Luter v. Hutchinson

• Decision Date: 26 November 1902
• Citation: 70 S.W. 1013
• Parties: LUTER v. HUTCHINSON.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

70 S.W. 1013

LUTER v. HUTCHINSON.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.

November 26, 1902.

Appeal from Bexar county court; Robt. B. Green, Judge.

Action by E. J. Hutchinson against W. E. Luter. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Earl Scott, for appellant. Chas. H. Bertrand, for appellee.

FLY, J.

This suit was instituted by appellee, and is a contest over the title to a certain mare in the possession of appellant. The cause was tried by jury, and resulted in a verdict and judgment for appellee. Appellant claimed title to the animal by purchase from J. P. Van Aiken, and interposed the plea of limitation of two years. To meet the plea of limitation, appellee filed the following plea: "Plaintiff denies all and singular the allegations in defendant's second amended original answer, and says, in answer thereto, that the statute of limitation of two years set up by defendant cannot avail him, for this: The defendant and those under whom he claims are not good-faith purchasers for value. The property sued on was stolen from plaintiff, and they knew it when they purchased; and they fraudulently concealed said animal, and did not make use of her in the open and notorious manner which would give them the right to claim notorious, exclusive, and adverse possession." It will be noted that there are no allegations as to the means of concealment used by appellant and his vendors, nor is it alleged that appellee could not, by the use of reasonable diligence, have discovered his cause of action before he instituted it, nor are the facts showing diligence in the discovery of the fraud set out. The statute provides that actions for the conversion of personal property shall be barred in two years, and there is no statutory provision in Texas relieving against fraud if proceedings are brought within a reasonable time after its discovery. In many of the states such cases are provided for by statute, and in others the rule of suspending the statute on account of fraud has been ingrafted upon the statute through judicial interpretation. In Texas, law and equity being blended, the rule made by the courts may be justified on the ground, not that it is within the power of courts to ingraft such an exception on the statute, but that, independently of the statute, courts of equity will relieve against fraud where proper diligence has been used in discovering it, and suit instituted in a reasonable time after such discovery. Munson v. Hallowell, 26 Tex. 475, 84 Am. Dec. 582. Whether the exception is one arising from a provision of the law, judicial interpretation, or by the rules of equity, it is always the rule that, in order to obtain the benefits of its provisions, the facts must be fully stated that bring the party seeking to avoid the statute within the terms of the exception. Bremond v. McLean, 45 Tex. 10; Ransome v. Bearden, 50 Tex. 128; Kuhlman v. Naker, Id. 636; Alston v. Richardson, 51 Tex. 6; Kennedy v. Baker, 59 Tex. 150; Cooper v. Lee, 75 Tex. 114, 12 S. W. 483. If a party has held possession of personal property a sufficient length of time to perfect a title by limitations, his good faith alone will be the test; but, if he relies upon the possession of a vendor to support his title, then the bona fides of such vendor, as well as his own, must appear from the facts. Under the facts in this case, if appellant in good faith purchased the mare from Van Aiken, who was the purchaser from some one else in good faith, their bona fides, coupled with the open use of the animal for two years, perfected the title to the animal in appellant, regardless of how the property may have been acquired from appellee. The uncontroverted proof showed good faith on the part of appellant and Van Aiken, and the fact that Joseph Rohmer, a remote vendor, may have fraudulently acquired possession of the mare, can in no manner affect the title held by appellant. We fail to discover a single circumstance tending to establish any knowledge upon the part of Van Aiken or appellant of any defect in the title to the mare, or that showed any desire or attempt upon the...