Lundquist v. State
| Decision Date | 30 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-CR-851 |
| Citation | 179 N.E.3d 1051 |
| Parties | Frederick M. LUNDQUIST, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorney for Appellant: Donald J. Schmid, South Bend, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Megan M. Smith, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] In this interlocutory appeal, Frederick Lundquist contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence arising from a police search of Lundquist's house, which was based on a warrant that listed the wrong address. In accordance with our precedent as detailed below, we reject Lundquist's argument and affirm the trial court.
[2] Lundquist raises two issues:
[3] Upon receipt of a complaint that alleged that Lundquist had used a .22 rifle to shoot and kill a pit bull as retribution for the pit bull having killed a goat, the Wabash County Sheriff's Department contacted the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms as well as Lundquist's parole officer. Police were advised that possession of the gun would constitute a federal offense as well as a violation of the terms of Lundquist's then-active parole.
[4] Deputy Cody Gibson of the Wabash County's Sheriff's Department sought a warrant to search Lundquist's home. Lundquist's home is separated from his mother's home by a horseshoe-style driveway on the same property; Lundquist's mother owns both homes. Lundquist's home is on the west side of the driveway and is a one-story gray residence with a front door facing northeast; his address is 5173 E. 50 South. Lundquist's mother resides on the east side of the driveway at 5179 E. 50 South in a two-story log cabin with a front door that faces south.
[5] The warrant's description of the location to be searched was based upon the following sources: (1) Deputy Gibson's personal experience with the property; (2) a map drawn by the complaining witness;1 (3) BMV records wherein Lundquist listed 5179 E. 50 South as his address; (4) criminal records wherein Lundquist listed 5179 E. 50 South as his address; and (5) the fact that a mailbox located in front of the property reflected the address 5179 E. 50 South.2
[6] Deputy Gibson drafted the warrant listing Lundquist's mother's address, but correctly described the physical characteristics of Lundquist's 5173 E. 50 South residence as "a one-story residence, grey in color, with a front door facing northeast ... on the west side of the horseshoe driveway." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 50. Police executed the warrant on April 24, 2018, at 5173 E. 50 South, Lundquist's actual residence. Deputies discovered a shotgun and accompanying ammunition, a .22 caliber rifle and accompanying ammunition, a plastic bucket containing marijuana, and a bowl of white powder alongside a rolled-up dollar bill.
[7] Deputy Gibson then sought a second search warrant that was not limited to Lundquist's residence, but which allowed police to search outbuildings and the garage associated with Lundquist's home, the shed, and cellphones that might contain evidence of drug possession or sale. The second warrant repeated the mistake of listing the incorrect address, but once again accurately described the physical characteristics of Lundquist's home.
[8] Meanwhile, Lundquist was arrested as part of a traffic stop. During the stop, Lundquist's parole officer searched Lundquist's vehicle and discovered marijuana. On April 24, 2018, the State charged Lundquist with Count I, maintaining a common nuisance, a Level 6 felony; Count II, possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor; and Count III, possession of marijuana with a prior drug conviction, a Level 6 felony.3 In a separate count, the State alleged that Lundquist is an habitual offender.4
[9] Lundquist filed a motion to suppress the evidence found during the search of his home on the grounds that the warrants did not list his address, but rather listed the address of his mother. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. On April 26, 2021, the trial court certified the order denying the motion to suppress. We accepted jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal on June 7, 2021, in accordance with Indiana Appellate Rule 14(B).
[10] Lundquist argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the search of his residence violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. "When a trial court denies a motion to suppress evidence, we necessarily review that decision ‘deferentially, construing conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling.’ " Marshall v. State , 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1258 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Robinson v. State , 5 N.E.3d 362, 365 (Ind. 2014) ), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S.Ct. 113, 205 L.Ed.2d 36 (2019). We consider, however, any substantial and uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant. Id. We review the trial court's factual findings for clear error, and we decline invitations to reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. Id. "If the trial court's decision denying ‘a defendant's motion to suppress concerns the constitutionality of a search or seizure,’ then it presents a legal question that we review de novo." Id. (quoting Robinson , 5 N.E.3d at 365 ).
[11] Under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. To preserve that right, a judicial officer may issue a warrant only "upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Id. Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution contains language "nearly identical to its federal counterpart." McGrath v. State , 95 N.E.3d 522, 527 (Ind. 2018). Moreover, "our statutory law codifies these constitutional principles, setting forth the requisite information for an affidavit to establish probable cause." Id. (citing Ind. Code § 35-33-5-2 ).5
[12] "Despite the fact that the text of Article I, Section 11 is nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment, Indiana courts interpret and apply it ‘independently from federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.’ " McLain v. State , 963 N.E.2d 662, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Powell v. State , 912 N.E.2d 853, 863 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) ), trans. denied. We insist upon the pursuit of this independent analysis, in part, because Loretta H. Rush & Marie Forney Miller, CULTIVATING STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW TO FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION-INDIANA'S STORY , 33 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 377, 380 (2019).
[13] Here, neither of the parties conducts a separate analysis of the Fourth Amendment and Indiana Constitution implications of this case; both parties conflate the analysis. Lundquist, however, does cite cases concerning both the Fourth Amendment and the Indiana Constitution. Accordingly, we will separately address whether the evidence was admissible under both the Fourth Amendment and the Indiana Constitution.
[14] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Generally, a search warrant should not issue unless it particularly describes the place to be searched and the things or persons to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV ; Ind. Code. § 35-33-5-2(a)(1). Lundquist argues that, because the warrants included the incorrect address, those warrants did not "particularly describe[e] the place to be searched." Thus, Lundquist contends, the warrants themselves were constitutionally defective pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We disagree.
[15] Our courts have previously considered cases in which a defendant sought to suppress evidence stemming from a search conducted pursuant to a warrant with an incorrect address as well as an inaccurate physical description of the premises to be searched. In Houser v. State , 678 N.E.2d 95 (Ind. 1997), our Indiana Supreme Court addressed a similar issue and held:
The State concedes that the warrant here erroneously placed Lee's Automotive at 1435 South Hoyt Avenue, when the correct address was 1435 South Kinney Avenue. However, the warrant did correctly state that officers were to search a cement block building bearing the words "Lee's Automotive." Houser's business was located on a "triangular piece of land" bordered by South Hoyt, South Kinney and West Eighth Street. Although we do not condone use of search warrants containing the wrong street address, the warrant in this case sufficiently described the property to be searched despite the mistake. See, e.g., Willard v. State , 272 Ind. 589, 594, 400 N.E.2d 151, 155 (1980) (...
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