Luken v. Edwards
| Decision Date | 03 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. C10-4097-MWB,C10-4097-MWB |
| Parties | GENE C. LUKEN, Plaintiff, v. TINA MARIE EDWARDS, formerly TINA MARIE LUKEN, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
A. Standards For A Motion To Dismiss........................ 4
B. Analysis of Luken's Claims..............................7
1. Title III claim................................7
2. Invasion of privacy claim........................ 10
a. Invasion of privacy under Iowa law............. 11
b. Intrusion upon seclusion theory............... 12
3. Iowa 808B claim.............................. 16
4. Invasion of attorney-client privilege claim............. 18
This case represents the federal fallout from the marital dissolution proceeding between plaintiff Gene C. Luken ("Luken") and his former wife, defendant Tina Marie Edwards, f.k.a. Tina Marie Luken ("Edwards"). Edwards seeks the dismissal of all claims against her, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), for failure to state a claim.
A. Procedural Background
On October 22, 2010, plaintiff Gene C. Luken filed his Complaint against defendant Tina Marie Edwards alleging four causes of action. In Count I, Luken contends Edwards violated Title III of the Omnibus Crime and Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 ("Title III" or "the Act") by intercepting telephone calls between him and other individuals, including his attorney. In Count II, Luken asserts an Iowa common law claim for invasion of attorney-client privilege based on Edwards's interception his telephone calls. Count III contains an Iowa common law claim for invasion of privacy and Count IV alleges a claim under Iowa's wiretapping act, Iowa Code § 808B.8.
On December 1, 2010, Edwards moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Specifically, Edwards contends the Complaint contains legal conclusions and the elements of the causes of action in conclusory terms, and fails to provide the factual basis which would support such claims. Edwards also argues Luken's invasion of attorney-client privilege claim should be dismissed because Iowa courts have never recognized such a claim. On December 3, 2010, Luken filed an Amended Complaint in which he again alleges the same four causes of action against Edwards. On December 7, 2010, Luken filed his resistance to Edwards's motion. Lukenargues the Amended Complaint clearly states factual allegations supporting each of his claims. He also argues that Iowa courts have recognized the attorney-client privilege as a common law right and its breach by Edwards constitutes a viable cause of action. On December 13, 2010, Edwards filed a reply brief in which she argues that the Amended Complaint contains the same defects as the original Complaint and Luken's claims against her should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
B. Factual Background
On a motion to dismiss, I assume all facts alleged in Luken's Amended Complaint are true, and liberally construe those allegations. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) () (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). I draw the following factual background in such a manner.
Plaintiff Gene C. Luken is a resident of Spirit Lake, Iowa. Defendant Tina Marie Edwards is a resident of Dickinson County, Iowa. Luken and Edwards were married. On July 24, 2008, a petition to dissolve their marriage was filed. A divorce decree in their case was filed on June 1, 2010. Luken and Edwards lived in the same residence while their divorce was pending. After their divorce, they continued to live in the same residence for sixty days.
Luken "had an expectation of privacy both while conversing with his counsel and conversing with others." Amended Compl. at ¶ 18. Edwards intercepted telephone calls between Luken and other individuals, including his attorney, while Luken and Edwards's divorce was pending. Edwards listened to Luken and his attorney discussing pretrial, trial, and post-trial strategy, and took notes of these conversations. Edwards used and disclosedthese conversations. Luken was disadvantaged throughout the divorce because Edwards knew what Luken and his counsel were planning, frustrating his attempts to settle before and after trial.
Edwards seeks dismissal of all claims for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). After reviewing the standards for a motion to dismiss, I will address the specific issues raised by Edwards's motion seriatim.1
A. Standards For A Motion To Dismiss
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for a motion to
dismiss on the basis of "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."2 In its decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Supreme Court revisited the standards for determining whether factual allegations are sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," in order to "give the defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests," Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, ibid.; Sanjuan v. American Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (C.A.7 1994), a plaintiff's obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to relief" requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986) (). Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, see 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed.2004) (hereinafter Wright & Miller) (" [T]he pleading must contain something more... than... a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action"), on the ASSUMPTION THAT ALL THE allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact), see, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, n. 1, 122 S. Ct. 992, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2002); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989) (); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974) ().
Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555-56 (footnote omitted); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (). Thus, theEighth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that, under Bell Atlantic, "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain factual allegations sufficient 'to raise a right to relief above the speculative level....'" Parkhurst v. Tabor, 569 F.3d 861, 865 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555). To put it another way, "the complaint must allege 'only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 569 F.3d 383, 387 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 570); accord Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 () (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 557).
Nevertheless, the court must still "accept as true the plaintiff's well pleaded allegations." Parkhurst, 569 F.3d at 865 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 32627 (1989)); B&B Hardware, Inc., 569 F.3d at 387 ("[W]e 'assume[] as true all factual allegations of the complaint'" (quoting Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2007)). The court must also still "construe the complaint liberally in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp., 514 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2008) (post-Bell Atlantic decision). On the other hand, "[w]here the allegations show on the face of the complaint that there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is [still] appropriate." Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) ().
B. Analysis of Luken's Claims
1. Title III claim
Edwards seeks dismissal of Luken's Title III claim. She argues Luken has failed to allege sufficient facts to obtain relief under Title III because his allegations are almost entirely legal conclusions which must be disregarded under Iqbal. Luken counters, arguing his factual allegations in the Amended Complaint plausibly states a claim under the Act. Luken specifically asserts Edwards violated 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) when she...
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