Lutz Industries v. Dixie Home Stores
Citation | 242 N.C. 332,88 S.E.2d 333 |
Decision Date | 30 June 1955 |
Docket Number | No. 306,306 |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | LUTZ INDUSTRIES, Inc., successors to Lutz Hosiery Mill, Inc. v. DIXIE HOME STORES, a corporation, and Robert A. Gibbons and Henry M. Smith, t/a Gibbons & Smith. |
W. H. Strickland and Alfred R. Crisp, Lenoir, for plaintiff, appellee.
Adams & Adams, Asheville, and Mull, Patton & Craven, Morganton, for defendant, appellant Dixie Home Stores.
Townsend & Todd, Lenoir, for defendant, appellant Gibbons & Smith.
The defendants Gibbons and Smith state in their brief that both appellants present the same questions for determination, and therefore they adopt in toto the brief filed by their co-defendant, the Dixie Home Stores, and abandon any of their assignments of error, which are not carried forward and discussed in the brief of their co-defendant. The Dixie Home Stores has not carried forward and discussed in its brief the denial of the court to strike any allegations, except those contained in its own motion. Therefore, we are concerned with identical motions to strike and to make more definite certain parts of the Complaint.
The defendants having made their motions to strike in apt time, G.S. § 1-153, it is made as a matter of right. Daniel v. Gardner, 240 N.C. 249, 81 S.E.2d 660; Brown v. Hall, 226 N.C. 732, 40 S.E.2d 412. Upon motion irrelevant allegations in a pleading should be stricken. The test is, does the pleader have a right to introduce in evidence the facts to which the allegation relates? If so, the motion should be denied: if not, it should be allowed. Daniel v. Gardner, supra; Penny v. Stone, 228 N.C. 295, 45 S.E.2d 362. The denial of a motion to strike made in apt time 'is not ground for reversal unless the record affirmatively reveals these two things: (1) That the matter is irrelevant or redundant; and (2) that its retention in the pleading will cause harm or injustice to the moving party. ' Hinson v. Britt, 232 N.C. 379, 61 S.E.2d 185, 187.
Assignments of error Nos. 3, 4, 6 and 8 of the Dixie Home Stores, and assignments of error Nos. 5, 6, 9 and 12 of Gibbons & Smith refer to the same allegations of the Complaint, which allegations in substance state that the defendants in making certain electrical installations violated the provisions of the National Electrical Code of 1951, the standard adopted by the National Board of Fire Underwriters, which violation proximately caused a fire destroying the property described in the Complaint. These allegations are contained in Paragraphs 7, 8, 13 and 14 of the Complaint.
The relevant part of Paragraph 7 follows--the words asked to be stricken are emphasized:
The relevant parts of Paragraph 8, with the words asked to be stricken emphasized, are: 'That the defendants, Gibbons and Smith, agents of the defendant, Dixie Home Stores, a corporation, knew or should have known the requirements of the National Electric Code hereinbefore referred to, and that it was their duty to and they should have refrained from making an installation in connection with the use of a dangerous instrumentality, to-wit: electricity, contrary to the provisions of said code * *.'
The relevant parts of Paragraph 13, with the words asked to be stricken emphasized, follow:
All parts of Paragraph 14 reading as follows: 'That by reason of the unlawful, wanton, wilful and gross negligent conduct of the defendant corporation and its agents and their failure to observe the rules and requirements of the National Electrical Code, and failure to observe the ordinance of the City of Lenoir, that this plaintiff is entitled to recover punitive damages of the defendant corporation in the amount of $50,000.00.'
In support of their motions to strike, the defendants make two contentions. One, the allegations of the Complaint are not sufficient for us to determine that the City of Lenoir has enacted an ordinance adopting the National Electrical Code of 1951 and making it a part of the law of the city. Two, the National Electrical Code of 1951 sets up a private standard of care, which has no relevancy to the legal standard of reasonable care imposed upon all persons by law, and the retention of the allegations of the Complaint in respect thereto will be highly prejudicial to them in the trial. The defendants in their brief state: 'We think the Town of Lenoir could have validly enacted an ordinance copying word for word the so-called National Electrical Code of 1951.'
The briefs of the parties make no reference to the North Carolina Building Code--enacted by the General Assembly in 1933, and, as subsequently amended, set forth in G.S., Chapter 143, Article 9, Sections 143-136 to 143-143, both inclusive, which chapter is entitled 'State Departments, Institutions, and Commissions.' G.S. § 143-137 states: 'It is the purpose of this article to protect life, health and property and all its provisions shall be construed liberally to that end. ' G.S. § 143-139 created a Building Code Council which was empowered and directed to draw up a building code for the State. In 1936 the Building Code Council adopted, promulgated and published a North Carolina Building Code. This Building Code is an important public document of which we take judicial notice. Staton v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 144 N.C. 135, 56 S.E. 794; Clark v. City of Greenville, 221 N.C. 255, 20 S.E.2d 56; 20 Am.Jur., Evidence, Sec. 44.
Chapter XV, entitled 'Electrical Control' of the 1936 North Carolina Building Code, reads as follows:
'Except as may be otherwise provided by rules promulgated by the Building Code Council, the electrical systems of a building or structure shall be installed in conformity with the 'National Electrical Code,' as approved by the American Standards Association.
'The electric wiring of houses or buildings for lighting or for other purposes shall conform to the regulations prescribed by the organization known as National Board of Fire Underwriters.
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Hutchens v. Hankins, 8217SC514
...Inc., 279 N.C. 192, 182 S.E.2d 389 (1971) and Bell v. Page, 271 N.C. 396, 156 S.E.2d 711 (1967). In Lutz Industries v. Dixie Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332, 341, 88 S.E.2d 333, 339 (1955) our Supreme Court recognized that a standard of conduct may be determined by reference to a statute that imp......
-
Marshall v. Beno Truck Equipment, Inc., 84
...273, 228 N.W. 528 (1930); Singles v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 174 Neb. 816, 119 N.W.2d 680 (1963); Lutz Industries v. Dixie Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332, 88 S.E.2d 333 (1955); Watson v. White, 309 N.C. 498, 308 S.E.2d 268 (1983); Story v. Green, 164 Cal. 768, 130 P. 870 (1913); Allard v......
-
Sides v. Duke University
...or with a reckless disregard for plaintiff's rights. Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975); Lutz Industries, Inc. v. Dixie Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332, 88 S.E.2d 333 (1955). See generally, 5 Strong's N.C. Index 3d, Damages §§ 11-11.2 (1977 and Supp.1984). Thus, plaintiff's plea ......
-
Coleman v. Cooper
...747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052, 105 S.Ct. 1754, 84 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985). In Lutz Industries, Inc. v. Dixie Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332, 88 S.E.2d 333 (1955), our Supreme Court held that a standard of conduct may be determined by reference to a statute which imposes upo......