Lunde v. Schultz

• Decision Date: 17 April 2014
• Docket Number: NO. 4:14–cv–00108–SMR–HCA,4:14–cv–00108–SMR–HCA
• Parties: Paul David LUNDE, Plaintiff, v. Matt SCHULTZ, Secretary of State, and Commissioner of Elections of the State of Iowa, in his official capacity only, and the State of Iowa, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

221 F.Supp.3d 1095

Paul David LUNDE, Plaintiff,

v.Matt SCHULTZ, Secretary of State, and Commissioner of Elections of the State of Iowa, in his official capacity only, and the State of Iowa, Defendants.

NO. 4:14–cv–00108–SMR–HCA

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Central Division.

Signed April 17, 2014

Paul D. Lunde, Ames, IA, for Plaintiff.

Meghan L. Gavin, Attorney General of Iowa, DES MOINES, IA, for Defendant.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

STEPHANIE M. ROSE, U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Before the Court are two pending motions: (1) Plaintiff Paul David Lunde's ("Plaintiff") Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction, filed March 24, 2014 [ECF No. 4]; and (2) Defendants Matt Schultz's ("Secretary Schultz" or "Defendant") and the State of Iowa's pre-answer Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction ("Motion to Dismiss"), filed April 11, 2014 [ECF No. 12]. Both parties have responded to the respective motions. [ECF Nos. 13, 14]. On April 14, 2014, the Court held oral argument on both pending motions, and both parties declined to submit additional briefing. [ECF No. 16]. Both matters are fully submitted.

I. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff filed nomination papers with the Secretary of State of the State of Iowa to be included as a Republican candidate for United States Senator on the June 3, 2014 primary ballot. Compl. at 1–2, [ECF No. 1]. The filing deadline for nominations lapsed on March 14, 2014, the same day Plaintiff filed his papers. Id. at 4. Plaintiff's nomination papers were rejected, however, because Plaintiff failed to gather a sufficient number of signatures in support of his nomination, as required by Iowa law. Id. at 1; see Iowa Code § 43.20 (requiring nomination papers be signed by eligible electors by "at least one percent of the voters of the candidate's party, in each of at least ten counties of the state, and in the aggregate not less than one-half of one percent of the total vote of the candidate's party in the state, as shown by the last general election"). Under § 43.20, and based on the voter turnout from the 2012 general election, Plaintiff was required to file nomination papers containing an aggregate number of signatures totaling 3,654.

Plaintiff alleges he failed to obtain the requisite number of signatures because the Republican County Chairs of larger counties did not aid him in gathering or furnishing signatures of Republican voters. Compl. at 3. Plaintiff states "that the apparent lack of cooperation in furnishing signatures might be related to Plaintiff's position with respect to the abortion issue," specifically Plaintiff's "pro-choice" stance. Id. at 3–4. Plaintiff contends his failure to obtain the requisite number of signatures was due, in part, to the County Chairs' refusals to assist him. Id. at 6.

Accordingly, Plaintiff makes three primary arguments in his Complaint.¹ First, Plaintiff argues the portion of Iowa Code § 43.20 requiring candidates obtain signatures of not less than one-half of one percent of the total vote of the candidate's party in the state (hereinafter the "aggregate requirement") violates Article I, Section 3 of the United States Constitution ("Qualifications Clause") by adding an additional qualification to be a U.S. Senator. Compl. at 1. Second, Plaintiff contends the aggregate requirement is unconstitutional as applied to him because the Republican County Chairs allegedly declined to furnish signatures to Plaintiff due to his "pro-choice" stance on abortion, thereby submitting Plaintiff to a "religious test" in violation of Article VI of the Constitution. Id. at 2–5. Finally, Plaintiff argues § 43.20 violates the Equal Protection Clause by requiring more signatures be obtained by a party candidate than is required of a nonparty or third party candidate. Pl's Br. Second Mot. for Temp. Rest. Order at 1–3, [ECF No. 10–4, at 1–3].

II. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants advance several arguments in support of their Motion to Dismiss, including allegations that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff's claims and that the Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, Defendants contend: (1) exclusive jurisdiction to address Plaintiff's Complaint lies in Iowa state court pursuant to the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act ("IAPA");² and (2) Plaintiff's Complaint is moot as it cannot be resolved prior to the June 3, 2014 primary election.³ Defendants also contend Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Because Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was filed pursuant to both Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the Court finds it prudent to distinguish between the materials relied upon in ruling on each portion of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Defendants have submitted an affidavit of Sarah Reisetter, Iowa Director of Elections, in support of its Rule 12(b)(1) Motion. [ECF No. 15]. The Court is permitted to consider this affidavit in ruling on Defendants' claim that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Johnson v. United States , 534 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2008) ("Trial courts have wide discretion to allow affidavits, other documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts under Rule 12(b)(1).") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Plaintiff has filed an affidavit and copies of email communications in resistance to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. [ECF No. 17]. Having reviewed these documents, the Court has determined they are relevant to Plaintiff's resistance to the Rule 12(b)(6) portion of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The Court declines to consider Plaintiff's affidavit and email communications because they are extraneous to the Complaint, and consideration of these materials would convert Defendants' Motion to Dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) ; see Barron ex rel. D.B. v. South Dakota Bd. of Regents , 655 F.3d 787, 792 (8th Cir. 2011) (acknowledging that consideration of a plaintiff's affidavit in opposition to a motion to dismiss converts the motion to one for summary judgment); Sebrite Agency, Inc. v. Platt , 884 F.Supp.2d 912, 916 (D. Minn. 2012) (declining to consider affidavits and other materials outside the amended complaint). Accordingly, the Court has not and will not consider Plaintiff's additional materials in ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

III. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES

A. Iowa Administrative Procedures Act

Defendants contend the rejection of Plaintiff's nomination papers is an administrative decision by a state agency, and Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of that decision. Def's' Br. at 4–6. Accordingly, Defendants argue Plaintiff's sole avenue of judicial review for his claims is governed by the IAPA, which provides that such claims must be brought before a state district court. Iowa Code § 17A.19(2). However, Defendants agree that this Court has jurisdiction to hear and act on Plaintiff's Complaint if his claims are a general challenge to the constitutionality of the state's election statutes and the relief requested is declaratory in nature.

The Court agrees Plaintiff's claims and requested relief are somewhat difficult to discern. However, the Court believes Plaintiff's Complaint is properly construed as a request for a declaratory judgment that the challenged state statutes are unconstitutional and not as a request solely to review the Secretary of State's decision to reject his nomination papers. Although the Court has no doubt Plaintiff's ultimate goal is to be included on the primary ballot, he pursues that objective by way of a constitutional challenge to the state statute, and Defendants agree the Court maintains jurisdiction over such claims.

B. Mootness

Defendants also contend Plaintiff's Complaint is moot because it cannot be resolved prior to the June 3, 2014 primary election. Def's' Br. at 6–7. "In general, a pending claim for injunctive relief becomes moot when the challenged conduct ceases and there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated." Beaulieu v. Ludeman , 690 F.3d 1017, 1024 (8th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). However, a dispute is not moot when it "falls within a special category of disputes that are capable of repetition while evading review." Turner v. Rogers , 564 U.S. 431, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2514–15, 180 L.Ed.2d 452 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A dispute is capable of repetition but evades review where (1) "the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration"; and (2) "there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subjected to the same action again." Id. at 2515 (alteration original).

The Court finds Plaintiff's claim is exactly the type that is capable of repetition yet evading review. Given the abbreviated and often unmovable timelines associated with election disputes and the prolonged nature of litigation, challenges to state election laws are likely the type of dispute that is too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration. Here, Plaintiff was notified that his nomination papers had been rejected on March 15, 2014. [ECF No. 1–3, at 1–2]. He promptly filed suit on March 20, 2014. [ECF No. 1]. To comply with federal election laws, the ballots for many counties were due at the printer by March 31, 2014, and must be mailed to overseas absentee voters by April 19, 2014. Def's' Br. at 6–7. Moreover, Plaintiff's claim is capable of repetition, as Plaintiff may very well wish to run in future senatorial races. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Complaint is not moot. See Norman v. Reed , 502 U.S. 279, 287–88, 112 S.Ct. 698, 116 L.Ed.2d 711 (1992) ("Even if the issue before us were limited to petitioners'...