Luck v. Rovenstine

• Decision Date: 16 February 1999
• Docket Number: No. 97-3051,97-3051
• Citation: 168 F.3d 323
• Parties: William E. LUCK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. C. Alan ROVENSTINE, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 323

168 F.3d 323

William E. LUCK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. C. Alan ROVENSTINE, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 97-3051.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Feb. 9, 1998.

Decided Feb. 16, 1999.

Christopher C. Myers (argued), Myers & Geisleman, Fort Wayne, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Robert T. Keen, Jr. (argued), Diana C. Bauer, Miller, Carson, Boxberger & Murphy, Fort Wayne, IN, Jeffrey A. Modisett, Office of the Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before FLAUM, DIANE P. WOOD, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge.

When a law enforcement officer makes a warrantless arrest, the Fourth Amendment entitles the arrestee to a prompt probable cause hearing before a judge or magistrate. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-14, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). According to the Supreme Court, "prompt" in this context means, under most circumstances, within 48 hours. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991). In this case, Billy Luck was jailed for more than a week, with no Gerstein hearing, after an Indiana state trooper arrested him without a warrant and turned him over to the custody of the Kosciusko County, Indiana, Sheriff, Al Rovenstine. Luck sued both the arresting officer and the sheriff, but only his claim against the sheriff in his personal and official capacities remains. The district court granted summary judgment in the sheriff's favor on both claims. We agree that Luck failed to raise a genuine issue of fact about the sheriff's individual liability to him, but we find that Luck established enough to survive an adverse summary judgment on his official capacity claim, and we therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings on that count alone.

I

The account of the facts that follows is, naturally, presented in the light most favorable to Luck, the non-moving party. See, e.g., Reid v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 157 F.3d 1106, 1110 (7th Cir.1998). On December 22, 1993, 18-year-old Billy Luck voluntarily admitted to Indiana State Trooper Thomas Littlefield that he had been involved in some recent thefts. Trooper Littlefield read Luck his rights, told him he was under arrest, handcuffed him, and transported him to the Kosciusko County Jail, where he relinquished custody of Luck to the sheriff's authority. Trooper Littlefield informed the booking officer that he was charging Luck with felony theft. Jail staff processed Luck and placed him in a holding cell, where he remained for four days. After that, Luck was moved to a cellblock in the general population.

On December 28, Luck asked when he would be going to court. Jail personnel said they would check, but they did not provide him with an answer at that time. Instead, the next day, the Kosciusko County Jail Commander informed Sheriff Rovenstine that Luck had been detained for eight days on the basis of a warrantless arrest without being brought before a judge or magistrate for a probable cause hearing. Sheriff Rovenstine immediately contacted the Kosciusko County Prosecutor's Office, which directed Sheriff Rovenstine to release Luck. Luck was released the same day. Ultimately, Luck pleaded guilty to the theft charge and received a sentence of one year's probation.

Luck later brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Trooper Littlefield and Sheriff Rovenstine in their official and individual capacities, alleging, among other things, an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty without due process of law. He complained that he should have been brought before a judge or magistrate for a probable cause hearing during his detention. Trooper Littlefield settled with Luck, leaving Sheriff Rovenstine as the sole defendant.

At his deposition, Sheriff Rovenstine testified that, although he had been unaware of Luck's specific situation, such a situation was not necessarily unusual for a detainee who had been brought in by an agency other than the Kosciusko County Sheriff's Department, such as the Indiana State Troopers. The Kosciusko County Jail serves as a holding facility for several different law enforcement agencies, and Sheriff Rovenstine followed a policy of tracking detainees differently depending on whether or not an outside agency brings them in. Pursuant to that policy, when one of his own officers arrests a suspect, the sheriff is fully informed about the detainee's status, and on his own initiative he releases the suspect if she is not called for a hearing within the proper time frame. In contrast, if an outside agency incarcerates a suspect in his jail, the sheriff's staff does not monitor the hearing schedule for the suspect. In the latter case, they release a detainee only when directed to do so by a judge or prosecutor. To explain this difference in approach to monitoring and releasing detainees, Sheriff Rovenstine indicated that he did not wish to meddle in the affairs of other agencies and was trying to avoid a "turf war."

II

We first address Luck's claim that Sheriff Rovenstine may be liable in his official capacity for the violation of Luck's constitutional rights. This is, in essence, a claim against the office of sheriff rather than a claim against Sheriff Rovenstine himself, and we therefore understand the claim to be directed against the county. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991); Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 577 (7th Cir.1998).

Municipal liability under § 1983 does not automatically spring from the acts of municipal employees. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). Instead, municipalities are liable only for wrongs that they themselves cause. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 818, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985), discussing Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Such wrongs may, for example, arise from "official policy," that is to say, "acts which the municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered." Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 479-80, 106 S.Ct. 1292. It is also well established that legislative action is not needed to create official policy; the act of an ultimate municipal decision-maker suffices. Id. at 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292. See also Radic v. Chicago Transit Auth., 73 F.3d 159, 161 (7th Cir.1996). Thus, Luck's official capacity claim against Sheriff Rovenstine can survive summary judgment if Luck can show (1) that Sheriff Rovenstine was an official with authority to establish municipal policy, and (2) that there is a genuine issue of material fact whether Sheriff Rovenstine's actions caused the violation of Luck's right to be free from unconstitutional detention.

The district court concluded that Sheriff Rovenstine was not a municipal decision-maker and that the county could be liable only if it expressly ratified Sheriff Rovenstine's decisions. The court was in error in this regard, as the sheriff concedes. Indiana Code § 36-2-13-5(a) provides without further qualification that it is the sheriff's duty to take care of the jail and its prisoners. Thus, the sheriff's actions are not subject to any further scrutiny or ratification by the county, and the sheriff serves as the county's official decision-maker in matters involving the county jail. See also Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 577 (addressing an official capacity claim against an Indiana sheriff).

Although he acknowledges his status as a county decision-maker and the jail's caretaker, Sheriff Rovenstine contends that he has no duty to ensure that detainees arrested without a warrant receive a probable cause hearing or gain release. Sheriff Rovenstine believes that someone else, perhaps the arresting officer or the prosecutor, is responsible for the period of confinement between a warrantless arrest and a judicial determination of probable cause.

We find unconvincing the sheriff's attempt to shrug off his federal constitutional responsibilities toward detainees confined in the Kosciusko County Jail who have not yet had a probable cause hearing. In the somewhat different context of a claim for a substantive due process violation after probable cause has been established in an appropriate way, this court held in Armstrong that the sheriff's office could not abdicate its own responsibility for the fate of pretrial detainees. See 152...