Lundberg v. Single Men's Endowment Association

Decision Date26 October 1889
Citation43 N.W. 394,41 Minn. 508
PartiesMatilda Lundberg v. Single Men's Endowment Association
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Plaintiff brought this action in the district court for Hennepin county, under Gen. St. 1878, c. 76, against the defendant, which, it is alleged "is and for more than three years last past has been a de facto domestic corporation, claiming to be duly incorporated under the laws of this state, and acting and contracting as such corporation under the name" by which it is impleaded. The complaint alleges the recovery of a judgment for $ 1,177 by plaintiff against defendant on October 1, 1887, and execution returned unsatisfied on December 29, 1887, and that the judgment is wholly unpaid, and the defendant is insolvent. The relief demanded is the appointment of a receiver, the taking of an account of the company's assets and liabilities, the ascertaining and enforcement of the liabilities of its officers, etc., in accordance with the statute. The action was tried by Hicks, J., who on November 9, 1888, filed his decision and order for judgment in favor of plaintiff, that a receiver be appointed, etc., but not naming any person as receiver. On November 26, 1888, the defendant appealed to this court "from the order and interlocutory judgment of this court in this action, entered on the 9th day of November, appointing Charles H. Chadbourne, Esq. receiver," etc., and a supersedeas bond was approved and filed. On January 2, 1889, judgment was entered by the clerk in accordance with the decision and order of November 9 1888, but naming Charles H. Chadbourne as receiver. On April 1, 1889, the defendant appealed from this judgment. On April 16, 1889, on the first appeal, judgment of affirmance was entered in this court for failure of the appellant to serve a paper book.

Judgment affirmed.

M. B. Koon and M. A. Spooner, for appellant.

Chas. C. Willson, for respondent.

OPINION

Gilfillan, C. J.

The appellant claims there should be a reversal for two reasons First, because a prior appeal with a stay-bond stayed proceedings in the action at the time the judgment in this appeal was entered; second, because the findings of the court and direction for judgment did not authorize the clerk to enter judgment naming a receiver, no receiver being named in the findings or direction for judgment. Assuming the facts to be as assumed by the appellant, there is no matter of error such as this court...

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