Lynch v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 17 November 1921 |
| Citation | 109 S.E. 427 |
| Parties | LYNCH. v. COMMONWEALTH. |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Error to Circuit Court, Montgomery County.
Frank Lynch was convicted of assault and battery, and brings error. Affirmed.
Harless & Calhoun, of Christianburg, for plaintiff in error.
John R. Saunders, Atty. Gen., J. D. Hank, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and Leon M Bazile, Second Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.
KELLY, P. The defendant, Frank Lynch, was tried under an indictment containing two counts, the first charging that he broke and entered a dwelling house in the daytime with intent to commit rape, and the second merely charging him with an attempt at the latter offense. He was found guilty of assault and battery, and sentenced to a term in jail and the payment of a fine.
It is conceded by his counsel that under the indictment for felony, as above, set out, the defendant could have been lawfully convicted of assault and battery, provided the evidence was sufficient for that purpose. The sole question presented for our decision is whether the trial court erred in refusing to set aside the verdict as being contrary to the evidence.
The conflicts in the testimony were settled adversely to the accused by the verdict of the jury, and the case, as it comes to us upon the facts, is as follows: On the afternoon of March 30, 1920, Mrs. Mary Martin was at home alone with her two small children, the elder of them being only two years of age. She heard a noise or knocking at, the back door, and, on going to see what it meant, was met at the door by Frank Lynch, who said to her. "Say, Mrs. Martin, I want to kiss a white woman; I want to see what it is like to kiss a white woman." She replied, "No, sir;" and he thereupon put his hand upon her shoulder and said, "I didn't mean to insult you." At this juncture, she told him "to get out, " and he left.
The evidence was certified in narrative form. We have stated it from the commonwealth's standpoint as fully as it appears in the record. Was it sufficient to support the verdict?
A battery accompanies and includes an assault. Various definitions of both offenses are found in the books, all substantially much the same, but, as is well said in 2 R. C. L. p. 525:
The surrounding circumstances, such as time and place, the relationship or sex of theparties, the subject-matter of the words used, may have a most important bearing in determining whether a particular act constitutes an assault and battery. The law upon the subject is intended primarily to protect the sacredness of the person, and secondarily to prevent breaches of the peace. The reason of the law is the life of the law, and this maxim often finds useful application in cases of alleged assault and battery. To constitute battery there must be some touching of the person of another, but not every such touching will amount to the offense. Whether it does or not will depend, not upon the amount of force applied, but upon the intent of the actor.
2 Am. & Eng. Ency. L. pp. 953, 955, 959.
"Any touching by one of the person or clothes of another in rudeness or in anger is an assault and battery." Engelhardt v. State, 88 Ala. 100, 7 South. 154; Jacobi v. State, 133 Ala. 1, 32 South. 158, 163; Hyde v. Cain, 159 Ala. 364, 47 South. 1014;. Seigel v. Long, 169 Ala. 79, 53 South. 773, 774, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1070.
In Goodrum v. State, 60 Ga. 509, a case holding that it Is an assault and battery for a man, without any innocent excuse, to put his arm around the neck of another's wife against her will, the court said:
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...touching. See 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 120 (1768) (hereinafter Blackstone); Lynch v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 762, 765, 109 S.E. 427, 428 (1921); see also 2 LaFave & Scott, supra, § 7.15(a). The question is whether the term "force" in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) has......
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Johnson v. United States, 08–6925.
...touching. See 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 120 (1768) (hereinafter Blackstone); Lynch v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 762, 765, 109 S.E. 427, 428 (1921); see also 2 LaFave & Scott, supra, § 7.15(a). The question is whether the term “force” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) has......
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