Smart v. Carpenter
Decision Date | 30 March 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 25,667.,25,667. |
Parties | Gordon SMART and Sylvia Smart, husband and wife, and Sam Tyra and Lidia Tyra, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Jimmy CARPENTER, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Richard A. Hawthorne, P.A., Richard A. Hawthorne, Ruidoso, NM, for Appellants.
H. John Underwood, Ltd., Zach Cook, Ruidoso, NM, for Appellee.
{1} This is an appeal of the trial court's dismissal of a complaint seeking enforcement of restrictive covenants governing a residential subdivision. We hold that the trial court erred in concluding that the actions of Appellee, Jimmy Carpenter (Carpenter), did not violate the covenants, and we therefore reverse the dismissal.
{2} Appellants are the owners of real property in River's Edge Subdivision (Subdivision) located approximately fifteen miles east of Ruidoso in Lincoln County, New Mexico. Carpenter is also an owner of real property in the Subdivision. The Subdivision is subject to the covenants contained in the "Amended Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, Architectural Approval and Road Use and Maintenance Agreement of River's Edge Subdivision" (Covenants), recorded in the county records of Lincoln County. The parties purchased their real property after the Covenants were recorded. Paragraph 18 of the Covenants specifically restricts the use of all tracts of land within the Subdivision to residential purposes only. Paragraph 3 of the Covenants specifically prohibits the operation of any commercial or business activity within the Subdivision, with the exception of a personal home office.
{3} Carpenter owns Lot 6 in the Subdivision. At the time Carpenter purchased Lot 6, he received a copy of the Covenants, which he read and understood. Carpenter has not yet constructed a home on his lot, but he has constructed a 40-by 80-foot garage on the property. The garage is not used as a residence in any manner. Although the construction of the garage was an issue at trial, it is not an issue in this appeal.
{4} Carpenter owns and operates a trucking business with three commercial truck tractors and four commercial trailers pulled by the tractors (trucks and trailers). This business is currently operated out of Carpenter's home, which is located in Ruidoso. The trucking business is operated for profit. Carpenter stores and parks the trucks and trailers on Lot 6 when they are not in use. He also services and maintains the trucks and trailers in the garage located on Lot 6. During the periods the trucks are in use, Carpenter parks his personal vehicles on Lot 6. Before Carpenter began construction of the garage and before he began parking and storing his trucks and trailers on his lot in the Subdivision, Appellants complained to Carpenter and advised him that no commercial activity or business could be operated within the Subdivision.
{5} Based on the above findings, the trial court concluded that the Covenants run with the land, are binding on all of the parties, and are valid and enforceable. The trial court also concluded that Carpenter's activity on Lot 6 did not violate the Covenants and that Appellants therefore were not entitled to injunctive relief. We disagree.
{6} Prior to beginning our analysis, we address the relevant standard of review. The parties contend abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard to apply. A complaint seeking injunctive relief is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Wilcox v. Timberon Protective Ass'n, 111 N.M. 478, 485, 806 P.2d 1068, 1075 (Ct.App.1990). When a trial court misapprehends the law, the court abuses its discretion. See N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-028, ¶ 7, 127 N.M. 654, 986 P.2d 450 ( ); LaBalbo v. Hymes, 115 N.M. 314, 318, 850 P.2d 1017, 1021 (Ct.App.1993) ( ).
{7} Appellants challenge the finding that Carpenter was not engaging in prohibited commercial activity on the subject property. Although characterized as a finding, this determination actually functions as a conclusion. See Webb v. N.M. Publ'g Co., 47 N.M. 279, 283, 141 P.2d 333, 335 (1943) ( ). Conclusions of law by the trial court are reviewed de novo. Gutierrez v. Connick, 2004-NMCA-017, ¶ 7, 135 N.M. 272, 87 P.3d 552 ( ). We apply a de novo standard of review to the legal question to be answered in this case. See Brooks v. Norwest Corp., 2004-NMCA-134, ¶ 7, 136 N.M. 599, 103 P.3d 39 (); Aragon v. Brown, 2003-NMCA-126, ¶ 9, 134 N.M. 459, 78 P.3d 913 ( ).
{8} Paragraph 18 of the Covenants limits use of all of the tracts in the Subdivision to "residential purposes only." Paragraph 3 allows a personal home office, which is not at issue here, but that paragraph prohibits "commercial activity or business" on any tract in the Subdivision. The issue is whether Carpenter's actions on Lot 6 of the Subdivision violate these two restrictions.
{9} At the trial court level, Carpenter relied on 9394 LLC v. Farris, 10 A.D.3d 708, 782 N.Y.S.2d 281 (N.Y.App.Div.2004), County of Butte v. Bach, 172 Cal.App.3d 848, 218 Cal.Rptr. 613 (1985), and Liu v. Dunnigan, 25 Md.App. 178, 333 A.2d 338 (Ct. Spec.App.1975), as support for his argument that he had not violated the Covenants. Appellants cite to these same cases to support their arguments on appeal. These cases relate primarily to the use of a residence for office purposes and are not sufficiently on point to assist in determining the nature of Carpenter's activities on Lot 6.
{10} Appellants contend that the trial court mistakenly relied on the fact that Carpenter was not in violation of paragraph 2 of the Covenants when it decided that Carpenter was not in violation of any of the covenant restrictions. Paragraph 2 prohibits the operation of junkyards, pipe yards, wrecking yards, auto sales, RV parks, or other similar businesses. We do not find this argument persuasive because Appellants did not allege that Carpenter violated paragraph 2 and because the trial court's determination that Carpenter complied with paragraph 2 has no direct bearing on the evaluation of the facts as to violations of paragraphs 3 and 18 of the Covenants. Appellants also argue that the trial court was wrong in relying on Carpenter's intent to build a home on Lot 6 in the future, as stated in finding of fact 15. We find no error. This fact is supported by substantial evidence and establishes the general residential use of the Carpenter lot. The fact does not, however, answer the basic question in this appeal: what is the nature of Carpenter's use of the property as it relates to his trucks and trailers?
{11} Relying on the trial court's finding that "[t]here is substantial evidence to establish that [Carpenter] is not engaging in prohibited commercial activity on the subject property," Carpenter points to his own testimony at trial, as well as that of two other lot owners in the Subdivision, all of whom testified that they did not consider Carpenter to be operating or running a business in the Subdivision. While we agree that these three witnesses provided their assessment of Carpenter's activities, the ultimate determination as to the nature of this activity is a question of law. See State ex rel. Martinez v. Lewis, 116 N.M. 194, 201, 861 P.2d 235, 242 (Ct.App.1993).
{12} The issue is whether Carpenter's actions on Lot 6 of the Subdivision constitute...
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