Luginbuhl v. City of Gallup

• Decision Date: 11 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. 31,910.,31,910.
• Citation: 302 P.3d 751
• Parties: David LUGINBUHL, Petitioner–Appellant, v. CITY OF GALLUP, Gallup Police Department, Respondents–Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

302 P.3d 751

David LUGINBUHL, Petitioner–Appellant,

v.CITY OF GALLUP, Gallup Police Department, Respondents–Appellees.

No. 31,910.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

March 11, 2013.

Vega Lynn Law Offices, LLC, Rosario D. Vega Lynn, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

Mason and Isaacson, PA, Thomas Lynn Isaacson, Gallup, NM, for Appellee.

OPINION

ZAMORA, Judge.

{1} Petitioner David Luginbuhl appeals from the district court's denial of his petition for injunctive relief seeking to block the City of Gallup (City) and the Gallup Police Department (GPD) from forcing him to resolve his employment dispute through arbitration. Petitioner argues that because he is not a dues-paying member of the Gallup Police Officer's Association (Union), he should not be forced to abide by the arbitration clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the Union, which represents members of the GPD, and the City, but rather that he should be allowed to pursue relief immediately in the district court to seek redress for his dismissal from the GPD. We disagree, and we affirm the district court for the reasons that follow.

BACKGROUND

{2} Petitioner was a full-time police officer for the GPD from October 27, 2007, until his termination on June 8, 2011. During his time of employment he chose not to join the Union, did not pay dues, and never sought the assistance of the Union.

{3} The City recognized the Union “as the exclusive collective bargaining representative for the regular full-time non-probationary sworn police officers (Certified), Patrolman First Class (PFC), and Sergeants.” Despite his decision to decline union membership, Petitioner acknowledges that he was a regular full-time, non-probationary, sworn police officer employed by the GPD and a member of the bargaining unit covered by the CBA.

{4} The CBA contains all issues introduced for negotiation and agreed by and between the Union and the City. There were forty-two matters negotiated and reduced to writing, including but not limited to annual clothing allowances for uniforms; rules regarding firearms; time off and various types of leave, including holidays; vacation and holiday benefits; health coverage and salary compensation; overtime and extra-duty assignments and pay; layoff and recall procedures; the filling of vacancies; the disciplinary process; and a grievance and appeal process. The CBA took effect in November 2008 and remained in effect until November 2011, and was the operative agreement at the time of Petitioner's June 2011 dismissal and implementation of the grievance process. The grievance procedure begins when an employee “file[s] a written grievance within seven (7) days of the date the employee knew or should have known of the issue that generated the disciplinary action.”

{5} Petitioner initiated the grievance procedure to challenge his termination. He followed the first three steps of the grievance process: (1) a meeting between the employee and his or her supervisor, (2) a meeting between the employee and the police chief, and (3) a meeting with the city manager to help resolve the dispute. However, he elected not to follow through with the fourth and final step: arbitration. Instead, claiming he was not bound by the CBA because of his non-union status, he filed his petition in district court seeking injunctive relief. A hearing was held on December 20, 2011, at the end of which the petition was denied, with a written order following on January 4, 2012. This appeal followed, and we address the question of whether the district court properly denied the petition.

DISCUSSIONI. Standard of Review

{6} “Any request for injunctive relief is directed to the sound discretion of the [district] court.” Cunningham v. Gross, 102 N.M. 723, 725, 699 P.2d 1075, 1077 (1985). “When a [district] court misapprehends the law, the court abuses its discretion.” Smart v. Carpenter, 2005–NMCA–056, ¶ 6, 139 N.M. 524, 134 P.3d 811;see Aragon v. Brown, 2003–NMCA–126, ¶ 9, 134 N.M. 459, 78 P.3d 913 (stating that a district court abuses its discretion “when it applies an incorrect standard, incorrect substantive law, or its discretionary decision is premised on a misapprehension of the law”). A district court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Smart, 2005–NMCA–056, ¶ 7, 139 N.M. 524, 134 P.3d 811. To the extent we address constitutional issues, our review is de novo. State v. Pacheco, 2007–NMSC–009, ¶ 12, 141 N.M. 340, 155 P.3d 745.

II. Writ of Prohibition

{7} We begin by noting that Petitioner sought a writ of prohibition from the district court as well as a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. A district court may issue a writ of prohibition “provided, that no such writs shall issue directed to judges or courts of equal or superior jurisdiction.” N.M. Const. art. VI, § 13; see State v. Valerio, 2012–NMCA–022, ¶ 16, 273 P.3d 12 (“District courts have the authority ... to issue writs of prohibition to courts of inferior jurisdiction.”), cert. denied,2012–NMCERT–001, 291 P.3d 598. “It is well established that the extraordinary writ of prohibition is generally available only in cases where there is no adequate remedy at law.” Valerio, 2012–NMCA–022, ¶ 23, 273 P.3d 12;see17 McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 49:80, at 556 (3d ed. 2004) (noting the “fundamental fact that the purpose of the writ is to prevent the lower body from assuming jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested, or where having jurisdiction, it has exceeded its legitimate powers”); State ex rel. Wells v. Hough, 193 Mo. 615, 91 S.W. 905, 915 (1906) (“Its chief function is to keep inferior courts within the orbit of their rightful jurisdiction.”).

{8} The City contends that the district court was without jurisdiction to grant the request for a writ of prohibition because the municipality is not an “inferior court” as contemplated by the constitutional provision. As discussed below, we decide that no injunctive relief in any form—whether it be a writ of prohibition, temporary restraining order, or a preliminary injunction—is proper in this case, because arbitration is the proper forum for Petitioner's grievance. Therefore, we need not address the question of whether a writ of prohibition may issue from a district court to a municipality or an arm of a municipality.¹ We now proceed to the issues raised by Petitioner's appeal.

III. Whether Petitioner is Subject to the Public Employee Bargaining Act

{9} Petitioner contends that he filed a grievance according to the City's personnel rules and regulations for non-union employees, and not a grievance pursuant to the CBA. The primary difference between the two processes is that the CBA requires arbitration. Public employers and employees in New Mexico are also subject to the Public Employee Bargaining Act (PEBA), NMSA 1978, §§ 10–7E–1 to –26 (2003, as amended through 2005). Whether the Petitioner has a duty to arbitrate depends on whether or not he falls within the strictures of the PEBA.

{10} The PEBA identifies the parties to a collective bargaining agreement. A “public employer” is defined as “the state or a political subdivision thereof,” and a “public employee” is “a regular non[-]probationary employee of a public employer.” Section 10–7E–4(R), (S) (internal quotation marks omitted). Petitioner is a regular non-probationary employee of the City, a municipal corporation of the State of New Mexico, as a member of the GPD. An “appropriate bargaining unit” is defined as “a group of public employees designated by the board or local board for the purpose of collective bargaining.” Section 10–7E–4(A) (internal quotation marks omitted). As noted above, Petitioner concedes that, as a regular full-time sworn police officer with the GPD, he was a member of the bargaining unit.

{11} A “labor organization” is defined as “an employee organization, one of whose purposes is the representation of public employees in collective bargaining,” and a labor organization is an “exclusive representative” when it “has the right to represent all public employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for the purposes of collective bargaining.” Section 10–7E–4(I), (L) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The City recognized the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative. The City and the Union ² entered into a[CBA] that was in effect from November 2008 to November 2011. As required by the PEBA, the CBA contained a grievance procedure. Section 10–7E–17(F) states:

An agreement shall include a grievance procedure to be used for the settlement of disputes pertaining to employment terms and conditions and related personnel matters. The grievance procedure shall provide for a final and binding determination. The final determination shall constitute an arbitration award within the meaning of the Uniform Arbitration Act [ (UAA) ] [NMSA 1978, §§ 44–7A–1 to 28 (2001) ]; such award shall be subject to judicial review pursuant to the standard set forth in the [UAA]. The costs of an arbitration proceeding conducted pursuant to this subsection shall be shared equally by the parties.

{12} Section 34 of the CBA sets forth the grievance and appeal procedures and the four-step grievance process, which includes the arbitration provision. The arbitration provision states that the “decision of the [a]rbitrator shall be final and binding on both the [p]arties.”

{13} We conclude that Petitioner is a public employee, working for a public employer, and he is therefore subject to the PEBA, the November 2008 to November 2011 CBA, and the four-step grievance procedure provided for within that CBA, which includes arbitration, prior to seeking judicial review.

IV. Whether the Arbitration Clause Is Unsupported by Consideration or Vague

{14} As a threshold matter, Petitioner argues that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable because it is unsupported by consideration. He also contends that the arbitration clause at issue is impermissibly vague insofar as it is “unclear and...