Lurie v. Florida State Bd. of Dentistry

Decision Date10 October 1973
Docket NumberNo. 42715,42715
Citation288 So.2d 223
PartiesDr. Jack LURIE, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA STATE BOARD OF DENTISTRY, Respondent.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Herbert Stettin, Friedman, Britton & Stettin, Miami, for petitioner.

Richard L. Randle, Slater & Randle, Jacksonville, for respondent.

ERVIN, Justice.

We review on petition for writ of certiorari a per curiam without opinion decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Lurie v. Florida State Board of Dentistry, Fla.App., 264 So.2d 479.

From the record proper it appears we have jurisdiction for a certiorari review as will hereinafter appear.

The question to be decided is whether a grant of compelled testimony immunity from criminal prosecution which, at the time granted in 1967, included immunity from administrative proceedings based upon the same acts, would continue to render the recipient immune from later administrative proceedings despite the decision of Headley v. Baron, Fla.1969, 228 So.2d 281.

The facts in the case are: On August 30, 1967 Petitioner was compelled to testify before the County Solicitor of Brevard County regarding alleged illegal transactions between himself and Arnold Rosenbaum. At that time charges were pending against Rosenbaum, who allegedly had been in possession of a stolen Cadillac and had made a false statement on an application for an automobile title certificate. The interrogation of Petitioner not only concerned the charges against Rosenbaum, but also involved matters relating to the operation of a stolen car ring in Brevard County and Petitioner's acquisition of two automobiles from Rosenbaum.

One year later Petitioner was informed against for receiving a stolen automobile and aiding Rosenbaum in the concealment of stolen property.

Petitioner sought a writ of prohibition from the Fourth District Court of Appeal, contending he was immune from prosecution under Section 932.29, F.S.1967, F.S.A., which provided that a person could not be excused from testifying in certain prosecutions on the ground he might incriminate himself, but when he did so testify he could not 'be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he may so testify . . .'

While that cause was pending, this Court on July 16, 1969 in Headley v. Baron, Fla.1969, 228 So.2d 281, overruled Florida State Board of Architecture v. Seymour, Fla.1952, 62 So.2d 1. Seymour held the above-quoted portion of Section 932.29, which grants immunity from prosecution or from subjection to 'any penalty or forfeiture,' was not limited in application to criminal prosecutions, but also provided immunity from subjection to administrative revocation of professional license proceedings. Headley, however, held that 'the words 'penalty or forfeiture' when read in the entire context of Section 932.29 clearly refer (only) to a criminal penalty of forfeiture.' Under Headley, therefore, Section 932.29 grants immunity only from criminal prosecutions and can not be used to immunize one against loss of a professional license in an administrative proceeding as a result of grand jury testimony.

On September 19, 1969 the Fourth District Court of Appeal made absolute the writ of prohibition and held that Petitioner was immune from the criminal prosecution for his activities with Rosenbaum. State ex rel. Lurie v. Rosier, Fla.App.1967, 226 So.2d 825.

On June 22, 1971 Respondent Board of Dentistry filed a two-count accusation against Petitioner, a state licensed dentist, charging him with (1) wilful negligence and malpractice in the removal of a tooth, and (2) conspiracy and concealment of stolen cars. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, contending, among other things, that he was fully immune from any administrative penalty or forfeiture for his alleged stolen car actions because of Section 932.29 and the District Court mandate in State ex rel. Lurie v. Rosier, supra. The Board found him guilty as charged and on August 21, 1971 revoked his license for one year on the malpractice charge and permanently on the concealing stolen automobile charge.

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District; that court per curiam without opinion denied the petition on June 30, 1972. See 264 So.2d 479.

We granted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari because of conflict with this Court's decision in Florida Forest and Park Service v. Strickland, 1944, 154 Fla. 472, 18 So.2d 251, where we held:

'That where a statute has received a given consideration by a court of supreme jurisdiction and Property or contract Rights have been acquired under and in accordance with such construction, such rights should not be destroyed by giving to a subsequent overruling decision a retrospective operation.' (Emphasis supplied.)

We have re-examined the cases of Headley v. Baron, supra, and Florida State Board of Architecture v. Seymour, supra, in the light of the circumstances of this case and also in the light of the weight of judicial authority throughout the nation on the question of citizens' immunities from the imposition of penalties and forfeitures in administrative proceedings where they are compelled to testify before grand juries, prosecuting officers, or courts concerning matters or things which might incriminate them. We are convinced now this Court was in error in overruling Florida State Board of Architecture v. Seymour, supra. See 9 Fla.Jur., Criminal Law § 276; 1 Fla.Jur., Administrative Law and Procedure § 82, and 68 A.L.R. 1503; 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law §§ 267, 268, 269. Compare Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787, reh. den., 335 U.S. 836, 69 S.Ct. 9, 93 L.Ed. 388; Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 69 S.Ct. 1000, 93 L.Ed. 1264, annotation; Englander v. State (Fla.), 246 So.2d 746, and Lefkowitz v. Turley, 94 S.Ct. 316, 37 L.Ed.2d 274. Opinion filed November 19, 1973.

Where testimony is so compelled the person (witness) testifying should have the benefit of immunity statutes or other protections afforded by law. As Justice realistically and honestly with the professed the guarantee must be as broad as the constitutional guaranty. He also said for the Seymour court, 'A forfeiture is also a penalty and has to do with loss of Property, position or some other personal right . . .' and, 'It is accordingly our view that a proceeding to revoke appellant's certificate as an architect amounts to a prosecution to effect a penalty or forfeiture as contemplated by the (statute) . . .' 62 So.2d, text page 3. See State ex rel. Vining v. Florida Real Estate Commission (Fla.), 281 So.2d 487 headnote two.

That the testimony Petitioner was compelled to give in 1967 to the County Solicitor of Brevard County fell in immune category was resolved by the Fourth District Court's decision in State ex rel. Lurie v. Rozier, supra.

Immunity extended by the State under Section 932.29, F.S., F.S.A., 1967 in surrender of the Fifth Amendment privilege is not divisible so that the protection vouchsafed thereunder is only from criminal prosecution. This result can be ascertained from a cursory reading of Section 932.29, F.S., F.S.A., 1967:

'No person shall be excused from attending and testifying . . . before any court upon any investigation, proceeding or trial . . . But no person shall be prosecuted or Subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he may so testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, And no testimony so given or produced Shall be received against him upon any criminal investigation or proceeding.' (Emphasis supplied.)

As Justice Terrell stated in Seymour, supra, 62 So.2d, at 3: 'Whether the prosecution, penalty or forfeiture has to do with a civil or criminal action is not material. The statute (932.29, F.S.) makes it applicable to both.'

Such an interpretation is not a strained construction of the Legislature's enactment, but rather one which comports realistically and honestly which the professed immunity grant. The State through its authorized officials in granting immunity to a witness acts totally for the State, including its licensing agencies. A professional state licensing board must respect the immunity granted similarly as must the prosecuting attorney. To be efficacious in securing testimony of a citizen the immunity extended must be coextensive with all possible governmental penalties and forfeitures, criminal or civil. Persons holding professional licenses cannot be excepted from total immunity protection.

Our recent holding in State ex rel. Vining v. Florida, supra, supports the principle '. . . (extends) as well to other types of administrative proceedings which may result in deprivation of livelihood. Certainly, threatened loss of professional standing through revocation of his real estate license is as serious and compelling to the realtor as disbarment is to the attorney. In succinct terms, it is our view that the right to remain silent applies not only to the traditional criminal case, but also to proceedings 'penal' in nature in that they tend to degrade the individual's professional standing, professional reputation or livelihood.'

that immunity from the imposition of penalties extends to administrative proceedings. In that case a real estate broker was charged with several violations of the Real Estate License Law. He moved to quash the information alleging, inter alia, that the requirement of filing a sworn answer pursuant to Section 475.30(1) violated his right to remain silent guaranteed to him by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A. In relying upon Spevak v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 87 S.Ct. 625, 17 L.Ed.2d 574 (1967), we stated that the U.S. Supreme Court's logic of making available the constitutional privilege against...

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