Lynch v. Burts

• Decision Date: 30 September 1870
• Citation: 48 Tenn. 600
• Parties: George W. Lynch, Ex'r, v. Jennie Burts et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

48 Tenn. 600

George W. Lynch, Ex'r,

v.Jennie Burts et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

September Term, 1870.

FROM JEFFERSON.

In the Chancery Court at Dandridge, SETH J. W. LUCKY, Ch., presiding.

J. T. SHIELDS, for Complainant.

Barton & McFarland, for defendant, cited Hartsell v. George, 3 Hum., 255; Jacob v. Sharp, Meigs, 114; McCloud v. Chiles, 1 Col., 248.

SNEED, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

The bill is brought by the executor of the last will and testament of George Squibb, deceased, to obtain a construction of a clause in his will, ??d the directions of the Court in the disposition of a legacy of $500, therein bequeathed to the benefit of the respondent, Jennie Burts. The clause is as follows: “I further direct that my negro girl, Jennie, shall, at the decease of my wife, be set free, and sent to Liberia or some other suitable place; and to meet the expense thereof, I hereby direct my executors to set apart from the sale, property, as may best suit my wife, Mary Squibb, the sum of five hundred dollars, which shall be placed in faithful hands, to inure to the benefit of said Jennie.” The will was executed on the 30th of October, 1852, and the above is a literal copy of the clause in controversy.

The bill alleges that Jennie was the slave of the testator, and that the bequest was upon the condition that Jennie should remain in the service of the testator's wife until the death of the latter; that the said Jennie had not observed said condition, in that she had abandoned her mistress in September, 1863, claiming to be free under the public events of the late civil war; that she had forfeited the bequest, and that, as by the changed condition of things, no expense would be necessary in the transportation of said Jennie to Liberia or elsewhere, the complainant asks the direction of the Court as to the disposition of said sum of five hundred dollars, which he insists was intended solely to defray the expenses of placing Jennie in a free country.

The widow, Mary Squibb, to whom the whole estate is given for life; Elijah H. Miller, the devisee in remainder of the real estate, and the said Jennie and her husband, Henderson Burts, with whom she has intermarried since the execution of the will, are made parties defendant, with a view to interplead as to their respective rights. It is stated at the bar that Mary Squibb died since the service of process upon her, but there is no proof thereof in the record. The bill does not waive the answers under oath, and the only answer filed, is by Henderson Burts, and Jennie, his wife, which is under oath.

The answer denies the abandonment, and avers that the respondent, Jennie, did remain with her said mistress, and faithfully serve her, until about the latter part of the war, when her said mistress ordered and commanded her to leave the place; and in obedience to said positive orders, she did leave it; and the respondent, Jennie, insists, that, though she had acquired her freedom in a manner not contemplated in said will, her rights under the same could not be impaired. There was no testimony in the cause, but it was submitted and determined on the bill and answer.

The Chancellor held that the respondent, Jennie, was entitled to the bequest of $500, with interest from the rendition of the decree, and awarded execution in behalf of the said Jennie and her husband, to be levied of the assets of the testator in the hands of the complainant. Upon the question of interest, the decree is as follows: “But because no steps have been taken by the said Jennie, or any other person for her, to collect said legacy, or to establish the liability of the executor of said will to pay the same, and from the language of said provision, the said executor was fully justified in withholding the payment of the same; the Court is further pleased to declare, that the said Jennie is not entitled to the interest on the same, until the rendition of this decree.” The complainant alone has appealed.

From the earliest period in the jurisprudence of this State, the courts have guarded with the utmost jealousy, the right of freedom, when asserted by a slave. The technical doctrines of the common law, touching gifts of other species of property, by deed or by parol, have been made to yield in favorem libertatis, whenever that paramount right was placed in peril by the rigid adherence to such rules. While, during the existence of the institution of slavery, the rights of both master and slave were protected and enforced; yet the most humane and enlightened policy pervaded the spirit of our laws, even when the right of freedom was asserted on the one hand and denied on the other. The adjustment of rights growing out of a species of property,...