Moshier v. City of Springfield

• Decision Date: 22 February 1939
• Docket Number: No. 24423.,24423.
• Citation: 370 Ill. 541,19 N.E.2d 598
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. MOSHIER et al. v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

370 Ill. 541

19 N.E.2d 598

PEOPLE ex rel. MOSHIER et al.

v.CITY OF SPRINGFIELD et al.

No. 24423.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 22, 1939.

Mandamus proceeding by the People, on the relation of William H. Moshier and others, against the City of Springfield and others to compel the City of Springfield and its officers to pay the relators and all other members of the city fire department a minimum salary of $175 per month. From a judgment awarding the writ, the defendants appeal.

Judgment affirmed.

WILSON, J., and SHAW, C. J., dissenting.Appeal from Circuit Court, Sangamon County; Victor C. Hemphill, judge.

Hugh J. Dobbs, City Atty., of Springfield, for appellants.

Londrigan & Londrigan, of Springfield, for appellees.

Alexander H. Marshall and Thomas A. Matthews, both of Chicago, amici curiae.

JONES, Justice.

The circuit of Sangamon county awarded a writ of mandamus commanding the city of Springfield and its officers to pay relators and all other members of its fire department a minimum salary of $175 per month under the provisions of an act of the legislature effective June 29, 1937, and to levy taxes for that purpose. Laws of 1937, p. 344, Ill.Rev.Stat.1937, c. 24, §§ 860c, 860d. The act defines ‘fireman’ as any member of a regularly constituted fire department appointed or commissioned to perform fire fighting duties including the fire chief, assistant fire chief, captain, engineer, driver, ladder man, hose man, pipe man, and any other member thereof. It provides that the salary to be paid a fireman shall not be less than $150 per month in cities, villages and incorporated towns having a population of 10,000, or more, but less than 25,000; $175 per month in municipalities having a population of 25,000, or more, but less than 150,000, and that the act shall not apply to special firemen temporarily employed.

The City of Springfield has a population of 71,900. At the time the act became effective, the first quarter of the city's fiscal year, beginning March 1, 1937, had expired. The amount appropriated in the appropriation ordinance passed during the first quarter of the fiscal year for paying members of the fire department was insufficient to pay each of them $175 per month for the whole of the fiscal year. The city had adopted the Fire Protection Tax Act of 1929 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1937, chap. 24, § 838a et seq.) which enabled it to levy a tax at a rate not exceeding two mills for fire protection. Under its provisions, the city appropriated and levied for the fiscal year 1937 approximately one mill for new equipment and the maintenance thereof, and the maintenance of buildings; no part of the appropriation or levy under that act was for paying members of the fire department.

The judgment awards a writ commanding appellants to pay relators and all other members of the city fire department, commencing July 1, 1937, a minimum salary of $175 per month; to levy on or before the third Tuesday of September, 1937, a sufficient tax in addition to the one-mill tax previously levied, not exceeding two mills in the aggregate, to pay such salaries until the close of the present fiscal year; to appropriate, in the 1938 appropriation ordinance, a sufficient amount from the funds collected by reason of such tax levy for the payment of all salaries due at the close of the 1937 fiscal year, and to include in the 1938 appropriation bill and tax levy, an amount sufficient for the payment of the minimum salary of $175 per month to the members of the fire department.

The grounds urged for reversal are that the Firemen's Minimum Wage Act is unconstitutional in that it is special legislation in contravention of section 22 of article 4 of the constitution, Smith-Hurd Stats., and creates a corporate debt of the city without its consent, in violation of section 10 of article 9; that the act is incomplete, and is in conflict with existing statutes and is, therefore, void; that the judgment invades the legislative field in violation of the due process clause of the constitution; that a prior appropriation by the city is a statutory condition precedent to the levy of the tax; that no appropriation has been made to pay the increase in the firemen's salaries; that the expenditure of funds by municipal officers, without an antecedent appropriation, is a criminal offense; and that a writ of mandamus cannot be lawfully issued to compel the performance of an unauthorized or illegal act. Appellees contend that neither the statute in controversy, nor the judgment is subject to any of the claims urged. We cannot concern ourselves about the wisdom of the legislation but must inquire whether the act is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. By leave of court, several other cities within the terms of the act have filed a brief and argument, as amici curiae, in support of the contentions of appellants.

It is a matter of common knowledge that ownership of property in any municipality, no matter how small, is seldom confined to the inhabitants, but in practically all municipalities some of the property is owned by non-residents. In many cases the stock of large buildings, banks, manufacturing and mercantile corporations located in a particular city is widely held. Hotels are continuously occupied by large numbers of people, both local and transient, who are always exposed to the possibility of disastrous fires. Schools, hospitals and other public buildings with their occupants, are exposed to the same risk. Thus, fire protection is a thing not only of local concern, but in which the general public has a vital interest. The owners of property and the general public are not the only ones affected by legislation for fire protection. There is a vast army of men employed in that occupation, which is obviously fraught with hazards uncommon to many other callings. Such hazards are, in a large degree, measured by the size of the municipality. In the interest of the public, as well as themselves, firemen are entitled to receive adequate compensation for their services, commensurate with such hazards. Otherwise, few men would seek that avenue for a livelihood. The protection of life and property from fire conserves the resources of the country, and is, therfore, a matter of public welfare. It is also a matter of common knowledge that it costs more to live in a city than it does in a hamlet, and that the cost varies with the size of the community. It is to the interest of the State that its citizenry be adequately housed and fed. Such a policy tends to prevent indigency, with its corresponding burdens on the public, and to maintain the strength and health of the citizens. This, too, adds to the resources of the country and is embraced within the public welfare. The physical welfare of the citizens is of so much importance to the State, and has such a direct relation to the general welfare, that laws tending to promote that object are proper under the police power which is inherent in the State. The legislature is vested with a large discretion in determining what measures are necessary to secure public welfare. Such statutes are upheld, if possible, and it is only when the legislature goes beyond its power that they are declared invalid. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Commerce Comm., 364 Ill. 213, 4 N.E.2d 96;Hunt v. Rosenbaum Grain Corp., 355 Ill. 504, 189 N.E. 907.

The manifest purpose of the act in controversy is to insure reasonable living conditions to firemen in municipalities having a population between 10,000 and 150,000. For the reasons above set out, it is obvious that such purpose is directly connected with and is a part of the general welfare. While arbitrary legislative classification of municipalities and other political subdivisions, based only on difference in population, cannot be sustained under section 22 of article 4 of the constitution, they may be classified for purposes of legislation on the basis of population, if such basis has some reasonable relation to the purpose and object of the legislation, and in some rational degree accounts for the variant provisions of the enactment. Mathews v. City of Chicago, 342 Ill. 120, 174 N.E. 35;Martens v. Brady, 264 Ill. 178, 106 N.E. 266;People v. Kaelber, 253 Ill. 552, 97 N.E. 1068;Booth v. Opel, 244 Ill. 317, 91 N.E. 458;People v. Knopf, 183 Ill. 410, 56 N.E. 155;Stewart v. Brady, 300 Ill. 425, 133 N.E. 310. A law is not to be regarded as class legislation merely because it affects one class and not another, provided it affects all members of the same class, alike. Whether a law is general,local or special does not depend upon the number of things within the scope of its operation. To be general, it is not necessary that an act operate in every place or upon every person in the State, but if every place or person brought within the relations or circumstances provided for is affected by the law, the act is general. An act is not local or special merely because it operates in but one place or upon a particular class of persons or things, provided there is a reasonable basis for the legislative classification. A law may be general notwithstanding the fact it may operate in only a single place, where the conditions necessary to its operation exist. Hunt v. Rosenbaum Grain Corp. supra; People v. City of Chicago, 349 Ill. 304, 182 N.E. 419; Mathews v. City of Chicago, supra; People v. Borgeson, 335 Ill. 136, 166 N.E. 451. Classifications of persons or objects for purposes of legislative regulation are not open to constitutional objection if they be not arbitrary but are based upon some substantial difference bearing proper relation to the classification. Lueth v. Goodknecht, 345 Ill. 197, 177 N.E. 690,70 A.L.R. 780. The difference in the cost of living, and in the hazards of the occupation, in municipalities within the two classifications in the act, and in those not embraced within its terms, furnishes a reasonable basis, under the general welfare and the police...