Lyman v. City of Boston

• Decision Date: 21 June 1895
• Citation: 164 Mass. 99,41 N.E. 127
• Parties: LYMAN v. CITY OF BOSTON.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

164 Mass. 99

41 N.E. 127

LYMAN v. CITY OF BOSTON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

June 21, 1895

COUNSEL

Robert M. Morse, for petitioner.

Thomas M. Babson, for respondent.

OPINION

MORTON J.

The questions put by the petitioner to the witness Rice on cross-examination, whether there were not restrictions upon his estate, and whether they did not enter into the price, were excluded on the ground that the restrictions could only be shown by the production of the deed. Subsequently Mr. Balch testified at length, without objection, to the state of the title, describing the restrictions, and saying, in substance, that he never was fully satisfied as to the nature of them; that he did not regard the title as absolutely clear; and that he was content for Mr. Rice to take it, and passed it. Mr. Rice gave the price which he paid for the property, and testified to the circumstances surrounding the sale, and to his conversations with Mr. Billings regarding it. The facts explanatory of the title and the sale were all before the jury, and they could judge whether the restrictions were accounted material, and affected the price. It does not seem to us that the petitioners were prejudiced by the exclusion of the questions. It was much better to have the witness describe the two estates than to permit him to express his opinion on their topographical similarity, etc. The petitioner has no valid exception to the exclusion of the question to Mr. Rice whether there was any topographical resemblance between his estate and the Lyman estate.

2. The next exception is that the Rice estate was so dissimilar to the Lyman estate that the price paid for the former furnished no just guide to the value of the latter. The dissimilarity is alleged to consist of the restrictions upon the Rice estate, etc., in the size, shape, topographical features, and situation of the two estates. It is also said that the sum paid for the Rice estate did not tend to show its market value, but involved other matters besides the value of the land and buildings, and included buildings of whose value the jury had no means of judging. It is well settled that sales of land similarly situated, and not too remote in point of time, are admissible to determine the value of land taken for public purposes. From the nature of the case, no two estates can be exactly alike. The question in each case is whether the similarity is sufficient to afford material assistance to the jury in determining the value of the estate in controversy, or whether the dissimilarity is such that the jury will be liable to be misled and prejudiced by the evidence. It is evident that there may be considerable difference in the size, shape, situation, use, and immediate surroundings of two estates, and perhaps in other respects and yet the price which one brought may be of substantial assistance in determining the value of the other. There may be general considerations, applicable to both alike, which largely affect their value, and render it proper that the price paid for one should be considered in arriving at the value of the other, notwithstanding the differences between them. Benham v. Dunbar, 103 Mass. 365. Much must of necessity be left to the discretion of the presiding judge on the question whether the similarity is such as to render the testimony competent. But his discretion is not an unlimited one. Chandler v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct, 122 Mass 305. If, in the present case, he had excluded the evidence because the two estates were not sufficiently alike, we should have hesitated to disturb the...