Luppes v. Harrison
| Decision Date | 15 June 1948 |
| Docket Number | 47235. |
| Citation | 32 N.W.2d 809,239 Iowa 880 |
| Parties | LUPPES v. HARRISON. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
R G. Remley, of Webster City, for appellant.
Prince & Guthrie, of Webster City, for appellee.
Plaintiff seeks recovery of damages sustained as the result of defendant's claimed negligence in driving his truck into plaintiff's automobile which was parked off a paved highway. The defendant claimed that a car had suddenly driven onto the highway in front of him, causing an emergency, which necessitated the application of the brakes of his truck causing the resulting skidding of it into plaintiff's car. The case was tried to the court, a jury having been waived. Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff and defendant has appealed.
The collision occurred about 4:00 P.M. on November 28, 1944 at or near the intersection of north and south Highway No. 69 and east and west Highway No. 20. Highway No. 69 does not cross Highway No. 20 at right angles, the north portion of Highway 69 being a short distance to the east of the portion of the highway extending to the south, thus forming an 'S' curve. A gasoline station is situated to the southeast of the intersection of the two highways and adjoins both of these roads for a distance of 140 feet. The station is about 50 feet from the pavement on each highway and the space between the building and the pavements is gravel surfaced. On the day of the collision there had been rain, sleet and snow and the pavement was in a slippery condition. Appellee's automobile was parked on the graveled drive at a point about twenty feet south of the east and west pavement. There is a 'slow' sign to the east of the north portion of Highway 69 on Highway 20 and at this point appellant, who was proceeding west, claims he slowed down his speed to 20 to 25 miles per hour and did not increase it. He testified that as his truck approached the intersection a car pulled out ahead of it from the north portion of Highway No 69 without stopping for a 'stop' sign and proceeded in a westerly direction at an approximate speed of 30 to 35 miles per hour when the appellant's truck was only 50 feet away. There was no obstruction to the view of the highway to the north from Highway 20. It is further shown that there were no other parked cars between that of the appellee and the south edge of Highway 20. It is the claim of the appellant that by reason of the car driving out in front of him an emergency developed and that he applied his brakes causing his truck to skid from the north side of Highway 20 and to strike appellee's car. As the result of the impact the parked automobile was moved 20 to 40 feet west of its original location.
The appellee in his petition has alleged that the collision was caused by the negligence of the appellant in that he was driving his truck at an excessive and dangerous rate of speed under the existing conditions; that appellant failed to drive his truck in a careful and prudent manner in that he was driving at a speed greater than was reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic, surface and other conditions that then existed on the highway at or near the intersection; that his truck had defective brake equipment that he failed to keep a proper lookout; and in not being able to stop his truck within the assured clear distance ahead. The appellee further alleged that he was free from contributory negligence. The appellant denied the allegations of appellee's petition.
The trial court found that by reason of the 'slow' sign which was on Highway 20 east of the intersection the appellant should have realized he was driving in a hazardous zone and that in suddenly applying the brakes and turning his truck to the left with its resulting skidding he was guilty of failing to drive his car in a careful and prudent manner and at a speed that was reasonable and proper under the circumstances. The court further found that there was no contributory negligence on the part of the appellee in that his car was parked off the highway near the oil station where it had a right to be. It further found that the appellee had met the burden of proof required and that damages should be recovered by him. In connection with the appellant's claim that an emergency had been created prior to the time of the collision the court found that when the car from the north drove onto the highway the appellant had not reduced the speed of his truck after it had passed the 'slow' sign. It further found that the appellant, by his own admissions, would never have come in contact with the car entering from Highway 69 in that this car was being driven at a speed greater than that of the appellant's truck. It further found that as a reasonable, prudent person the appellant should have known that the sudden application of the brakes on slippery pavement and the turning of his truck to the left would cause it to skid. The court further found that if appellant had been driving his truck at a proper rate of speed under the circumstances he could have passed to the south of the automobile that had entered Highway 20 from the north. The court held that such a set of circumstances did not create an emergency that would relieve the appellant of the consequences of his own negligent acts.
The appellant asserts as grounds for reversal that the court erred in holding that the appellee had by a preponderance of evidence sustained the burden of proof imposed on him to prove that his damage was the result of any negligence on the part of the appellant; that the appellee had sustained the burden of proof that he was free from contributory negligence; that the negligence of the appellant was the proximate cause of appellee's damages; in failing to give proper interpretation to the evidence; and in holding that the burden was on appellant to show that an emergency had developed which would excuse his claimed negligent acts.
I. This case, as previously stated, was tried to the court. The findings of the trial court as to fact questions, under these circumstances, have the force and effect of a verdict by a jury. Crouse v. Cadwell Transfer & Storage Co., 226 Iowa 1083, 1086, 285 N.W. 623; Heyland v. Wayne Independent School Dist., 231 Iowa 1310, 1315, 4 N.W.2d 278. They will not be set aside unless it is shown that the evidence presented is such that the court, as a matter of law, should have directed a verdict in favor of the appellant if the case had been tried to a jury. We do not believe that the evidence in this case justifies our holding that a directed verdict would have been warranted on proper motion. The trial court found that the appellant had failed to drive his truck in a careful and prudent manner and at a speed that was reasonable and proper under all the circumstances then existing and that these negligent acts were the proximate cause of the damages sustained. It also found that the appellee was free from contributory negligence. The trial court found that as to all of these facts the appellee had sustained his burden of proof. We do not see how it could be held...
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