Lyman v. Lyman (In re Jo)

• Decision Date: 28 February 2019
• Docket Number: D073231
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re the Marriage of VICKI JO and STEVEN A. LYMAN. VICKI JO LYMAN, Appellant, v. STEVEN A. LYMAN, Respondent.

In re the Marriage of VICKI JO and STEVEN A. LYMAN.VICKI JO LYMAN, Appellant, v. STEVEN A. LYMAN, Respondent.

D073231

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

February 28, 2019

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Super. Ct. No. D546274)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Jeannie Low, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.

Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, Kendra J. Hall, Lionel P. Hernholm and Sarah L. Taylor for Appellant.

Stephen Temko for Respondent.

Vicki Jo Lyman (wife) appeals from a marital dissolution judgment in which the family court found Steven A. Lyman (husband) was entitled to $2,535,174 in reimbursements under Family Code¹ section 2640 for separate property contributions to their community residence. It was undisputed that the source of at least $1,291,176 of the contributions was payments from a corporation that had been sold years before the parties' separation and dissolution, of which Steven² was the sole shareholder at the time of their marriage. Vicki contends the family court erred by equating the corporation's contributions as Steven's separate contributions. She argues the corporation had a distinct legal status and the corporation, not Steven, was the only potential party with standing to assert a claim for reimbursement under section 2640. Vicki asks that we reverse the judgment to the extent it awards $1,291,176 in section 2640 reimbursements as "legally unsupported." We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The relevant facts are undisputed, based in part on the parties' trial stipulations and other evidence that Vicki does not challenge on appeal, including the amounts of payments for which Steven sought reimbursement and the reasons for as well as the source of those payments.

The parties married in March 1996. Before their marriage, they entered into a valid and enforceable antenuptial agreement providing that Steven's "earnings and income and property . . . resulting from his personal services, skill and effort . . . during the marriage shall remain his separate property in the same manner as if the marriage had never been entered into." They also agreed Steven would designate up to $120,000 per year in salary to be placed into a joint checking account for both parties' use, and all earnings in excess of that would be Steven's separate property. The agreement expressed the parties' intent "after marriage to purchase or build a home, title to which will be taken in both parties' names as community property subject to the provisions of the Family Law Act [sections] 2581 and 2640." At the time they entered into the antenuptial agreement, Steven was the sole shareholder and chief executive officer of a business, Creative Touch Interiors, Inc. (CTI), which Steven valued at $8 million. Steven testified that the business was an S corporation, so all of its earnings "[f]lowed directly to me."

Shortly after marrying, Steven and Vicki purchased a home in Fairbanks Ranch (the Fairbanks house), taking title jointly as community property. CTI paid $306,680.59 as a down payment for the house. The home had significant construction defects, requiring major repair work that was performed between 1996 and 1998. Beginning in 2000, the parties extensively remodeled the home. CTI paid for a substantial amount of the repairs and remodeling.³ CTI's board chairman, Bobby Jack Elkins, handled CTI's finances; he entered data and maintained records of its payments, including amounts CTIpaid for Steve's personal expenses, which encompassed the expenses on the Fairbanks house. Both Steve and Elkins were authorized to write checks on CTI's account, and Elkins saw every original check written on CTI's account. CTI treated the work done on the Fairbanks house as a business expense; they were written off against CTI's income in the years they were incurred.

CTI was sold in 2004. Steven sold the Fairbanks house in 2011, generating $3,894,500 in net proceeds.

Steven and Vicki separated in August 2013, and obtained an order terminating marital status in December 2016. In the dissolution matter, Steven sought to be reimbursed under section 2640 for $2,953,780 for separate property contributions to the Fairbanks house. Following a 2017 trial on the matter, the family court (Temporary Judge Jeannie Low) issued a final statement of decision. Among other findings, the court found the parties had agreed before marriage that Steven's earnings, income and property resulting from his personal services, skill and effort during the marriage would remain his separate property, and that Steven's $120,000 yearly salary from CTI was community property. It found the documentary evidence, as well as testimony of several witnesses, supported many of Steven's reimbursement requests, and that he had met his burden to establish his entitlement to reimbursement notwithstanding the fact the funds used for part of the acquisition, and the majority of repair and remodel costs were paid directly from CTI. The court rejected Vicki's arguments to the contrary, finding Steven "was the sole shareholder [of CTI] at the time of all of the expenditures and by the terms of theparties' [antenuptial] Agreement, the funds used were his separate property." It awarded total section 2640 reimbursements to Steven of $2,535,174.⁴

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

Section 2640 provides in part: "In the division of the community estate under this division, unless a party has made a written waiver of the right to reimbursement or has signed a writing that has the effect of a waiver, the party shall be reimbursed for the party's contributions to the acquisition of property of the community property estate to the extent the party traces the contributions to a separate property source." (§ 2640, subd. (b).) " 'Contributions to the acquisition of property' . . . include downpayments [and] payments for improvements . . . ." (§ 2640, subd. (a).)⁵

" 'Under Section 2640, in case of dissolution of the marriage, a party making a separate property contribution to the acquisition of the property is not presumed to have made a gift, unless it is shown that the parties agreed in writing that it was a gift, but is entitled to reimbursement for the separate property contribution at dissolution of marriage. The separate property contribution is measured by the value of the contribution at the time the contribution is made.' " (In re Marriage of Bonvino (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1432, quoting Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29D West's Ann. Fam. Code (1994 ed.) foll. § 2640, pp. 136-137.)

The issue presented requires consideration of section 2640 and whether the Fairbanks house payments from CTI's account meet the criteria in that statute for reimbursement. Interpretation and application of a statutory scheme to an undisputed set of facts, as presented here, constitutes a question of law subject to de novo review on appeal. (Valentine v. Franchise Tax Board (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1290, fn. 3; Heller v. Franchise Tax Board (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1730, 1735.) In matters of statutory interpretation, we begin with the statute's language, giving it plain and commonsense meaning. (Hassell v. Bird (2018) 5 Cal.5th 522, 540; see In re Marriage of Walrath (1998) 17 Cal.4th 907, 917.) "[O]ur ' " 'fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose.' " [Citation.] . . . 'We construe statutory language in the context of the statutory framework, seeking to discern the statute's underlying purpose and to harmonize its different components.' " (Connor v.First Student, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1026, 1035; Webb v. City of Riverside (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 244, 252.) " '[W]hen the statute's language is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, [the court may] turn to extrinsic aids to assist in interpretation.' . . . 'Where a statute is theoretically capable of more than one construction we choose that which comports with the intent of the Legislature.' " (Webb, at p. 252; see Walrath, at p. 918.) In that case, the goal must be to " ' "promot[e] rather than defeat[] the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences." ' " (Walrath, at p. 918.) Where the statutory language is clear and a literal interpretation does not result in unintended or absurd consequences, courts must generally follow its plain meaning. (Hassell v. Bird, at p. 540.)

On appeal, this court presumes the correctness of the judgment or order below. (People v. JTH Tax, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1259.) " 'All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.' " (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; Lister v. Bowen (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 319, 337.) Vicki bears the burden of affirmatively establishing reversible error. (Marriage of Cochran (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1056.) To meet this burden, she must support her arguments with legal analysis and demonstrate how the purported errors require reversal. " 'To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error.' '[C]onclusory claims of error will fail.' " (Lister v. Bowen, at p. 337.)

II. Analysis

Here, Vicki does not challenge the family court's finding that payments issued by CTI funded the purchase, repair and remodel of the Fairbanks house, which was a community residence. Nor does she challenge the court...