Lueth v. Goodknecht

• Decision Date: 09 October 1931
• Docket Number: No. 20749.,20749.
• Citation: 345 Ill. 197,177 N.E. 690
• Parties: LUETH v. GOODKNECHT et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

345 Ill. 197

177 N.E. 690

LUETH

v.GOODKNECHT et al.

No. 20749.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 18, 1931.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Oct. 9, 1931.

Action by John F. Lueth against Harry Goodknecht and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Kankakee County Court; Henry F. Ruel, Judge.

John H. Beckers, of Kankakee, for appellant.

W. H. Dyer, of Kankakee, for appellees.

STONE, C. J.

This is an appeal from a judgment for the defendants in the county court of Kankakee county in a suit on a promissory note in the principal sum of $241, given to the partnership of Lueth Bros., of which appellant is the surviving partner. The appeal is brought to this court because the constitutionality of sections 1, 2, and 4 of the Evidence Act (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1929, c. 51, §§ 1, 2, 4) is said to be involved.

In the trial court the evidence showed that appellant, John Lueth, and George C. Lueth, deceased, were partners in the implement business under the firm name of Lueth Bros. The note was dated June 17, 1920, and was by its terms due on or before one year after date. On February 19, 1927, prior to the bringing of this suit, George C. Lueth died. The defense was payment to George C. Lueth. Appellee Harry Goodknecht was permitted, over objection, to testify concerning the payment of the note a few days after its date. In this he was corroborated by the testimony of his brother, Albert Goodknecht. This testimony was also received over the objection of appellant.

It is contended here that sections 1, 2, and 4 of the Evidence Act are unconstitutional in that they are not uniform in operation upon all persons and property similarly situated. Section 1 of the Evidence Act provides that no person shall be disqualified as a witness in any civil action, suit, or proceeding by reason of his or her interest in the event thereof, as a party or otherwise, except as in the act provided. Sections 2 and 4 are limitations on section 1. By section 2 on party or person directly interested in the event of any civil suit shall be allowed to testify when the adverse party sues or defends as conservator of an incompetent person, or as trustee, executor, administrator, heir, legatee, or devisee of any deceased person. By section 4 it is provided as to actions by or against surviving partners, that no adverse party or person adversely interested in such suit shall be competent to testify to any admission or conversation by any deceased partner unless one or more of the surviving partners were also present at the time of such admission or conversation. The argument is that by these provisions of the Evidence Act an adverse party to a suit brought by a surviving partner may testify to any matter except admissions or conversations of the deceased partner when no other partner was present, whereas under section 2 a person directly interested in the event of the suit may not testify where the adverse party sues or defends in any capacity therein named, and that act therefore contravenes the constitutional requirement of uniformity.

It is conceded, as indeed it must be, that a law is not to be regarded as class legislation merely because it affects one class and not another, provided it affects all members of the same class alike. Classifications of persons or objects for purposes of legislative regulation are not open to constitutional objection if they be not arbitrary but are based upon some substantial difference bearing proper relation to the classification. It is argued, however, that there is here no substantial difference justifying a classificationand legislative treatment of a partnership estate as distinguished from the personal estate of a deceased person. With this we cannot agree. A partnership estate is sui generis. While partnership property has many characteristics of an estate in common and of joint tenancy, yet the interests of the partners in the firm property is neither that of joint tenants nor of tenants in common. Each is possessed of a joint interest in the whole but does not own any separate part of partnership property. Each has an undivided interest in the property of the partnership only after the debts are paid. Morrison v. Austin State Bank, 213 Ill. 472, 72 N. E. 1109,104 Am. St. Rep. 225;Taft v. Schwamb, 80 Ill. 289;Rainey v. Nance, 54 Ill. 29. These distinctive characteristics of a partnership estate afford ample basis for the classification made by the Evidence Act. It may be also observed that the competency of the surviving partner to testify affords a further distinction as basis for legislative classification. The necessity for protection of the personal estate of a deceased person, on which section 2 of the act is based, does not to the same degree obtain in the case of a partnership estate. The act is not open to the constitutional objection raised.

It is also argued that though section 4 of the Evidence Act be not unconstitutional, the defendants and their witnesses, by reason of the language of section 4, were incompetent to testify concerning the contents of a receipt which Harry Goodknecht stated was given him on payment of the note. This objection arises in this manner: Appellee Harry Goodknecht and his brother testified that they went to the place of business of Lueth Bros., where they found George C. Lueth, since deceased, and there paid him the full...