Luessenhop v. Clinton County, N.Y.

• Decision Date: 20 July 2005
• Docket Number: No. Civ.1:04-CV-263(RFT).,Civ.1:04-CV-263(RFT).
• Citation: 378 F.Supp.2d 63
• Parties: Elizabeth LUESSENHOP, Plaintiff, v. CLINTON COUNTY, NEW YORK, William Bingel, in his Individual Capacity and in his Official Capacity as Clinton County Administrator, and Janet Duprey, in her Individual Capacity and in her Official Capacity as Clinton County Treasurer, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

Page 63

378 F.Supp.2d 63

Elizabeth LUESSENHOP, Plaintiff, v. CLINTON COUNTY, NEW YORK, William Bingel, in his Individual Capacity and in his Official Capacity as Clinton County Administrator, and Janet Duprey, in her Individual Capacity and in her Official Capacity as Clinton County Treasurer, Defendants.

No. Civ.1:04-CV-263(RFT).

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

July 20, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Office of Mark A. Schneider, Plattsburgh, NY, for Plaintiff, Mark A. Schneider, of counsel.

Maynard, O'Connor, Smith & Catalinotto, Albany, NY, for Defendants, Robert A. Rausch, of counsel.

MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER¹

TREECE, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff, Elizabeth Luessenhop, brings a cause of action against the Defendants, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Rights in a tax foreclosure proceeding. Dkt. 1, Compl. at ¶ 51. Defendants seek a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56(b). Dkt. No. 25. Plaintiff cross-moves for Partial Summary Judgment on the issues of liability, injunctive relief and declaratory relief. Dkt. No. 29.

I. FACTS

Luessenhop owned two parcels of land located in Clinton County, New York, and was derelict in paying the property taxes on those parcels.² Compl. at ¶ 1. These properties had been the subject of four prior foreclosure proceedings due to back taxes owed on the parcels.³ Dkt. 25, Defs.' Stat. of Undisputed Facts at ¶ 4. In January 2002, notices were sent to those owing taxes including Luessenhop, whose notice was delivered to her permanent address.⁴ Id. at ¶ 5. Then in October 2002, notices and petitions of foreclosure were mailed to those who had still not paid the taxes with Plaintiff's notice again being sent to her permanent address. Id. at ¶ 6. Luessenhop had provided Clinton County and the Town of Champlain, where the properties were located, a permanent address located in Washington, D.C., where four previous tax bills and other foreclosure notices had been sent without any problem. Id. at ¶ 8; Compl. at ¶¶ 15 & 17. Luessenhop occasionally spends time in London, England, and claims that both the County and Town had her address and phone number in London along with her permanent address.⁵ Compl. at ¶ 17.

Plaintiff was sent two notices by certified mail to her permanent address that went unclaimed and were returned to the Clinton County Treasurers' Office, where the Plaintiff's address was confirmed to be correct according to the tax rolls. Defs.' Stat. of Undisputed Facts at ¶¶ 10 & 11. Plaintiff denies receiving any notices at her permanent address.⁶ Compl. at ¶ 2. In addition to the certified mail, the County also posted the notice at the Clinton County Courthouse and published the notice in two newspapers. Dkt. No. 25, Janet L. Duprey Aff. at ¶¶ 3 & 5. Luessenhop states that in April 2003, she received a notice from the Champlain Tax Collector and subsequently sent a check for the amount owed.⁷ Compl. at ¶¶ 21 & 22.

The October 2002 Notice had set a redemption date of January 17, 2003, and because Luessenhop had not paid her taxes as of that time, a default judgment was entered on March 20, 2003, and title to the property was transferred to Clinton County on April 1, 2003. Defs.' Stat. of Undisputed Facts at ¶¶ 6 & 15. In May 2003, a "for sale" sign was placed on the properties which caused Luessenhop to call the Clinton County Treasurer. Compl. at ¶ 25. Plaintiff then found out that title had been transferred and in order for her to regain title she would have to purchase it back at a public tax auction. Id. at ¶ 28. On August 1, 2003, Plaintiff's motion to vacate the default judgment was denied and subsequent appeals were denied.⁸ Defs.' Stat. of Undisputed Facts at ¶ 18 & 19. As of today's date, Luessenhop's property is still owned by Clinton County and the Defendants have agreed not to auction off the properties until the conclusion of this action. Compl. at ¶¶ 48 & 49. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate only where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The moving party bears the burden to demonstrate through "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any," that there is no genuine issue of material fact. F.D.I.C. v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir.1994) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). "When a party has moved for summary judgment on the basis of asserted facts supported as required by [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)] and has, in accordance with local court rules, served a concise statement of the material facts as to which it contends there exist no genuine issues to be tried, those facts will be deemed admitted unless properly controverted by the nonmoving party." Glazer v. Formica Corp., 964 F.2d 149, 154 (2d Cir.1992).

To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," and cannot rest on "mere allegations or denials" of the facts submitted by the moving party. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); see also Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d 282, 287 (2d Cir.2003) ("Conclusory allegations or denials are ordinarily not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment when the moving party has set out a documentary case."); Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522, 525-26 (2d Cir.1994). To that end, sworn statements are "more than mere conclusory allegations subject to disregard ... they are specific and detailed allegations of fact, made under penalty of perjury, and should be treated as evidence in deciding a summary judgment motion" and the credibility of such statements is better left to a trier of fact. Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d at 289 (citing Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir.1995) and Flaherty v. Coughlin, 713 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir.1983)).

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 164 F.3d 736, 742 (2d Cir.1998). "[T]he trial court's task at the summary judgment motion stage of the litigation is carefully limited to discerning whether there are any genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue-finding; it does not extend to issue-resolution." Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994). Moreover, mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by the record, are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Carey v. Crescenzi, 923 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir.1991).

B. Due Process Claims

In order to state a claim for violation of due process, a plaintiff must allege that there was deprivation of life, liberty or property without proper notice and an opportunity to be heard. See generally Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 795, 103 S.Ct. 2706, 77 L.Ed.2d 180 (1983) (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)). Fundamentally, due process requires notice that is "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections" and an "opportunity for [a] hearing appropriate to the nature of the case," both which must be granted in a meaningful time and manner. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313 & 314, 70 S.Ct. 652; see also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965)). "Due process is flexible" and procedural protections are situational. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)). Therefore, in order to determine the process due before official action will be taken, courts looks at several factors including:

[1)] the private interest that will be affected by the official action; [2)] the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and [3)] the Government's interest including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893.

Here, Plaintiff alleges deprivation of property wherein the Clinton County's tax foreclosure proceedings and subsequent auction violated her due process rights due to a failure to provide proper notice.

1. Notice

The due process notice requirement is satisfied as long as the entity has acted reasonably in choosing the "means likely to inform persons affected, [and] not whether each property owner actually received notice[,]" thereby "discharg[ing] its burden." Weigner v. City of New York, 852 F.2d 646, 649 (2d Cir.1988) (quoted in Akey v. Clinton County, 375 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir.2004)). Plaintiff contends that she was deprived of her property without due process since she did not receive actual notice of the foreclosure. Plaintiff also claims that Article 11 of New York's Real Property Tax Law is unconstitutional because it allows a county to retain profits from a tax auction when actual notice of the foreclosure proceedings was not provided to the owner of the property. However, and much to the contrary, the correct inquiry for this Court is whether the notice was a reasonable means...