes to gather in and transport such children as presented themselves, and he did in fact, on that day, carry a portion of them to school. Plaintiff for a week or two thereafter continued to send his cars over said routes, but after the first day he carried very few children, and finally no children presented themselves for transportation, and plaintiff withdrew his cars from further service.

The act of plaintiff in thus sending his cars out and offering to transport the children on September 8 and thereafter was not intended by him and was not in fact an acceptance of the vote of the school board of August 17, nor of the contract presented to him by the board for execution, but was done solely upon his claim that the vote of the school board of August 17 and the statements of Fisk Stevens constituted an acceptance of plaintiff's bid and became a binding contract between plaintiff and defendant upon the terms contained in plaintiff's bid, and that in thus sending out his cars he was acting in fulfillment of such claimed contract on his part. At no time did plaintiff indicate an intention or purpose to accept the vote of the school board of August 17, awarding him the contract for the transportation of the children for such school year, or indicate that he would enter into a contract with the school board upon the basis of such vote. At no time was the subject of a renewal of the contract of October 6, 1919 (plaintiff's Exhibit 1), discussed by the parties, nor were there any negotiations between them at any time with reference to such renewal. On September 9, 1920, the school board voted to pay plaintiff $35 for the transportation of the children on September 7, 1920, and drew its order on the treasurer of the town for that sum, and tendered it to the plaintiff, but plaintiff refused to receive and accept the same.

The trial court reached conclusions as follows: (a) That no express agreement was entered into by the parties concerning the transportation of the school children for the school year 1920-21; (b) that the acts and conduct of the parties concerning such subject-matter were not of such a character as to create or raise an implied contract...