Luttrell v. State

• Decision Date: 07 June 1899
• Citation: 51 S.W. 930
• Parties: LUTTRELL v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

51 S.W. 930

LUTTRELL v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 7, 1899.

Appeal from district court, Hunt county; Howard Templeton, Judge.

Louis Luttrell was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals. Reversed.

R. L. Porter, S. D. Stinson, W. C. Jones, John Wynne, and Tom C. Thornton, for appellant. Robt. A. John, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

HENDERSON, J.

Appellant was convicted of murder in the first degree, and his punishment assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for life, and he appeals.

The case was filed at the Dallas branch of this court on October 1, 1897, and was submitted on the 20th of April, 1898, at the Austin term. The record is written with a pen, and contains 436 pages; 215 pages thereof being the statement of facts. This record should have been condensed into not exceeding 200 pages; 50 pages of which would have been sufficient for the statement of facts, showing every essential feature of the case to be passed on by this court. We consider it a just subject of criticism that this court has, by this method of practice, been compelled to go through much unnecessary matter, consuming time that should have been devoted to other subjects. It serves but very little purpose in making a statement of facts to embody every word and sentence each witness may have uttered on the stand. All that we desire is a proper presentation in the statement of facts of the salient features of the case; and, where witnesses agree on any given point, it would be a very easy matter to state what one witness testified on the question, and then state that others, naming them, agree with such witness. If a fact is not traversed, or is conceded, such should be stated; and where witnesses testify on immaterial points, not important to be considered in any bill of exceptions or charge of the court, such might be well omitted. Of course, this does not apply to cases in which it is insisted that the evidence does not support the verdict. In all such cases the record should be full. We make these remarks because the record is unnecessarily large and unwieldy. But these observations apply equally in many cases that come to this court, and we may be compelled in self-defense, when such records come up, to adopt a rule requiring the parties to restate and condense the record.

On a night in September, 1893, one Ed Doggett (a young blacksmith, about 20 years of age), on his way from the business part of the city of Greenville to his home, a short distance from the public square, was shot and killed on one of the public streets of said city, the slayers evidently being concealed in a lumber yard fronting on Stonewall street. At the January term, 1894, the grand jury of Hunt county returned an indictment against defendant and one John English for the murder. The venue in the case was subsequently changed to Collin county on the ground of the existence of prejudice against appellant in Hunt county. The case pended there for several terms of court, and was eventually dismissed on the part of the state, because of its inability to procure testimony to secure the conviction of appellant. Subsequent to this the state discovered other testimony, and the parties were again indicted in Hunt county, on January 30, 1897. At the following July term the case was called for trial. A trial was had, which resulted in the conviction of appellant. On the trial the state offered the positive testimony of an eyewitness to the homicide, and this evidence was strongly reenforced by circumstances testified to by other witnesses. The motive assigned by the state for the homicide was to the effect that appellant and John English, a short time prior to the killing, attempted to rob the First National Bank of Greenville, and that deceased was either cognizant of same, or had knowledge of some fact in connection therewith that would lead to the identity of Luttrell and English as the guilty parties; and that on said account appellant and his co-defendant conspired together, and in pursuance thereof shot and killed deceased. Defendant entered a plea of not guilty, and relied on the weakness of the state's case, and also on the plea of alibi. On the trial, appellant filed a motion to change the venue of the case on the ground of prejudice against him, and on the ground that there was a secret formidable combination against him; and in this connection he also insisted that, the court having formerly changed the venue on a previous indictment to Collin county, the question of a change of venue was res adjudicata, and that it was the duty of the court to recognize this, and change the venue of the case. With reference to the latter proposition we have this to say: That the former change of venue, made in 1894, of an indictment and case then pending against appellant in Hunt county, on the ground of prejudice then existing against him, could not be an adjudication of the question on the new indictment for the same transaction (the old one having been dismissed), presented in the district court of Hunt county in 1897, three years later. It was a new indictment, presented long subsequent to the change in the former case, and under new conditions. The court in such case might take cognizance of the former change, and it might afford some evidence of the existence of prejudice formerly; but it could not be considered res adjudicata as to the then existence of prejudice in Hunt county. The court did not err in overruling the application on this ground. The state controverted the appellant's motion for a change of venue on the ground of prejudice and formidable combination, and in connection therewith the court...