Luna v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 13 September 2016
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 15-395 KK
• Parties: JOSEPH LUNA, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

JOSEPH LUNA, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN,Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

Civ. No. 15-395 KK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

September 13, 2016

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER¹

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Social Security Administrative Record (Doc. 21), filed September 24, 2015, in support of Plaintiff Joseph Luna's ("Plaintiff") Complaint (Doc. 1) seeking review of the decision of Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, ("Defendant" or "Commissioner") denying Plaintiff's claim for Title II childhood disability benefits and Title XVI supplemental security income benefits. On November 19, 2015, Plaintiff filed his Motion to Reverse and Remand for Rehearing, With Supporting Memorandum ("Motion"). (Docs. 24, 25.) The Commissioner filed a Response in opposition on February 24, 2016 (Doc. 29), and Plaintiff filed a Reply on March 21, 2016. (Doc. 30.) The Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final decision under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c). Having meticulously reviewed the entire record and the applicable law and being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds the Motion is well taken and is GRANTED.²

I. Background and Procedural Record

Claimant Joseph Luna ("Mr. Luna") was initially found eligible as a child for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3). (Tr. 42.) Mr. Luna's SSI benefits were discontinued when he turned 18. (Tr. 42, 474.) Mr. Luna alleges here that he became disabled on May 18, 2012,³ at the age of nineteen, because of "3150,⁴ mental retardation, learning disabilities, depression, and chronic headaches." (Doc. 25 at 3, Tr. 232.⁵) Mr. Luna graduated from high school in 2011 and has no past relevant work history.⁶ (Tr. 30.)

On May 13, 201l,⁷ Mr. Luna filed an application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (Tr. 191-92.) This application was denied on October 5, 2011. (Tr. 90, 103, 112.) On January 5, 2012, Mr. Luna then protectively filed⁸ an application for childhood disability benefits ("CDB") under Title II, based on a parent's Social Security earnings. (Tr. 228-37.) Mr. Luna'sCDB application was initially denied on February 23, 2012. (Tr. 88, 89-98, 121-23.) On March 24, 2012, Mr. Luna requested reconsideration of his "SSI" [sic] application filed under his social security number and his CDB application filed under a parent's social security number. (Tr. 124.) Before there was a decision on his reconsideration, however, Mr. Luna filed an application for SSI benefits on May 24, 2012. (Tr. 194-99.) Mr. Luna's applications were denied at reconsideration on October 23, 2012. (Tr. 100, 101, 102-10, 111-19, 125-27, 128-31.) On December 17, 2012, Mr. Luna requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (Tr. 134-36.) On February 8, 2013, Attorney Barbara Jarvis submitted a Request for On-The-Record Favorable Decision ("Request") and represented that Mr. Luna was only making an SSI claim and requested his claim be reopened to the original filing date of May 3, 2011, and that his alleged onset date be amended to May 3, 2011. (Tr. 144-55.) The ALJ conducted a hearing on August 8, 2013.⁹ (Tr. 38-87.) Mr. Luna appeared in person at the hearing with Ms. Jarvis. (Tr. 40.) The ALJ took testimony from Mr. Luna (Tr. 47-78) and an impartial vocational expert ("VE"), Nicole King. (Tr. 40, 78-86.)

On December 30, 2013, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Tr. 19-32.) In arriving at her decision, the ALJ determined that Mr. Luna had not attained age 22 nor engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged disability onset date of July 4, 1993. (Tr. 24.) The ALJ found that Mr. Luna suffered from severe impairments of a learning disability, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, depression, and mixed migraines. (Id.) The ALJ also determined that Mr. Luna had a non-severe impairment related to his use of marijuana and Spice. (Tr. 25.) However, the ALJ found that these impairments, individually or in combination, did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id.)

Because she found that Mr. Luna's impairments did not meet a Listing, the ALJ then went on to assess Mr. Luna's residual functional capacity ("RFC"). The ALJ stated that

[a]fter careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: he can perform simple routine tasks with reasoning level one; and can perform jobs not requiring the ability to read instructions, write reports or perform math.

(Tr. 26.) The ALJ concluded that Mr. Luna had no past relevant work. (Tr. 30.) Based on the RFC and the testimony of the VE, the ALJ determined at step five that considering Mr. Luna's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that he could perform. (Tr. 30-31.)

On March 27, 2015, the Appeals Council issued its decision denying Mr. Luna's request for review and upholding the ALJ's final decision. (Tr. 1-3.) On May 7, 2015, Mr. Luna timely filed a Complaint seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision. (Doc. 1.)

II. Standard of Review

Judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of disability benefits is limited to whether the final decision¹⁰ is supported by substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards to evaluate the evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10^th Cir. 2004); Langley v. Barnhart, 373 F.3d 1116, 1118 (10^th Cir. 2004). In making these determinations, the Court must meticulously examine the entire record, but may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Flaherty v. Astrue, 515 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10^th Cir. 2007). In other words, the Court does not reexamine the issues de novo. Sisco v. U.S. Dep't. of Health & Human Servs., 10 F.3d 739, 741 (10^th Cir.1993). The Court will not disturb the Commissioner's final decision if it correctly applies legal standards and is based on substantial evidence in the record.

"Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Langley, 373 F.3d at 1118. Substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10^th Cir. 2007). A decision "is not based on substantial evidence if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record[,]" Langley, 373 F.3d at 1118, or "constitutes mere conclusion." Musgrave v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10^th Cir. 1992). The Court's examination of the record as a whole must include "anything that may undercut or detract from the [Commissioner's] findings in order to determine if the substantiality test has been met." Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257, 1262 (10^th Cir. 2005). "The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the] findings from being supported by substantial evidence." Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084 (quoting Zoltanski v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 372 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10^th Cir. 2004)). Thus, the Court "may not displace the agency's choice between two fairly conflicting views," even if the Court would have "made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo." Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1257-58 (10^th Cir. 2007).

"The failure to apply the correct legal standard or to provide this court with a sufficient basis to determine that appropriate legal principles have been followed is grounds for reversal." Jensen v. Barnhart, 436 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10^th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). As such, even if a reviewing court agrees with the Commissioner's ultimate decision to deny benefits, it cannot affirm that decision if the reasons for finding a claimant not disabled were arrived at using incorrect legal standards, or are not articulated with sufficient particularity. Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10^th Cir. 1996). "[T]he record must demonstrate that theALJ considered all of the evidence, but an ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence." Id. at 1009-10. Rather, the ALJ need only discuss the evidence supporting his decision, along with any "uncontroverted evidence he chooses not to rely upon, as well as significantly probative evidence he rejects." Id.; Mays v. Colvin, 739 F.3d 569, 576 (10^th Cir. 2014).

III. Applicable Law and Sequential Evaluation Process

Disability under the Social Security Act is defined as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A claimant is disabled under the Act if his "physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). To qualify for disability insurance benefits, a claimant must establish a severe physical or mental impairment expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of twelve months, which prevents the claimant from engaging in substantial gainful activity. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10^th Cir. 1993).

When considering a disability application, the Commissioner uses a five-step sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987). At the first four steps of the evaluation process, the claimant must show that: (1) he is not engaged...