Lyell v. Renico

• Decision Date: 01 December 2006
• Docket Number: No. 04-1106.,04-1106.
• Citation: 470 F.3d 1177
• Parties: Earl Ray LYELL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Paul RENICO, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 1177

470 F.3d 1177

Earl Ray LYELL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Paul RENICO, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 04-1106.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: September 19, 2006.

Decided and Filed: December 1, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

ARGUED:

Michael J. Newman, Dinsmore & Shohl, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. William C. Campbell, Office of the Attorney General, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellee.

ON BRIEF:

Michael J. Newman, Jennifer K. Swartz, Daniel J. Greenberg, Dinsmore & Shohl, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. William C. Campbell, Office of the Attorney General, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellee. Earl Ray Lyell, Muskegon Heights, Michigan, pro se.

Before: CLAY and SUTTON, Circuit Judges; OBERDORFER, District Judge.^*

SUTTON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which OBERDORFER, D.J., joined.

CLAY, J. (pp. 1189-93), delivered a separate concurring opinion.

OPINION

SUTTON, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Earl Ray Lyell of assault with intent to commit murder, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.83, and a judge sentenced him to thirty to sixty years in prison as an habitual offender, Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.1083. He now petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the trial court (1) coerced the jury into reaching a guilty verdict by improperly polling the jury and (2) exhibited bias and partiality that denied him a fair trial. Although we reject Lyell's claim that the jury polling violated his constitutional rights, we agree that the trial judge's conduct violated his due-process right to a fair trial. We reverse and conditionally grant the writ.

I.

The facts giving rise to Lyell's arrest and trial are straightforward. According to the prosecution, Lyell repeatedly stabbed Anthony Nimeth after learning that Nimeth intended to tell the authorities about Lyell's involvement in a high-speed car chase with the police. According to Lyell, Nimeth tried to rob him at knife point, leaving Lyell no choice but to stab Nimeth in self defense.

The trial was anything but straightforward. Throughout the proceedings, the trial judge and Lyell's defense counsel, Hart, clashed verbally, frequently in the presence of the jury. See People v. Lyell, No. 214100, slip op. at 3, 2001 WL 671474 (Mich.Ct.App. May 4, 2001). The clashes began in voir dire when the judge interrupted Hart's questioning of prospective jurors on several occasions (without prior objection from the prosecution) in order to accuse him of being repetitive, see, e.g., Tr. Day 1 at 61, 109, or argumentative, see, e.g., id. at 63, 96, 99, and they continued through Hart's direct and cross-examination of witnesses. At the same time, the judge rarely interrupted the prosecutor; and when she did interrupt him (at least on two occasions), she did so in order to assist him. See Tr. Day 2 at 68; Tr. Day 5 at 28. Our review of the record reveals that over the course of the six-day trial, the judge interrupted Lyell's counsel— without prompting or objection from the prosecution—roughly 40 times.

On three occasions the court assumed control of witness questioning in a manner suggesting that the judge favored the prosecution's case. Tr. Day 2 at 68 (urging the prosecutor to ask a question even though the prosecutor believed it called for hearsay), 154 (interrupting Hart's attempt to impeach the witness with previous statements made to police and sua sponte eliciting details—via 12 separate questions—not revealed on direct); Tr. Day 5 at 28 (urging the witness to answer a question voluntarily withdrawn by the prosecutor). The following exchange is illustrative:

THE COURT: Is there any reason why you don't ask [the witness] what [another witness, Miss Reiland,] said to her?

MR. WENZEL[the prosecutor]: Because technically it is hearsay. THE COURT: It is admissible.

MR. HART: Judge, with all due respect, I would rather just fight Mr. Wenzel and not—

THE COURT: You know what, you're not acting like[ ] a lawyer. We are talking about—at least it has been established that this is an exciting event, and it makes a whole lot more sense if the witness tells us what was said to her. Now, don't object anymore, Mr. Hart, when things are so obvious. Now, would you please ask her what Miss Reiland said.

Tr. Day 2 at 68.

During Hart's cross-examination of Nimeth, the man stabbed by Lyell, the court became particularly active, interrupting the cross-examination—without a prior objection from the prosecution—18 times. Id. at 130 (2 interruptions), 132 (2 interruptions), 133, 134, 137, 140, 141, 142, 143, 146, 162, 169, 170, 189; Tr. Day 3 at 22, 38, 41, 43. At least 14 of these interruptions occurred in less than an hour. See Tr. Day 2 at 178. The interruptions often contained implications that Hart's attempts to discredit Nimeth's character for truthfulness were not relevant to the case, because Nimeth's proclivity for lying to the police was "not the issue in this case." Id. at 170; id. ("[N]o issues have been raised as far as I have been able to determine . . . ."); see id. at 130, 131, 132, 133, 142, 143. When Hart persisted in this line of questioning, the trial judge interjected: "What does that have to do with this? I don't understand the point you're making." Id. at 149. Hart explained that he intended to use the questions to discredit the prosecution's theory of motive, to which the judge responded, "I guess I just don't get it." Id. at 150.

The judge's repeated interruptions of Hart's questioning often came in the form of insults directed at Hart. For instance, she told him, "You want to be an actor. Be a lawyer." Id. at 131. Shortly thereafter, she added: "Don't act like a child, Mr. Hart. You're a lawyer," id. at 133, and "Would you please position yourself and act like [a lawyer]," id. at 134. She also accused him of being "a smart aleck," id. at 141, of being "silly," id. at 147, and of "trying to create a furor," id. at 141. When Hart appeared (to the judge's mind) to be investigating a forbidden line of questioning, the following exchange resulted:

THE COURT: Mr. Hart, you know you're exhausting all of us. Mr. Hart, do you have any more questions for this witness before he is excused?

MR. HART: Yes, I do, Judge.

THE COURT: I don't know why you keep doing these things over, and over again. That was a terrible thing, terrible thing for you to do.

MR. HART: I disagree.

THE COURT: Doesn't make any difference whether you agree or not.

Tr. Day 3 at 22.

The conflict between the judge and Hart culminated when—once again in the presence of the jury—the judge held Hart in contempt, fined him $250 and commented that "[t]here are some of these people who have never heard lawyers, who have never been in a courtroom before, it is embarrassing to all of us to have you act in this fashion." Id. at 27. Six days after the cross-examination of Nimeth and the contempt ruling, the judge instructed the jury that she and Hart did not "bear each other any animus," that the verdict must be based solely on the evidence, that Hart was not "a fact in [the] case" and that finding Hart in contempt should not be considered by the jury when "making a determination about the facts in [the] case." Tr. Day 6 at 19-20.

The jury returned a guilty verdict. After the jury announced its verdict, Lyell's counsel asked the court to poll the 14 jurors. During the polling, the first 11 jurors all concurred in the verdict. But the 12th juror apparently changed her mind, refusing to concur in the verdict:

THE CLERK: [Juror] was that and is this your verdict?

JUROR NO. 12: No. I am sorry, Judge.

THE COURT: Don't talk anymore. Let me just say this to you. May I ask the remaining two . . . jurors, was that and is that your verdict?

JUROR NO. 13: Yes.

JUROR NO. 14: Yes.

THE COURT: It is not possible for me to talk to you any further. But I really would ask you to go back and, you know, discuss with each other where you are and what processes you're involved in to see if you can arrive at a verdict. I don't urge anyone to give up their ideas or their thoughts, but I do think it is very important to, you know, talk with each other and to see what it is that you disagree upon. If you would be kind enough to do that, I would be appreciative.

Id. at 38-39. Lyell's counsel did not object when the court polled the last two jurors. But after the court gave this charge, Lyell moved for a mistrial. Id. at 39-40. The court did not rule on the motion, and when the jurors returned about an hour later they announced a guilty verdict. Id. at 40-41.

On direct review, a divided panel of the Michigan Court of Appeals, relying on state law, concluded that "the circumstances surrounding the [jury] polling did not tend to coerce the jurors to reach a particular verdict." People v. Lyell, No. 214100, slip op. at 3. As to the issue of judicial bias, a divided panel (again relying on state law) concluded that "the judge acted within her power and discretion to control the trial" and that her "conduct did not demonstrate partiality that influenced the jury's verdict." Id. at 4. In reviewing Lyell's habeas petition, the district court rejected both claims.

II.

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), we may grant the writ as a general rule only if the state court's decision on the merits was either "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). The statute, however, acknowledges an exception. "By its very language, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is applicable only to habeas claims that were adjudicated on the merits in state court." Newton v. Million, 349 F.3d 873, 878 (6th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (providing that heightened deference applies "to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings"). If ...