Lutz v. State

Decision Date26 April 1934
Docket Number7,8.
Citation172 A. 354,167 Md. 12
PartiesLUTZ v. STATE. SIEGERT v. STATE.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Appeals from Circuit Court, Anne Arundel County; Nicholas H. Green Judge in both cases.

Anne Lutz and Edward Siegert were separately convicted of keeping and maintaining a bawdyhouse, and each separately appeals.

Judgment in each case affirmed.

Robert Moss, of Annapolis, for appellant in both cases.

G. C A. Anderson, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Wm. Preston Lane, Jr., Atty Gen., and A. Theodore Brady, State's Atty., of Annapolis, on the brief), for the State in both cases.

OFFUTT Judge.

The defendant in each of these two cases was indicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced in the circuit court for Anne Arundel county for keeping and maintaining a bawdyhouse.

The indictment filed in each case contained two counts, the first for maintaining a bawdyhouse, the second for maintaining a disorderly house, and the two counts of the indictment in the one case are, except for the names, and that the first count in the case against Siegert does not conclude against the statute, identical in form and substance.

A demurrer to the indictment in Siegert's case was overruled, as was a demurrer to each count of the indictment in the case against Anne Lutz. Her case was tried before the court sitting as a jury, while the case against Siegert was tried by a jury. Siegert was convicted under the first count of the indictment and in the Lutz case there was a general verdict of guilty.

The sole question raised by the appeals is whether either count of the indictment against Lutz, or the first count of the indictment against Siegert, stated an indictable offense. The two cases, while separate and distinct, may therefore be considered together.

Prior to 1890 the offense of keeping a disorderly house was a common-law misdemeanor, as prior to 1892 was the offense of keeping a bawdyhouse, and in each case the punishment was in the discretion of the court. Beard v. State, 74 Md. 132, 21 A. 700. Chapter 523 of the Acts of 1890 fixed the punishment for keeping a disorderly house, and chapter 522 of the Acts of 1892 fixed the punishment for keeping a bawdyhouse. Neither statute defined the offenses to which they respectively related, but left them as at common law.

The law was in that state when the present statute, chapter 737 of the Acts of 1920, codified as Code, article 27, §§ 20, 21, and 22, was adopted.

That statute repealed and re-enacted with amendments section 20, then codified as Code, art. 27, § 19, and added two additional sections to that article, which are at present codified as sections 21 and 22, the whole described in its title as relating to "Prostitution, Lewdness and Assignation."

The point of the demurrer to the first count of each of the indictments involved in these appeals apparently is that the statute repealed and superseded the common-law offense of keeping a bawdyhouse, and that the count while good at common law fails to state a violation of the statute, and that since the common law relating to the maintenance of a bawdyhouse has been repealed it states no indictable offense.

In Hooper v. Baltimore, 12 Md. 475, it was said: "In Dwarris on Statutes it is said, at page 695, 'As a rule of exposition, statutes are to be construed in reference to the principles of the common law. For it is not to be presumed that the legislature intended to make any innovation upon the common law, further than the case absolutely required. The law rather infers that the act did not intend to make any alteration other than what is specified, and besides what has been plainly pronounced.' " That statement of the law was approved in Keech v. Baltimore & Washington R. R. Co., 17 Md. 45, and Greenwood v. Greenwood, 28 Md. 386, and announces an established rule of statutory construction. Harrison v. State, 22 Md. 468, 85 Am. Dec. 658, Heiskell v. Baltimore, 65 Md. 125, 4 A. 116, 57 Am. Rep. 308; 12 C.J. 186, 25 R. C. L. 1054, Sutherland on Stat. Construction, §§ 251, 294.

In 25 R. C. L. 1054, it is said that: "It has been said that statutes are not presumed to make any alterations in the common law further than is expressly declared, and that a statute, made in the affirmative without any negative expressed or implied, does not take away the common law. The rules of the common law are not to be changed by doubtful implication, nor overturned except by clear and unambiguous language. In order to hold that a statute has abrogated common law rights existing at the date of its enactment, it must clearly appear that they are repugnant to the act, or the part thereof invoked, that their survival would in effect deprive it of its efficacy and render its provisions nugatory."

Where, however, a statute and the common law are in conflict, the common law yields to the statute to the extent of the inconsistency, Sutherland on Stat. Const. § 294; 12 C.J. 186, and a statute which deals with an entire subject-matter is generally construed as abrogating the common law as to that subject.

Prior to the act of 1920 there was in this state no statutory definition of the kind of offensive nuisance of which a bawdyhouse is a type, Beard v. State, 74 Md. 132, 21 A. 700, so that the question here is whether that statute was so far inconsistent with the common-law definition of a bawdyhouse as to repeal it, or whether the Legislature intended by that statute to deal with all nuisances of that character; for in either event the effect of it would be to supersede the common law as to that particular nuisance. Comparing the statute with the common-law definition of a bawdyhouse, it appears that an essential ingredient of the offense defined by the statute is the "offering or receiving of the body for sexual intercourse for hire." Code, art. 27, § 21, while at common law to constitute a bawdyhouse "it need not be kept for lucre," Bishop on Cr. Law (9th Ed.) § 1086. At common law a necessary element of the offense of keeping a bawdyhouse was that of "keeping," that is, of maintaining, some place whether a house, a boat, a tent, or a vehicle, kept open...

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    ...and disharmony with the common law, such that both the common law and the statutes cannot coexist. Id. (quoting Lutz v. State , 167 Md. 12, 15, 172 A. 354 (1934) ).Although CJP § 3-224(b) lists several grounds upon which a circuit court must vacate an arbitration award, these grounds do not......
  • Owens v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • June 5, 2007
    ...decision where it is found to be a vestige of the past, no longer suitable to the circumstances of our people."); Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 15, 172 A. 354, 356 (1934); Gladden v. State, 273 Md. 383, 389, 330 A.2d 176, 180 (1974); Denison v. Denison, 35 Md. 361, 378 (1872); Coomes v. Clemen......
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    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • June 5, 2007
    ...decision where it is found to be a vestige of the past, no longer suitable to the circumstances of our people."); Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 15, 172 A. 354, 356 (1934); Gladden v. State, 273 Md. 383, 389, 330 A.2d 176, 180 (1974); Denison v. Denison, 35 Md. 361, 378 (1872); Coomes v. Clemen......
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    ...common law must be made expressly clear. See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 353 Md. 683, 693, 728 A.2d 698, 702 (1999); Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 15, 172 A. 354, 356 (1934). Second, for the very reason that a petition for writ of mandamus is not an appeal, any notion that the Court of Special A......
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