Luis R., In re

• Decision Date: 04 August 1987
• Docket Number: No. 13009,13009
• Citation: 528 A.2d 1146,204 Conn. 630
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: In re LUIS R. *

Page 1146

528 A.2d 1146

204 Conn. 630

In re LUIS R. ^*

No. 13009.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 4, 1987.

Decided Aug. 4, 1987.

Francis J. Carino, Chief State's Advocate, Hartford, for appellant (petitioner).

John T. Short, Jr., Sp. Public Defender, with whom was Christopher Sheehan, Hartford, for appellee (respondent).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, SANTANIELLO, HULL and HIGGINS, JJ.

SANTANIELLO, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal by the state from an order of the trial court barring the defendant, who was adjudicated a delinquent for aiding another in committing a serious juvenile offense, from himself being charged as a serious juvenile offender.

The factual and procedural posture of this case is as follows: On November 25, 1985, a fifteen year old boy was robbed at knifepoint of a radio that he was carrying. The defendant, a minor, admitted in court that he had intentionally aided another person in the commission of the robbery. On April 25, 1986, the defendant was adjudicated a delinquent child for being an accessory to a robbery in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-135 and 53a-8. The defendant filed a motion on May 19, 1986, seeking an order of the court barring his adjudication as a "serious juvenile offender" as defined in General Statutes § 46b-120. ¹ On July 1, 1986, the court granted the motion and the defendant was sentenced and committed to the department of children and youth services (DCYS) for placement at the Long Lane School as a delinquent child for a maximum period not to exceed two years. This appeal was filed by the state in the Appellate Court on July 18, 1986, and on August 12, 1986, this court transferred the appeal to itself.

Initially, both parties to this action concede that there are distinct and substantial differences between being adjudicated a "delinquent" as compared to being adjudicated a "serious juvenile offender." The consequences of the more serious designation are delineated in General Statutes §§ 46b-141, ² 46b-140, ³ 46b-126, ⁴ and 46b-140(e)(2). ⁵ Therefore, in view of the substantial differences of the potential penalties, the state is pursuing this appeal.

The state in its appeal, claims that the defendant should have been charged and prosecuted as a "serious juvenile offender" because the defendant had intentionally aided another who had committed a "serious juvenile offense," as defined in General Statutes § 46b-120. It claims that under the mandate of General Statutes § 53a-8, ⁶ the defendant should be "criminally liable for such conduct" and should be prosecuted and punished "as if he were the principal offender."

The defendant, to the contrary, contends that since General Statutes § 46b-120 specifies the offenses that constitute "serious juvenile offenses" without mentioning "aiding and abetting" as defined by § 53a-8, the defendant cannot be charged as a "serious juvenile offender." He further claims that since statutes defining juvenile delinquency, such as § 46b-120, set standards governing the deprivation of a child's liberty, they are penal in nature and thus are to be strictly construed. State v. Cook, 183 Conn. 520, 522, 441 A.2d 41 (1981); State v. Tedesco, 175 Conn. 279, 291, 397 A.2d 1352 (1978).

Although the state concedes that § 46b-120 is penal in nature, and, as such, must be strictly construed, it argues that the entire scheme of the statutes must be considered as a whole, and that one who aids another in the commission of a "serious juvenile offense" may be adjudicated a "serious juvenile offender." Strict construction does not mean that a statute must be read in isolation. " 'In construing a statute, common sense must be used, and courts will assume that the legislature intended to accomplish a reasonable and rational result.' " State v. Roque, 190 Conn. 143, 151, 460 A.2d 26 (1983), citing Stoni v. Wasicki, 179 Conn. 372, 376-77, 426 A.2d 774 (1979). "The rule of strict construction does not require that the narrowest technical meaning be given to the words employed in a criminal statute in disregard of their context and in frustration of the obvious legislative intent." State v. Faro, 118 Conn. 267, 274, 171 A. 660 (1934), quoting United States v. Corbett, 215 U.S. 233, 242, 30 S.Ct. 81, 84, 54 L.Ed. 173 (1909); State v. Ellis, 197 Conn. 436, 445, 497 A.2d 974 (1985); cf. Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 489, 400 A.2d 726 (1978); Evening Sentinel v. National Organization for Women, 168 Conn. 26, 31, 357 A.2d 498 (1975).

The state claims that the defendant should be charged as a serious juvenile offender because he was an accessory to robbery. Being an accessory is not a crime in and of itself, but is only another way of committing a crime. General Statutes § 53a-8 provides in relevant part that "[a] person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense, who ... intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable for such conduct ... as if he were the principal offender." Here, the defendant admitted in court that he had intentionally aided another person in the commission of the crime of robbery in the second degree. That crime is listed as one of the "serious juvenile offense[s]" that may, under § 46b-120, result in classification of a juvenile as a "serious juvenile offender." Despite the omission of accessory status under § 53a-8 in the litany of crimes listed in § 46b-120, a list that specifically includes reference to "attempt" under General Statutes § 53a-49 and "conspiracy" under § 53a-48, the state maintains that our penal code, read as a whole, does not exclude an accessory from being charged as a "serious juvenile offender." We find the defendant's argument that he cannot be adjudicated as a "serious juvenile offender" because § 46b-120 sets forth attempt and conspiracy as "serious juvenile offense[s]" while it fails to set forth accessorial liability as such an offense to be without merit.

We have recently addressed the differences between the crimes of attempt and conspiracy, and accessorial liability. State v. Foster, 202 Conn. 520, 522 A.2d 277 (1987). In Foster, supra, 527-28, 522 A.2d 277, we stated that "[a]ttempt and conspiratorial liability differ substantially from the liability imposed on an accessory.... [B]oth attempt and conspiracy are offenses in and of themselves, while accessorial liability is not. ⁷ Attempt is a distinct, inchoate offense and a defendant may be punished for attempting to commit a substantive offense without actually committing the crime. General Statutes §§ 53a-49, 53a-51; see State v. Trent, 182 Conn. 595, 600, 438 A.2d 796 (1981). Likewise, conspiracy has been recognized as being a crime distinct from the commission of the substantive offense. See General Statutes § 53a-48. 'We have repeatedly held that conspiracy is a common-law crime and punishable as such under the statutes relating to the punishment of high crimes and misdemeanors. The commission of the substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit it are separate and distinct crimes.... The crime of conspiracy is dependent on clear principles, and has characteristics and ingredients which separate it from all other crimes.' State v. Johnson, 162 Conn. 215, 218-19, 292 A.2d 903 (1972); see State v. Crump, [201 Conn. 489, 497, 518 A.2d 378 (1986) ]; State v. Baker, 195 Conn. 598, 608, 489 A.2d 1041 (1985).

"There is, however, no such crime as 'being an accessory.' State v. Edwards, 201 Conn. 125, 130, 513 A.2d 669 (1986); State v. Harris, 198 Conn. 158, 163, 502 A.2d 880 (1985); State v. Baker, supra. The defendant is charged with committing one substantive offense; '[t]he accessory statute merely provides alternate means by which a substantive crime may be committed.' State v. Baker, supra; State v. Edwards upra, [201 Conn. at] 131 ."

"Moreover, because accessorial liability is not a distinct crime, but only an alternative means by which a substantive crime may be committed, it would be illogical to impose liability on the perpetrator of the crime, while precluding liability for an accessory, even though both possess the mental state required for the commission of the crime. Connecticut 'long ago adopted the rule that there is no practical significance in being labeled an "accessory" or a "principal" for the purpose of determining criminal responsibility. See State v. Gargano, 99 Conn. 103, 109, 121 A. 657 (1923); State v. Hamlin, 47 Conn. 95, 118 (1879); General Statutes (1875 Rev.) p. 545. The modern approach "is to abandon completely the old common law terminology and simply provide that a person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when he is an accomplice of the other person in the commission of the crime. Such is the view taken in the Model Penal Code, which provides that a person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he solicits the other person to commit it, or aids or agrees or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it, or (having a legal duty to prevent the crime) failed to make the proper effort to prevent it." LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law (1972) § 63, p. 501; see also Model Penal Code (1985) § 2.06, comment 6. Connecticut has taken the same approach through General Statutes § 53a-8. See State v. Baker, supra.' State v. Harris, supra." State v. Foster, supra, 202 Conn. at 532-33, 522 A.2d 277.

Since § 53a-8 does not define a separate distinct crime, but only describes an alternative means by which a substantive crime may be committed, the defendant may be considered a serious juvenile offender for the purposes of § 46b-120 by having intentionally aided another in the commission of a "serious juvenile offense" as defined by that statute.

There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded for...