Lunde v. Helms

Decision Date06 July 1994
Docket NumberNo. 93-2957,93-2957
Citation29 F.3d 367
Parties93 Ed. Law Rep. 48 Karen R. LUNDE, Appellant, v. Charles M. HELMS, Associate Dean for Student Affairs and Curriculum, College of Medicine, University of Iowa; John W. Eckstein, Dean of the College of Medicine, University of Iowa; College of Medicine, University of Iowa; Hunter R. Rawlings, III, President, University of Iowa; Jerald W. Dallam, Registrar, University of Iowa; University of Iowa, State of Iowa, Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Paul D. Lunde, Johnston, IA, argued for appellant.

John Parmeter, Asst. Atty. Gen., Des Moines, IA, argued for appellee.

Before McMILLIAN, WOLLMAN and MAGILL, Circuit Judges.

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

Karen R. Lunde appeals from a final order entered in the District Court 1 for the Southern The following is an abbreviated statement of the facts. The facts have been set forth in some detail in the state appellate court opinion. Lunde v. Iowa Board of Regents, 487 N.W.2d 357 (Iowa Ct.App.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 377, 121 L.Ed.2d 288 (1992); see also Lunde v. Helms, 898 F.2d 1343 (8th Cir.) (per curiam) (appeal of stay of district court proceedings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 897, 111 S.Ct. 249, 112 L.Ed.2d 208 (1990).

District of Iowa granting summary judgment in favor of defendants, the University of Iowa and several individual university officials, because res judicata barred litigation of her amended complaint. Lunde v. Helms, No. 4-89-CV-80128 (S.D.Iowa July 2, 1993). For reversal Lunde argues the district court erred in (1) denying the motion to recuse and (2) granting summary judgment in favor of defendants. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the order of the district court.

In 1987 Lunde received unsatisfactory reviews in three clinical rotations during her third year of medical school at the University of Iowa. The medical school placed her on academic probation. Lunde continued to have problems in clinical rotations and was granted a leave of absence. Lunde re-enrolled in June 1988 but continued to have clinical performance problems. On February 16, 1989, following an evaluation of her clinical performance, the medical school's committee on student promotions recommended cancellation of her registration in the medical school (in effect, dismissing her). The dismissal was reviewed and affirmed by the executive committee of the medical council and by the university's vice-president of academic affairs.

Earlier, on February 1, 1989, Lunde had filed a civil rights action in federal district court, alleging that she was about to be wrongfully dismissed from medical school. She sought declaratory relief, a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. She later dismissed the initial complaint and, on February 15, 1989, filed an amended complaint alleging her dismissal was the result of sex discrimination. On February 16, 1989, the district court held a hearing and denied her request for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. (That was also the day the medical school dismissed her.) On March 22, 1989, the district court heard additional arguments. Lunde filed new motions for preliminary injunctive relief; defendants filed motions to dismiss. Lunde amended her complaint to allege her dismissal was punishment for exercising her first amendment rights and a denial of due process. In August 1989 the district court held additional hearings.

On August 31, 1989, the district court stayed further proceedings pending the outcome of administrative and state judicial proceedings concerning Lunde's challenge to her dismissal from medical school. The district court further noted that it would vacate the stay and hold further proceedings if Lunde demonstrated that any administrative and state judicial proceedings plainly infringed her constitutional rights or federal statutory rights and that the state courts refused to address or remedy them. Lunde appealed the stay order, and this court affirmed the stay as a matter of docket management. Lunde v. Helms, 898 F.2d at 1345.

In September 1989 the university board of regents denied Lunde's appeal of her dismissal. In October 1989 Lunde filed a petition for judicial review of the university's decision in state district court. Lunde expressly asserted that she was reserving her federal claims for litigation in federal district court; nevertheless, she vigorously litigated all of her federal claims in the state courts. Specifically, Lunde claimed that she was entitled to "contested case" procedures 2 and that defendants had discriminated against her on the basis of sex and had denied her freedom of speech, due process and equal protection. The state district court ruled Lunde then returned to federal district court and moved to dissolve the stay. She also moved to recuse the district judge on the ground of bias and prejudice. The district court vacated the stay, denied the motion to recuse and granted Lunde leave to file an amended complaint, adding a Title IX damages claim and a demand for a jury trial. Defendants filed an answer and a motion for summary judgment. Lunde filed a motion for partial summary judgment. Following a hearing conducted by telephone conference call, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the ground of res judicata. The district court specifically noted that Lunde had already litigated in state court her claims that she had been dismissed from medical school because of sex discrimination, in retaliation for expressing her political views or opinions critical of medical school professors or in violation of due process and equal protection. Slip op. at 7-13. This appeal followed. We affirm.

that the dismissal was not a contested case under state law and, following a full adversarial trial, including the opportunity to present new evidence and to cross-examine witnesses, found that Lunde had been dismissed solely for academic reasons, not because of sex discrimination or in retaliation for expressing political views or opinions critical of medical school professors, and had not been denied due process or equal protection. The state appellate court affirmed, the state supreme court declined review, and the Supreme Court denied Lunde's petition for writ of certiorari.

MOTION TO RECUSE

Lunde first argues the district court erred in denying the motion to recuse. Lunde argues the district judge was biased and prejudiced against her, in part because of his association with the University of Iowa, a party defendant. The district judge is a graduate of the University of Iowa College of Law. Lunde also argues the district judge has a "financial interest" in the University of Iowa because he had made financial contributions to the Iowa Law School Foundation and had presented two educational programs at the University of Iowa. Lunde further argues the district judge had a financial interest because her lawsuit, if successful, would result in a multi-million dollar judgment against the University of Iowa.

As a preliminary matter, we note that the district court could have denied the motion to recuse as untimely filed. The original complaint was filed in February 1989; the first amended complaint was filed in August 1989. The motion to recuse was not filed until December 1992. Allowing for the time the federal proceedings had been stayed, some seven or eight months had elapsed between the filing of the complaint and the motion to recuse. See, e.g., Willner v. University of Kansas, 848 F.2d 1023, 1028 (10th Cir.1988) (motion to recuse filed some 10 months after complaint was untimely) (citing cases), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1031, 109 S.Ct. 840, 102 L.Ed.2d 972 (1989). However, the district court did not rely on this ground and denied the motion to recuse on the merits.

We review rulings on motions to recuse for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Gray v. University of Arkansas, 883 F.2d 1394, 1398 (8th Cir.1989) (judge's partnership five years earlier with member of Board of Trustees, a party defendant, was not grounds for recusal). The test is one of objective reasonableness, that is, whether the judicial officer's impartiality might reasonably be questioned under the circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 455(a).

We hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to recuse. We do not think that the district judge's having graduated from the university law school, even though the university is a party defendant, without more, is a reasonable basis for questioning the judge's impartiality. See Easley v. University of Michigan Board of Regents, 906 F.2d 1143, 1146-47 (6th Cir.1990) (judge's graduation...

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