Luna v. State

• Decision Date: 29 October 2008
• Docket Number: No. AP-75358.,AP-75358.
• Parties: Joe LUNA, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

268 S.W.3d 594

Joe LUNA, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas.

No. AP-75358.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

October 29, 2008.

Hilary Sheard, Senior Assistant Appellate Public Defender, San Antonio, for Appellant.

Enrico B. Valdez, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, San Antonio, Jeffrey L. Van Horn, State's Attorney, Austin, for State.

OPINION

PRICE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

The appellant was convicted in March 2006, of capital murder.¹ The appellant pleaded guilty in front of the jury, and based on the jury's answers to the special issues set forth in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.071, sections 2(b) and 2(e), the trial judge sentenced the appellant to death.² Direct appeal to this Court is automatic.³ After reviewing the appellant's twenty-five points of error, we find them to be without merit. Consequently, we affirm the trial court's judgment and sentence of death.

In the appellant's first point of error, he contends that the trial court "erred in conducting an unauthorized ad hoc proceeding which failed to provide a separate sentencing process as required by statute." In his second point of error, he asserts that the trial court "erred in conducting an unauthorized procedure which failed to provide a properly bifurcated trial in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth [A]mendments to the United States Constitution."

At the commencement of the trial on the merits, the trial court read the indictment and the appellant pleaded guilty in the presence of the jury. The trial court then excused the jury and admonished the appellant of the consequences of his plea. The parties also discussed how to proceed, concluding as follows:

THE COURT: [W]hat I plan to do is bring the jury back in, instruct them that you have entered a plea of guilty to the offense of capital murder. I will then move into the punishment phase of the trial. I guess it's a combination of punishment slash guilt-innocence. There will not be a jury charge until we conclude this phase. Upon the conclusion of all the evidence, I will give them a charge that instructs them to find you guilty. And that charge will also include the special issues that they will be required to answer. So this phase of the trial will include evidence from both the indicted case and any extraneous matters.

Anything else?

[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, may the record reflect that we have conferred with counsel outside—well, with the Court as to the procedure in reference to the submission of the charge, of the direction of the verdict of guilty, as well as the questions to be asked, to be done in a unified fashion in one verdict form, and one charging instrument, and that is agreeable to the parties?

THE COURT: Okay.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It is agreeable, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else before we get started?

I propose we bring the jury in and I'll instruct them that he has entered a plea of guilty and we'll move right into the evidence.

The trial court then recalled the jury and reiterated that the appellant had pleaded guilty to the indictment. The trial court explained that the parties would present evidence on both guilt and punishment and then the jury would receive a "charge that instructs you what to do as it relates to both phases of the trial." After the parties presented evidence, the trial court first read the jury charge on guilt/innocence. The jurors deliberated on guilt/innocence and returned a verdict finding the appellant guilty of capital murder as charged in the indictment. The trial court then read the punishment charge and the parties made closing arguments. The jurors deliberated on punishment and the trial court sentenced the appellant to death based on their answers to the special issues on the verdict form.

The appellant argues that Article 37.071 mandates a bifurcated proceeding in a capital case. He relies on the version of the statute in effect at the time he committed the offense, which states in pertinent part:

If a defendant is tried for a capital offense in which the state seeks the death penalty, on a finding that the defendant is guilty of a capital offense, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.[⁴]

The appellant complains that the jury in the instant case "received no clear instruction as to the necessity of mentally separating the two considerations of guilt and sentencing," that these issues were presented to the jury "in close temporal proximity," and that, as a result, "the jury may all too easily have misunderstood its role" and "assumed that a negative outcome for [the appellant] was dictated twice over." He acknowledges that a bifurcated proceeding is not "constitutionally mandated," but argues that it should be. He also asserts that, because bifurcated proceedings are mandated by Article 37.071, there is a "constitutionally cognizable due process interest in such a proceeding."

We decline to hold that bifurcated proceedings are statutorily or constitutionally mandated. In Holland v. State, we rejected the argument that Article 37.071 mandates a bifurcated proceeding in capital cases.⁵ As we stated in Williams v. State:

[T]he plea of guilty before a jury essentially becomes a trial on punishment since entry of a plea of guilty before a jury establishes a defendant's guilt except where evidence demonstrates his innocence. (Citations omitted). The introduction of evidence is not to determine guilt but is to enable the jury to intelligently exercise discretion in determining the appropriate punishment.[⁶]

Further, as we recently held in Fuller v. State, once a defendant pleads guilty to a jury, "[t]he case simply proceeds with a unitary punishment hearing."⁷ Points of error one and two are overruled.

In points of error three and four, the appellant claims that the trial court denied him due process and violated Article 46B.004 when it failed to conduct an "adequate" inquiry on the issue of his competency. In points of error five and six, the appellant argues that the trial court denied him due process and violated Article 26.13 when it accepted his guilty plea without an "adequate" competency inquiry.⁸

A person is incompetent to stand trial if he lacks (1) a sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.⁹ Either party may suggest by motion, or the trial court may suggest on its own motion, that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial.¹⁰ If evidence suggesting that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial comes to the attention of the trial court, then the trial court on its own motion shall suggest that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial.¹¹ On suggestion that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial, the trial court shall determine by "informal inquiry" whether there is some evidence from any source that would support a finding that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial.¹²

The trial court inquired about the appellant's competency several times during the proceedings. When the appellant initially pleaded guilty to the charges in the indictment, the trial court admonished him of the consequences of his plea. The appellant stated that he understood the admonishments, that his plea was not the result of threats or promises, and that he was satisfied with the assistance of defense counsel. The trial court asked defense counsel if the appellant had "a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings," if he was "able to assist in the preparation of any possible defenses," and if he was "mentally competent" to waive his rights and enter a guilty plea. Defense counsel replied to all of these questions in the affirmative.

The appellant later testified at trial, against the advice of defense counsel. Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel questioned the appellant about his decision to testify and his awareness of the consequences of doing so. The appellant repeatedly indicated an understanding of the consequences of his decision to testify. The trial court asked defense counsel if he believed that the appellant had "a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings" and was "mentally competent" to waive his Fifth Amendment rights and to testify in front of the jury. Defense counsel replied in the affirmative. The trial court also questioned the appellant, who said that he understood his Fifth Amendment right not to testify and the consequences of waiving that right. He also acknowledged that no one threatened him or coerced him to testify.

The trial court again inquired about the appellant's competency prior to closing arguments, when the appellant consented to the seating of an alternate juror.¹³ Defense counsel stated that he was not in favor of seating the alternate juror because she was, in his opinion, "extremely pro-death sentence." The trial court then questioned defense counsel and the appellant as follows:

THE COURT: [Defense counsel], are you confident that your client—I've asked this before, but as to this issue— has a rational and factual understanding of the issues we're dealing with this morning?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He does. There's no doubt about that. I think Doctor Skop has testified, also, as to his mental condition.

THE COURT: And in your opinion is he mentally competent at this time to be able to make that type of a decision?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, he is.

* * *

THE COURT: Right. [Appellant], do you understand everything we've done up here?

[APPELLANT]: I understand.

THE COURT: Do you have any questions about anything we've gone over?

[APPELLANT]: No.

THE COURT: Were you able to effectively communicate with your attorney this morning regarding not only the issue of the lawyer—or the juror's being ill this morning, but the issues related...