Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Warren
| Decision Date | 08 May 1925 |
| Docket Number | (No. 1181.) |
| Citation | 272 S.W. 826 |
| Parties | LUMBERMEN'S RECIPROCAL ASS'N v. WARREN. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Angelina County; L. D. Guinn, Judge.
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by R. N. Warren for injuries, opposed by the Lumbermen's Reciprocal Association, insurer. From a judgment of the circuit court awarding a lump sum settlement, which had been denied by the Industrial Accident Board, insurer appeals. Affirmed.
Fairchild & Redditt, of Lufkin, for appellant.
Collins & Collins, of Lufkin, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court of Angelina county awarding appellee a lump sum settlement under our Workmen's Compensation Act. No question of liability was urged, but the sole issue was as to appellee's right to a lump sum settlement. Appellant defended on the theory that it was liable as long as appellee suffered a total disability, but urged that the injuries were not permanent, and a lump sum settlement would deprive it of the right of adjustment in the future. The trial was to a jury, and the case was submitted on special issues.
As we understand the record, possibly three days were consumed in the trial of the case. The statement of facts consists of seventy-nine pages, the charge of four pages, submitting ten issues, with definitions of the terms used. At the conclusion of the evidence, counsel for appellee presented to the court a written charge submitting the case on special issues. This was handed by the court to counsel for appellant, with the statement that it was to be considered as the court's charge and for their examination and criticism. Appellant's counsel then retired to their office for the purpose of preparing their exceptions, special charges, and special issues. After reading over the court's charge, leading counsel for appellant returned to the courthouse to discuss certain features of the charge with the court, but the court would not accept his verbal criticism. He then informed the court that it would require about two hours' time to complete his exceptions and preparation of special charges and issues. Counsel then returned to his office, and with his partner began the preparation of their exceptions, etc. Within the next hour the court had the sheriff's office phone counsel three times to make haste in the preparation of their exceptions. The third time the sheriff told counsel that the court would allow them only ten minutes more time when the case would be submitted to the jury. Counsel replied to the sheriff that they could not finish their exceptions, charges, and issues within that time, but would return to the court when they had finished the same. Some issue was made as to what was, in fact, said, or rather the meaning of what was said. From the report made to the court, the trial judge inferred that counsel meant to be disrespectful to him; that they refused to obey his request, and had sent word that they would come into court when they got ready. Counsel for appellant testified that they meant nothing of the kind, but intended to inform the sheriff that they would return when they were ready with their papers and were prepared to proceed, that is, after they had finished their charges, exceptions, and issues. Anyway, they failed to return within the time fixed by the court. Thereupon the court called in the jury, read to them the charge as submitted to counsel for appellant, refused to permit appellee's counsel, who were in court, to make an argument, and ordered the jury to retire and consider their verdict. About fifteen minutes afterward, counsel for appellant returned into court with their charges, exceptions, and issues, and then for the first time were advised that the court had submitted the case to the jury in their absence. The evidence shows conclusively that counsel were diligent to the utmost of their ability in the preparation of their exceptions, etc., and that it was not possible for them to complete their work within the time allowed them by the court.
We agree with appellant that the two hours' time, that being the extreme limit of time allowed by the court in which to prepare its charges, exceptions, and issues, was not a "reasonable time" within the meaning of article 1970, Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, which is as follows:
"In all civil cases the judge shall, unless the same be expressly waived by the parties to the suit, prepare and in open court, deliver a written charge to the jury on the law of the case, or submit issues of fact to...
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Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Guest, 1901.
...reference to the decision quoted. See Southern Surety Co. v. Arter, Tex.Com. App., 44 S.W.2d 913. In Lumbermen's Reciprocal Association v. Warren, Tex.Civ.App., 272 S.W. 826, 827, writ refused, an award of the Industrial Accident Board in all material respects substantially like the one und......
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Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Huntsman, 13852.
...finality because it provides for compensation at so much per week "not to exceed" a specified number of weeks. Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Warren, Tex.Civ.App., 272 S.W. 826, writ refused; Vestal v. Texas Emp. Ins. Ass'n, Tex.Com.App., 285 S.W. 1041; Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Baker, Te......
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General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Hames
...Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Chancellor, 105 S.W.2d 720 (Tex.Civ.App., El Paso 1937, writ dism'd); Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Warren, 272 S.W. 826 (Tex.Civ.App., Beaumont 1925, writ ref'd). In Middlebrook the award of the Board was for weekly benefits of $9 per week for an indefinite per......
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Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Baker
...decision of the board. The case was reversed on other grounds but not for want of finality in the award. In Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Warren, Tex.Civ.App., 272 S.W. 826, 827, writ refused, the Industrial Accident Board, in refusing Warren a lump sum, and in granting him an award on hi......