Lucy v. Jarmon v. Ford Motor Co. and Administrator, Bureau of Workers' Compensation
| Decision Date | 30 April 1996 |
| Docket Number | 95APE10-1377,96-LW-2708 |
| Parties | Lucy V. Jarmon, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ford Motor Company and Administrator, Bureau of Workers' Compensation, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Philip J. Fulton & Associates, and Corrine S. Carman, for plaintiff.
Bugbee & Conkle, Gregory B. Denny and David M. McCarty, for defendant Ford Motor Company.
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and William McDonald, for defendant Administrator, Bureau of Workers' Compensation.
Plaintiff-appellant, Lucy V. Jarmon, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, dismissing her appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
During the course of her employment with defendant-appellee, Ford Motor Company ("Ford"), plaintiff allegedly contracted bronchial asthma, the condition underlying her current workers' compensation claim. On June 24, 1994, an Industrial Commission ("commission") district hearing officer allowed plaintiff's claim for bronchial asthma, but on September 13, 1994, a staff hearing officer vacated that order and disallowed plaintiff's claim. On October 27, 1994, the commission entered an order refusing to hear plaintiff's appeal, and on November 3, 1994, the commission sent the parties notice of its refusal.
On December 21, 1994, plaintiff submitted a handwritten letter to the Franklin County Clerk of the Common Pleas Court requesting a jury trial appeal of the commission's determination. Plaintiff enclosed a $70 filing fee and some exhibits. The deputy clerk stamped plaintiff's letter with the clerk of court's time stamp, crossed out the word "filed" within the time stamp and wrote instead the word "received"; plaintiff's letter thus indicated the clerk of court "received" it on December 21, 1994. (Plaintiff's Exhibit E.) On December 22, 1994, a deputy clerk of court returned by regular mail the letter, money order and exhibits. With plaintiff's returned letter, the deputy clerk enclosed a reply explaining plaintiff's letter could not be accepted as a civil complaint because it did not meet "the requirements as provided by the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure," and further stating the clerk's office would not "process" the letter until plaintiff complied with the civil rules. (Id.)
After receiving her returned letter with the deputy clerk's response, plaintiff, on February 3, 1995, tendered a notice of appeal with the common pleas court clerk, which was accepted and filed. On August 7, 1995, Ford filed a motion for summary judgment. Although the common pleas court denied Ford's motion, it entered a sua sponte order dismissing plaintiff's case for lack of jurisdiction.
Plaintiff timely appealed to this court, assigning the following errors:
R.C. 4123.512, providing claimants and employers may appeal certain commission orders to the common pleas court, requires the appealing party to "file" a notice of appeal within sixty days of receiving the order. R.C. 4123.512(A). If the appealing party files the required notice outside the sixty-day time period, the common pleas court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal.(fn1) Capparell v. Love (1994), 99 Ohio App.3d 624, 629.
Under R.C. 4123.512(B), a valid notice of appeal must contain the following:
"The notice of appeal shall state the names of the claimant and the employer, the number of the claim, the date of the order appealed from, and the fact that the appellant appeals therefrom."
The timely filing of a notice of appeal containing the above elements "is the only act required to perfect the appeal." R.C. 4123.512(A); Smoliga v. Keller (1965), 3 Ohio App.2d 250, paragraph two of the syllabus. After setting forth the requirements for a valid notice of appeal, R.C. 4123.512(B) further instructs, "[t]he administrator, the claimant, and the employer shall be parties to the appeal and the court, upon the application of the commission, shall make the commission a party."
Because plaintiff's first and second assignments of error relate to plaintiff's letter and its compliance with R.C. 4123.512, we address those assignments together. The parties agree plaintiff's letter to the clerk of court contained the requisite R.C. 4123.512(B) notice of appeal elements: (1) the claimant's name, (2) the employer's name, (3) the number of the claim, (4) the date of the commission order appealed from, and (5) the fact plaintiff appeals from that order. See, e.g., Ford's Reply Memorandum in support of Summary Judgment Motion.
Ford, however, cites Duran v. Whirlpool Corp. (Nov. 20, 1987), Hancock App. No. 5-86-4, unreported, and asserts plaintiff's letter was not "filed" with the clerk of courts on December 21, 1994. In that case, Duran sought to appeal a commission order to the common pleas court. Although she appeared at the appropriate clerk of courts' office with the commission record and a commission cover letter explaining the appeal procedure, a clerk's office employee discerned she was not an attorney and told her she could not file her own appeal. As a result, Duran filed her notice of appeal after she obtained counsel and beyond the sixty-day time limit. Although the clerk of court employee erroneously informed Duran she could not appeal pro se, the Duran court held the clerk of court's office did not prevent Duran from filing a timely R.C. 4123.512 notice of appeal. Id. Because Duran's notice of appeal was not timely, the Duran court held the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal.
Duran, however, is distinguishable from this case. Here, plaintiff tendered to the clerk of court a letter containing all the essential elements of a notice of appeal, and the deputy clerk actually received and time-stamped the letter. See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reese Refrig. (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 787, 790, citing King v. Penn (1885), 43 Ohio St. 57, and King v. Paylor (1942), 69 Ohio App. 193. Unlike the Duran case, plaintiff's letter was delivered to and received by the clerk of court within the sixty-day period. See Ins. Co. of N. Am., supra; Plaintiff's Exhibit E.
Further, a deputy clerk may not refuse to file a notice complying with the R.C. 4123.512(B) elements simply because it does not appear in complaint form. See Istenes v. Lake Cty. Auditor (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 735, 740 ("Rules of Civil Procedure do not control the contents of the notice of appeal from the Industrial Commission to the common pleas court *** [t]he Civil Rules have bearing only after the filing of the petition" under R.C. 4123.512-(D)). Compliance with the statutory elements, not the form of the notice or the deputy clerk's interpretation of that form, determines the court's jurisdiction. See Wells v. Chrysler Corp. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 21, 24; Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Puckett (1964), 176 Ohio St. 32; Bobbs v. Longview State Hospital (Nov. 8, 1979), Franklin App. No. 79AP-357, unreported (1979 Opinions 3348) (R.C. 119.12 plaintiff tendered notice of appeal without a check for a security deposit, and common pleas clerk wrongly refused to accept notice). Thus, a deputy clerk of court may not reject tendered papers and thereby decide jurisdictional questions, Id. at 3351; rather, the deputy clerk should accept and time-stamp tendered papers, allowing the court to determine the effect of any attempted filing. See Bobbs, supra; In re Morris (Aug. 14, 1979), Franklin App. No. 79AP-381, unreported (1979 Opinions 2333, 2334).
When plaintiff tendered her letter to the deputy clerk who received and time-stamped...
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