Lyles v. State
Decision Date | 18 May 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 709-82,709-82 |
Citation | 653 S.W.2d 775 |
Parties | D.L. LYLES, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Donald Ray Burger, Houston, for appellant.
John B. Holmes, Jr., Dist. Atty. and Timothy G. Taft, Randy McDonald, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, Robert Huttash, State's Atty. and Alfred Walker, Asst. State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
Before the court en banc.
OPINION ON STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
Appellant was convicted by a jury of criminally negligent homicide, and his punishment was assessed by the court at one (1) year's confinement in the county jail and at a fine of $1,000.00. On appeal the El Paso Court of Appeals reversed the conviction for refusal to dismiss the information for failure to comply with the Speedy Trial Act (Article 32A.02, V.A.C.C.P.). Lyles v. State, 636 S.W.2d 268 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1982). The appellate court found the State was not ready for trial within the 90 day time limit set by statute in view of the appellant's absence which resulted from a delay in processing the bond in the Sheriff's office. We granted the State's Petition for Discretionary Review to determine the correctness of that holding and because of an apparent conflict between the decision of the El Paso Court of Appeals and that rendered by the Dallas Court of Appeals in McPeters v. State, 624 S.W.2d 375 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1981) (No Petition for Discretionary Review history).
The prosecution in the instant case stemmed from a traffic collision on August 1, 1979 in Harris County between a semi-tractor driven by the appellant and an automobile occupied by the victim. The injuries suffered by the victim resulted in her death. Appellant Lyles was arrested on August 1, 1979, gave an in-custody statement and was released within 24 hours apparently without bond. He returned to his home in Robertson County.
A complaint and information were filed on August 13, 1979. The presence of the appellant for trial was not procured until approximately March 28, 1980. On May 20, 1980, the appellant filed his motion to dismiss the information for failure to provide a speedy trial. On May 27, 1980, the court, after a hearing, denied the said motion.
Article 32A.02, supra, provides in part:
"(2) 90 days of the commencement of a criminal action if the defendant is accused of a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment for more than 180 days; or ...."
Criminally negligent homicide is a Class A misdemeanor. V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 19.07.
V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 12.21, provides:
Under the Speedy Trial Act the State was required to be ready for trial within 90 days of the commencement of the criminal action in the instant case. Article 32A.02, § (2)(a), supra, provides:
In the instant case while the appellant was arrested on August 1, 1979 and detained in custody, he was released within 24 hours without bail and without charges being filed. The El Paso Court of Appeals was correct under the particular circumstances in finding the time limitations of Article 32A.02, supra, began on August 13, 1979, with the filing of the information. 1 Cf. Attorney General Opinion MW-41 (8/8/79).
We are not here dealing with a situation where the State files an announcement of ready among the papers of the cause soon after the filing of the information, nor a situation where the case is set for trial and the State announces ready when the case is called for trial within the time limitation set by statute.
At the hearing on the speedy trial motion assistant district attorney Thomas Henderson testified he reviewed the offense report, diagrams of the scene and photographs, and requested additional investigation. He authorized the filing of the information on August 13, 1979. Henderson stated the State was ready on that date save for the presence of the appellant.
On August 20, 1979 an arrest warrant was issued and transmitted from Harris County to Robertson County.
Marie Von Krosigk, chief prosecutor in the court where the information was filed from filing until February, 1980, reviewed the file and ordered an investigator to contact necessary witnesses. It was learned appellant resided in Robertson County. Von Krosigk contacted the Hearne Police Department to "run the warrant" on appellant. She was informed by letter of September 4, 1979 such police department was unable to locate appellant. Von Krosigk testified the State was ready within the 90 day time limit excluding the presence of the appellant.
On September 13, 1979, appellant was arrested in Hearne and posted a surety bond approved by the Sheriff of Robertson County. 2
The bond was transmitted to the Harris County Sheriff's office but was rejected by the warrant section. Neither Deputy John Mendenhal nor any of the other witnesses were able to testify as to the reason for the rejection. The Harris County Sheriff considered the bond a nullity and the Robertson County law enforcement authorities recognized the bond. The appellant was carried in a non-arrest status and his case was never set for trial.
Prosecutor Henderson became aware of the situation about March 20, 1980, when appellant tendered a second bond providing the same security. The bond was apparently still unacceptable to the Harris County Sheriff's office. Henderson, to avoid further delay, called the trial judge at home and vouched for the bond. The case was then set for trial.
The trial commenced on June 18, 1980. The State first secured the presence of the appellant on March 28, 1980, 228 days after the commencement of the criminal action on August 13, 1979. The period from March 28, 1980 to June 18, 1980 is not charged to the State since that period of delay was attributable to agreed continuances by both parties. Article 32A.02, § 4(3), V.A.C.C.P.
Turning to the question presented, we observe the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 32A.02, § 4, provides in relevant part:
This court recently interpreted this portion of the Speedy Trial Act in Newton v. State, 641 S.W.2d 530 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). Therein we noted:
Id. (Emphasis supplied.)
The clear import of Newton, as well as the opinion of the Court of Appeals in the instant case, is that securing the defendant's presence is a readiness burden which falls upon the State under the Speedy Trial Act.
Under the provisions of § 4 of Article 32A.02, supra, only subsection 5 is applicable to the circumstances of the instant case if any time period is to be excluded. And even the latter portion of subsection 5 "or because he resists being returned to the State for trial" is not pertinent here.
The question is whether under the circumstances the State used due diligence in obtaining appellant's presence within the 90 day time limitation. Here the State had appellant's written statement taken on the date of the alleged offense listing his address in Hearne. On September 13, 1979, appellant executed a surety bond which was approved by the Sheriff of Robertson County. It gave an address in Hearne. The bond was rejected by the Sheriff of Harris County for a reason or reasons that do not appear...
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