Luders v. City of Spokane

• Decision Date: 20 October 1960
• Docket Number: No. 35334,35334
• Citation: 57 Wn.2d 162,356 P.2d 331
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Christian O. LUDERS, Respondent, v. CITY OF SPOKANE, a municipal corporation, F. Gaines Sutherlin, Don L. Lussier, A. A. Brown, Emmett J. Lancaster, M. R. Bauer, E. G. Kukst and Homer C. Hall, as the Board of Trustees of the Relief and Pension Fund of the Police Department of the City of Spokane, Appellants.

Page 162

57 Wn.2d 162

356 P.2d 331

Christian O. LUDERS, Respondent, v. CITY OF SPOKANE, a municipal corporation, F. Gaines Sutherlin, Don L. Lussier, A. A. Brown, Emmett J. Lancaster M. R. Bauer, E. G. Kukst and Homer C. Hall, as the Board of Trustees of the Relief and Pension Fund of the Police Department of the City of Spokane, Appellants.

No. 35334.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Oct. 20, 1960.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 12, 1960.

E. Murray Barrett, Roland C. Wightman, Norman S. Johnson, John P. Tracy, Jr., Spokane, for appellants.

Farley & Schiffner, Spokane, for respondent.

FOSTER, Judge.

Respondent Luders sought judgment declaring Laws of 1959, chapter 6, p. 29, and Laws of 1959, chapter 78, p. 490, constitutional. These acts increased the pension allowances of retired policemen in first class cities to a minimum of $150 per month from July 1, 1957. Respondent prayed for a money judgment of $612.26 for the increased pension from July 1, 1957, to January 27, 1959. The trial court held the acts constitutional and awarded the money judgment, from which the city of Spokane and the board of directors of the police pension fund appeal.

Respondent Luders was a member of the Spokane police department from 1924 until his retirement in 1947, after which he received a pension of $117.50 per month until January 27, 1959, when, because of the emergency clause, Laws of 1959, chapter 6, became effective. The chapter provides in part:

'* * * all existing pensions shall be increased to not less than one hundred fifty dollars per month as of July 1, 1957. * * *'

Laws of 1959, chapter 78, contained the identical words of Laws of 1959, chapter 68 previously quoted, but lacked an emergency clause, in consequence of which its effective date was June 11, 1959.

The board of trustees of the police relief and pension fund of the city of Spokane, pursuant to Laws of 1959, chapter 6, increased respondent's pension to $150 per month beginning January 27, 1959, but refused, however, to back date the increase to July 1, 1957. Such is the justiciable issue here.

Appellants argue that the laws are unconstitutional.

He first claim is that the 1959 enactments violate art. II, § 25, of the state constitution, which, prior to November, 1958, provided as follows 'The legislature shall never grant any extra compensation to any public officer, agent, servant, or contractor, after the services shall have been rendered, or the contract entered into, nor shall the compensation of any public officer be increased or diminished during his term of office.'

Laws of 1957, chapter 84, p. 341, contained identical provisions increasing police pensions as to the acts presently challenged. Sonnabend v. City of Spokane, 53 Wash.2d 362, 333 P.2d 918, held the 1957 law violated art. II, § 25, of the state constitution. A constitutional amendment approved in the November, 1958, election added to art. II, § 25, the following sentence:

'Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent increases in pensions after such pensions shall have been granted.'

Therefore, the Sonnabend case, supra, no longer controls. Statutes must be read in the light of the constitution at the time of their enactment. So viewed, the acts do not violate art. II, § 25, as amended in 1958.

But appellants argue that Laws of 1959, chapters 6 and 78, could not cure the unconstitutional 1957 laws (Laws of 1957, chapter 84. p. 341). The argument fails because the 1959 enactments did not attempt to validate the prior unconstitutional statutes. These are new and independent acts passed pursuant to the 1958 constitutional amendment. They stand by themselves and have no reference to prior invalid laws.

Appellants' next claim is that the 1958 amendment to art. II, § 25, is not retroactive, and, therefore, the retrospective provisions of Laws of 1959, chapters 6 and 78, are invalid.

However, appellants misconceive the nature of the state constitution. The constitution of this state is not a grant of power, but a limitation thereof. The legislature's power to enact laws is unrestrained except when expressly or impliedly limited.

In Gruen v. State Tax Commission, 35 Wash.2d 1, 211 P.2d 651, 656, this court stated 'A statute, when enacted, possesses that binding force and effect named therein, unless it is clearly in conflict with our fundamental law. In other words, a statute cannot be judicially declared beyond the power of the legislature to enact unless in conflict with some specific or definite provision of the constitution . State v. Emonds, 107 Wash. 688, 182 P. 584.

'The legislature may legally enact any law not expressly or inferentially prohibited by our state constitution, the constitution being a limitation, not a grant of power. * * *' Italics ours.

The 1958 amendment to art. II, § 25, removed the constitutional barrier precluding increasing police pensions after grant thereof. The legislative power in this respect is now unlimited. The legislature clearly intended to implement the new amendment by back dating increased pensions.

Retrospective laws are not per se invalid in the absence of constitutional prohibition. State ex rel. American Savings Union v. Whittlesey, 17 Wash. 447, 50 P. 119; Bates v. McLeod, 11 Wash.2d 648, 120 P.2d 472.

Art. VIII, § 7, of the state constitution prohibits gratuities. We held in Bakenhus v. City of Seattle, 48 Wash.2d 695, 296 P.2d 536, that a pension granted to a public employee is not a gratuity, but is deferred compensation. That renders art. VIII, § 7, inapplicable. Here there is a compensation increase which may apply as well to deferred compensation as compensation paid during active service.

Furthermore, art. VIII, § 7, is concerned with municipal fiscal policy, indebtedness and budgeting, and is inapplicable to the present situation. The section was designed to prohibit municipal gifts and the use of municipal funds for nonmunicipal purposes. This situation is wholly different. Here there is no gift. This is a plan for the benefit of municipal employees, which the constitution does not prohibit.

A discussion of appellants other arguments is unnecessary.

The judgment is affirmed.

WEAVER, C. J., and MALLERY, FINLEY, ROSELLINI, OTT and HUNTER, JJ., concur.

FINLEY, Judge (concurring).

I have signed the majority opinion, but add a brief comment which seems pertinent as well as appropriate.

First, this appeal involves a simple constitutional amendment. I am convinced that, at least in the present instance, we should not borrow cases involving a rule of construction from other jurisdictions to engraft upon the above-mentioned simple constitutional amendment a judicially conceived limitation, which...