Lunde v. Iowa Bd. of Regents, 91-760

• Decision Date: 24 March 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-760,91-760
• Parties: 76 Ed. Law Rep. 851 Karen R. LUNDE, Appellant, v. IOWA BOARD OF REGENTS, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Court of Appeals

Page 357

487 N.W.2d 357

76 Ed. Law Rep. 851

Karen R. LUNDE, Appellant, v. IOWA BOARD OF REGENTS, Appellee.

No. 91-760.

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

March 24, 1992.

Paul D. Lunde, Ames, for appellant.

Bonnie J. Campbell, Atty. Gen., Gordon E. Allen, Deputy Atty. Gen., and John M. Parmeter, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Heard by DONIELSON, P.J., and HAYDEN and HABHAB, JJ.

HABHAB, Judge.

In 1987, during her third year of medical school at the University of Iowa, Karen R. Lunde received unsatisfactory reviews in three clinical rotations: neurology, urology, and obstetrics-gynecology. The School of Medicine (medical school) ¹ placed her on academic probation on January 18, 1988. While on probation, she received an incomplete after six weeks in a pediatric clerkship. She later repeated two weeks of that clerkship.

Karen R. Lunde's academic progress was reviewed by the Committee on Student Promotions in several meetings at which she appeared and made statements. The Promotions Committee recommended cancellation of her registration in the medical school. The matter was reviewed by the Medical Council and Executive Committee which canceled her medical school registration. The Assistant Dean of Academic Affairs affirmed the dismissal. The Board of Regents upheld the decision of the College of Medicine.

In all stages of these proceedings the University and Board of Regents declined to use contested case procedures as advocated by Karen R. Lunde's attorney. Rather, the dismissal was conducted following the informal "meet and confer" procedures set out in the medical school's student handbook.

She appealed to the district court which affirmed the dismissal. The court believed that she was not entitled to contested case proceedings before the University. It rejected her claim of discrimination on the basis of sex, violation of her rights to freedom of speech, and equal protection. The court concluded that only valid academic criteria were applied in her dismissal. She has appealed. We affirm.

I. Issues.

After reviewing the briefs by the parties, we are convinced there are two main issues properly before this court. The first and preliminary issue is whether Karen R. Lunde was entitled to contested case proceedings prior to her dismissal. The second is whether from the evidence we should uphold the medical school's dismissal of her for academic reasons. We determine the other issues, including the first-amendment issues, raised by Karen R. Lunde in her brief are without merit. ²

II. Contested Case.

The trial court ruled this action was not a "contested case" as defined by Iowa Code 17A.2(2). Rather, it held the present case was "other agency action." We set out the pertinent code section.

"Contested case" means a proceeding including but not restricted to ratemaking, price fixing, and licensing in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by Constitution or statute to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing.

Iowa Code section 17A.2(2).

There is a significant difference between the procedural requirements for a "contested case" and "other agency action." A "contested case" requires a formal evidentiary adversarial hearing before the agency. "Other agency action" entitles the person affected to no more than an informal hearing, without the procedural due process safeguards inherent in an adversarial proceeding. See Hollinrake v. Law Enforcement Academy, 452 N.W.2d 598, 601-602 (Iowa 1990); see also Bonfield, The Definition of Formal Agency Action Under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, 63 Iowa L.Rev. 285 (1977). The contested case requirement is premised on procedural due process considerations. Hollinrake, 452 N.W.2d at 602. "When a decision is based solely on legislative facts, due process does not require a hearing...." Id. (emphasis added).

The United States Supreme Court, in Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 98 S.Ct. 948, 55 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978), considered the procedural due process issue in a case similar to the one presently before us. In that case, as in this one, a female medical student was dismissed for inability to successfully complete the clinical rotations to the satisfaction of her medical professors. Id. at 81-82, 98 S.Ct. at 950-51, 55 L.Ed.2d at 129-30.

The student in Horowitz attacked her dismissal on the grounds of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 79-80, 98 S.Ct. at 949-50, 55 L.Ed.2d at 128-29. She claimed she was denied procedural due process by the medical school's failure to afford her a formal evidential hearing, similar to that requested by Karen R. Lunde here. Id. at 79-80, 98 S.Ct. at 950, 55 L.Ed.2d at 128. The student's challenge was based, at least in part, on equal protection issues, including gender discrimination. ³ See Id. at 92 n. 7, 98 S.Ct. at 956 n. 7, 55 L.Ed.2d at 136 ("Respondent alleges that the school applied more stringent standards in evaluating her performance than that of other students because of her sex, religion, and physical appearance."). The Supreme Court held the female student's due process rights were not violated. Id. 435 U.S. at 84-90, 98 S.Ct. at 952-55, 55 L.Ed.2d at 131-35.

Although Horowitz was decided on constitutional due process grounds, both the facts and its rationale apply in the present case. The student in Horowitz was seeking a formal adversarial hearing before the medical school board. Id. at 79-90, 98 S.Ct. at 949-55, 55 L.Ed.2d at 128-35. Likewise, Karen R. Lunde is seeking a contested case proceeding here. A contested case would involve an adversarial hearing with presentation of evidence and cross-examination of witnesses, with identical due process considerations. In Horowitz, the student was granted other remedial measures in order to improve her clinical standing. Id. at 81-86, 98 S.Ct. at 950-53, 55 L.Ed.2d at 129-32. She was allowed to appeal her dismissal to the university administration. Id. at 82, 98 S.Ct. at 951, 55 L.Ed.2d at 130.

The female medical student in Horowitz likewise indicated sexually discriminatory reasons played a role in her dismissal. Id. at 92 n. 7, 98 S.Ct. at 956 n. 7, 55 L.Ed.2d at 136. Finally, both the female student in Horowitz and Karen R. Lunde here were afforded a full trial before the district court to contest their dismissals. Id. at 79-80, 98 S.Ct. at 950, 55 L.Ed.2d at 128. The Supreme Court ruled in Horowitz that these various remedial measures (and opportunities to appeal) "went beyond constitutionally required procedural due process...." Id. at 85, 98 S.Ct. at 952, 55 L.Ed.2d at 132 (emphasis added).

Karen R. Lunde's insistence upon her entitlement to contested case proceedings is analogous to the procedural due process claim advanced in Horowitz. She had notice of the professors' dissatisfaction with her clinical rotations. She was given the opportunity to remedy the situation. She appealed her dismissal. In fact, she was afforded even more due process than the student in Horowitz, as she was allowed to appear before the deciding agency and present a statement and exhibits on her own behalf.

She subsequently was afforded a full adversarial trial in district court. The court exercised its authority pursuant to rule 17A.19(7) in ordering the taking of new evidence. Extensive evidence was taken. The record itself is voluminous. The appendix submitted with the case alone is 1800 pages in three bound volumes. She was afforded a full and fair opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses. She was allowed to present evidence, including medical school records and data. Apparently she took full advantage of this opportunity. ⁴

The trial court determined, after taking this voluminous evidence and viewing the witnesses presented, that Karen R. Lunde had been dismissed solely for academic reasons. It found gender discrimination played no role in her dismissal from medical school. We determine, as did the United States Supreme Court in Horowitz, Karen R. Lunde has been afforded the required procedural due process in the present case. ⁵ We agree with the trial court that she is not entitled to contested case proceedings.

The appellant, in passing, contends she "was illegally and without due process deprived of a recognized liberty interest." Like in Horowitz, we need not decide whether appellant's dismissal deprived her of a liberty interest in pursuing a medical career nor need we decide whether appellant's dismissal infringed any other interest constitutionally protected against deprivation without procedural due process. Even if we assumed the existence of a liberty or property interest, appellant, like in Horowitz, has been afforded at least as much due process as the fourteenth amendment requires. She was fully informed of the faculty's dissatisfaction with her progress. The ultimate decision to dismiss was careful and deliberate. She was afforded an extensive hearing before the district court. In reaching this result, we do not agree with the appellant that our holding in this respect is contrary to our supreme court's decision in Citizens' Aide/Ombudsman v. Rolfes, 454 N.W.2d 815 (Iowa 1990).

III. Academic Dismissal.

Turning to the issue of academic dismissal, the United States Supreme Court in Horowitz noted: "The educational process is not by nature adversary; instead it centers around a continuing relationship between faculty and students 'one in which the teacher must occupy many roles--educator, adviser, friend, and, at times, parent-substitute.' " Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 90, 98 S.Ct. at 955, 55 L.Ed.2d at 135 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 594, 95 S.Ct. at 746, 42 L.Ed.2d at 746). In that case, it is further noted that "whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decision-making." Id.

In the case at bar, the record...