Waterbury Teachers Ass'n v. Furlong
| Citation | 294 A.2d 546,162 Conn. 390 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
| Decision Date | 08 February 1972 |
| Parties | , 69 Lab.Cas. P 52,916 WATERBURY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION v. Arnold FURLONG et al. WATERBURY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF WATERBURY. WATERBURY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al. v. WATERBURY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION. |
Kevin T. Nixon, Naugatuck, with whom, on the brief, were Donald A. House and Michael C. Hagstrom, Naugatuck, for the appellant (plaintiff) in the first and second cases and for the appellant (defendant) in the third case.
John F. Phelan, Asst. Corp. Counsel, for the appellees (defendants) in the first and second cases and for the appellees (plaintiffs) in the third case.
Before HOUSE, C.J., and COTTER, THIM, SHAPIRO and LOISELLE, JJ.
Although the parties in this trilogy of cases have not combined them for a single appeal pursuant to the elective provisions of § 606 of the Practice Book, they were argued before us as companion cases. Since a decision on the appeal in each case is largely dependent on the resolution of a common basic issue, it is appropriate for us to discuss the merits of all three appeals in one opinion with appropriate separate discussion of the secondary legal issues peculiar to each fact pattern. They are the most recent of a long line of cases which deal with some aspect of the continuing problem of the respective powers of a board of education vis-a-vis the municipal board of finance. In this instance, the disputes arose in Waterbury and the problems concern not only the provisions of the Waterbury charter which provide for powers vested in the board of finance to approve the salaries of teachers as fixed by the board of education but also the effect of the provisions of Public Act No. 298, adopted by the special session of February, 1965, of the General Assembly. This act was entitled 'An Act Concerning the Right of Teachers' Representatives to Negotiate with Boards of Education.' At the start, it is important to bear in mind that in these cases we are concerned only with Public Act No. 298 and not the provisions of Public Act No. 811, adopted in 1969 and entitled 'An Act Concerning the Right of Certified Professional Employees to Negotiate with Boards of Education.' The latter public act is now found in §§ 10-153a-10-153h of the General Statutes and is substantially different from its predecessor Public Act No. 298. Unlike the 1965 act, with which the present cases are concerned, the 1969 act contains a provision (now § 10-153d) that any written contract concerning salaries and other conditions of employment negotiated between a board of education and a teachers' bargaining agent shall be filed with the town clerk and '(t)he terms of such contract shall be binding on the legislative body of the town . . . unless such body rejects such contract at a regular or special meeting called for such purpose within thirty days of the signing of the contract.' It further provides that '(t)he body charged with making annual appropriations in any school district shall appropriate to the board of education whatever funds are required to implement the terms of any contract not rejected pursuant to this section.' Section 10-153g now contains a specific provision that '(n)otwithstanding the provisions of any special act, municipal charter or local ordinance, the provisions of sections 10-153a to 10-153f shall apply to negotiations concerning salaries and conditions of employment conducted by boards of education and certified personnel.' The enactment of the 1969 statute has materially changed the law of the state as it would now apply to the issues raised in the present appeals, but, since the 1969 action of the General Assembly had no retroactive effect, the merits of these appeals must be determined by the law as it existed at the time the disputes herein discussed arose.
At the heart of these disputes between the parties are four legislative enactments. They are §§ 10-220 and 10-222 of the General Statutes, § 903(a) of the charter of the city of Waterbury (Spec. Acts 1931, No. 499, § 269), and Public Act No. 298 of 1965. In 1965, as well as at the present time, § 10-220 of the General Statutes provided, in part, that '(b)oards of education shall maintain in their several towns good public elementary and secondary schools and such other educational activities as in their judgment will best serve the interests of the town.' Section 10-222, as now, provided, in part, that each board of education should prepare an itemized estimate of the cost of maintenance of public schools for the ensuing year and submit that estimate to the local board of finance or other authority making appropriations in the municipality. It then provided that In 1965, there was also in existence a provision of the charter of the city of Waterbury, § 903(a), which provided:
To the problem of divided responsibilities in the fixing of teachers' salaries under these general statutes and the special act provision, the legislature in 1965 added the provisions of Public Act No. 298 § 3, which granted to teachers' representatives the right to negotiate with boards of education 'with repect to salaries and other conditions of employment' leading to 'the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party.'
The present controversies have arisen over the proper interpretation of these legislative enactments as they affected the respective powers of the board of education, the board of finance and the board of aldermen of Waterbury in connection with the compensation to be paid to teachers employed by that city. Before discussing the details of each of the separate appeals, some general observations are pertinent.
The Waterbury Teachers Association, hereinafter referred to as the association, asserts that its employment contracts with the board of education of the city of Waterbury, hereinafter referred to as the board, were valid and binding on the city of Waterbury, hereinafter referred to as the city, notwithstanding the restrictions imposed by the city's charter. It predicates the claim on three grounds.
In the first instance, the association contends that the board is not subject to municipal control except as limitations are found in statutory provisions and that no valid limitation of the powers of the board exists in any statutory provisions. It asserts that education is a function of the state and the board in operating and staffing the schools is serving as an arm of the state and in those functions is beyond the control of municipal authority. In its view, the numerous legislative enactments in the past as interpreted by this court have given broad discretion and authority to boards of education in the management of local school systems and, in the present cases, the contracts between the board and the association were binding on the board and the city without further approval or action by the board of finance.
With this contention, we cannot agree. This court on numerous instances in the past has held that the duty of providing education rests with the state and that local boards of education have been delegated this authority. See Board of Education v. Ellington, 151 Conn. 1, 193 A.2d 466; Fowler v. Enfield, 138 Conn. 521, 86 A.2d 662; State ex rel. Board of Education v. D'Aulisa, 133 Conn. 414, 52 A.2d 636; Board of Education of Stamford v. Board of Finance, 127 Conn. 345, 16 A.2d 601; Groton & Stonington Traction Co. v. Groton, 115 Conn. 151, 160 A. 902: Lucier v. Norfolk, 99 Conn. 686, 122 A. 711; State ex rel. Huntington v. School Committee, 82 Conn. 563, 74 A. 882; State ex rel. Walsh v. Hine, 59 Conn. 50, 21 A. 1024. The association interprets some of the broad language in these many decisions to hold that a board of education is virtually an autonomous organ beyond the control of the local municipality.
The general extent of local control was discussed in the recent case of Board of Education v. Ellington, supra. As we there noted (151 Conn. p. 6, 193 A.2d p. 469), quoting from Fowler v. Enfield, supra: But to this quotation was added the following statement which has particular significance in our consideration of the present cases: 'In the absence of special charter provisions, the power of any municipality to control the budget of its board of education is derived from General Statutes § 10-222.'
Following the above observations, the court, in the Ellington case, supra, noted (151 Conn. p. 8, 193 A.2d pp. 469, 470) that the board of finance 'has a broad but not unlimited power to determine the amount that the municipality will appropriate, among other things, for educational...
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