Luna v. Cerrillos Coal R. Co.

• Decision Date: 04 February 1911
• Citation: 16 N.M. 71,113 P. 831
• Parties: LUNAv.CERRILLOS COAL R. CO.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

16 N.M. 71

113 P. 831

LUNA

v.CERRILLOS COAL R. CO.

Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico.

Feb. 4, 1911.Rehearing Denied March 4, 1911.

Syllabus by the Court.

If, at the trial of a cause without a jury in a district court, the party requests the court to make findings of fact as provided by section 2999, Comp. Laws 1897, and in any appropriate way, before the rendition of the judgment, makes known to the court that he desires specific findings, and on what points he desires them, the court should make findings of the essential or determining facts on which its conclusion in the case was reached, specific enough to enable this court to review its decision on the same ground on which it was made.

Wright, J., dissenting.

Error to District Court, Santa Fé County; before Justice John R. McFie.

Action by Solomon Luna against the Cerrillos Coal Railroad Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed and remanded.

If, at the trial of a cause without a jury in a District Court, the party requests the court to make findings of fact as provided by Section 2999, Comp.Laws 1897, and in any appropriate way, before the rendition of the judgment, makes known to the court that he desires specific findings, and on what points he desires them, the court should make findings of the essential or determining facts on which its conclusion in the case was reached, specific enough to enable this court to review its decision on the same ground on which it was made.

This is an action of ejectment brought to recover an undivided interest in the Mesita de Juana Lopez grant. The complaint is in the form prescribed by statute, and, omitting the caption, is as follows:

“Solomon Luna, a resident of the county of Valencia in the territory aforesaid, complains of Cerrillos Coal Railroad Company, a corporation, in a plea of ejectment:

“For that whereas, heretofore, to wit, on the 15th day of January, 1898, at the county of Santa Fé, aforesaid, plaintiff was entitled to the possession of that certain piece or parcel of land situated in the county of Santa Fé aforesaid and commonly known as, and called, the grant of the Mesita de Juana Lopez, being the same tract of land covered by private land claim No. 64, which was confirmed by an act of Congress of the United States, approved January 28, 1879, which appears at page 592 of volume 20, c. 31, of the United States Statutes at Large; and afterwards, to wit, on the day and year aforesaid, at the county aforesaid, defendant entered into said premises and unlawfully withheld and thence hitherto has unlawfully withheld, and still does unlawfully withhold, from plaintiff possession thereof, to his damage in the sum of $25,000; wherefore plaintiff brings suit and prays judgment for recovery of the possession of said premises and for the sum of $25,000, his damages aforesaid and costs.”

The defendant pleaded not guilty, traversed the allegations of the complaint, but admitted possession of a portion of the grant, alleging that it had had rightful possession of such portion for more than 10 years prior to January 15, 1898. It also pleaded the statute of limitations as a defense in different ways. The plaintiff replied, traversing the new matter set up by the defendant.

By agreement the case was tried by the court without a jury, and the issues submitted were limited to the question of title as raised by the pleadings, and no evidence was taken of the value of improvements or the mesne profits. At the trial it was developed that the plaintiff claimed under purchases from descendants of Apolonia Romero and Patricio Romero, who the plaintiff undertook to to prove were children of Domingo Romero, one of the three to whom the grant was originally made in 1782. This the defendant denied. The defendant introduced evidence in support of its alleged right of possession of the Mesita de Juana Lopez grant, and also through the Ortiz Mine grant which was in conflict with the first-named grant, to the extent of between 11,000 and 12,000 acres. It also introduced evidence in support of its defense under the statute of limitations.

At the trial the plaintiff requested the court to give its decision in writing, to be filed with the clerk, and to “find the facts and give its conclusions of law pertinent to the case, in accordance with the requirements of section 2999, Comp. Laws 1897,” and the court thereupon gave its decision and made its findings in writing as follows:

“The above-entitled cause having been tried before the court without a jury, the same having been duly waived by the parties, and the testimony on behalf of each party having been heard, after due consideration of said testimony and arguments by the court, the court being fully advised in the premises, finds, as the facts in said cause:

“That said plaintiff, Solomon Luna, was not, on the 15th day of January, 1898, or at the time of the commencement of said action, to wit, on the 11th day of February, A. D. 1898, entitled to the possession of the property described in the said declaration or complaint, or any part thereof; that said defendant was at the time of the commencement of said action in possession of the said property; that said defendant did not, on the 15th day of January, A. D., 1898, enter into the said premises and unlawfully withhold the same from the plaintiff, nor did said defendant at any time after said 15th day of January, A. D. 1898, unlawfully withhold the same from the said plaintiff, nor did the defendant at the time of the commencement of said action unlawfully withhold the possession of said premises from said plaintiff in manner and form as alleged and charged against it in the declaration, or complaint, of said Solomon Luna, but that the said possession of said defendant of said property was lawful.

“As a conclusion of law the court finds: That plaintiff is not entitled to recover the possession of said property, or any part thereof, or any damages in said action, and that said defendant is not guilty of the said trespass or ejectment laid to its charge in manner and form as said Solomon Luna has complained against it.

“It is therefore considered by the court that said plaintiff take nothing by reason of the matters and things alleged in his said declaration or complaint, and that said defendant, the Cerrillos Coal Railroad Company, go hence without day and recover of said Solomon Luna its costs herein expended, to be taxed.”

The plaintiff objected and excepted on various grounds; one that the findings were not such as the statute contemplates, and specified numerous instances of failure to find facts alleged to be material. These objections the court overruled and the plaintiff excepted. He then filed a motion to have the findings made set aside and for a new trial, for the reason, with others, that “the court erred in overruling the plaintiff's objections, and each of them, to the said findings of fact.” The motion was denied, and the plaintiff duly excepted. All this was before judgment. Judgment was rendered on the findings made for the defendant, a bill of exceptions was allowed, and the cause was brought to this court on a writ of error.

Frank W. Clancy, for plaintiff in error. T. B. Catron, for defendant in error.

ABBOTT, J. (after stating the facts as above).

We have first to determine whether the attorney for the plaintiff duly and seasonably made known to the trial court his desire to have the court make specific findings of fact. His written request was for findings required by the statute (section 2999, Comp. Laws 1897), without stating in so many words that he desired them to be specific. We understand the practice of the district courts of the territory generally to be that in such cases the trial judge asks the attorney who has requested findings to make a draft of such findings as he desires, and submit it to the court and the opposing counsel. It does not appear that this course was followed in the present instance, but instead the court made the findings which have been cited from the record. To them the plaintiff's attorney filed objections so specific as fully to apprise the court of the findings he desired to have made, and when these objections were overruled, he excepted and moved to have the findings which had been made set aside, and for a new trial, on the ground, with others, that the findings were insufficient, which motions were overruled. All this was before judgment, and we think gave the trial court full opportunity to make specific findings, if it had thought proper to do so; and we think the plaintiff thereby became entitled to specific findings of fact, as he would have been upon a direct request for such findings. We are not unmindful of the many decisions from other jurisdictions brought forward in behalf of the defendant in support of its contention to the contrary. What we have to say on the subject, in discussing the other branch of the case, will apply in great measure on the question now under consideration.

Besides, the meaning of the provision in question has been twice considered by this court in recent cases. It was not necessary, in either case, to make a...