Lynch v. Ouellette
| Decision Date | 07 February 1996 |
| Parties | James LYNCH v. George OUELLETTE, et al. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
James P. Boone, Saco, for Plaintiff.
Stephen P. Beale, Skelton, Taintor & Abbott, Auburn, for Defendants.
Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA and LIPEZ, JJ.
James Lynch appeals from a summary judgment entered in the Superior Court (York County, Fritzsche, J.) in favor of George Ouellette and Sonia Ouellette on Lynch's complaint for the recovery of a $30,000 deposit he paid the Ouellettes as earnest money under a contract for the sale of real estate. Lynch contends that the trial court erred in granting the Ouellettes' motion for a summary judgment because he is entitled to a return of his deposit under the terms of the contract or, in the alternative, under an unjust enrichment theory. Finding no merit in Lynch's contentions, we affirm the judgment.
This matter arises from the following undisputed facts. On February 26, 1987, the parties entered into a purchase and sale agreement pursuant to which Lynch agreed to buy certain property owned by the Ouellettes at Old Orchard Beach. The original agreement provided that Lynch was to submit, in lieu of an earnest money deposit, an unconditional, irrevocable letter of credit in the amount of $30,000 within thirty days of the contract's execution. The agreement also provided that, in the event that a closing were not held by June 13, 1987, the Ouellettes would be able to draw $10,000 against the letter of credit; the remaining $20,000 could be drawn by them if no closing were held by June 30, 1987. Such sums were to be credited against the purchase price at closing. The contract expressly provided that the sums to be drawn by the Ouellettes against Lynch's letter of credit would be "unconditional" and "irrevocable," and would be made "regardless of whether a closing is ... scheduled for any later date, or is subsequently held; and if not held, regardless of whether such failure to close is attributable to [the] absence of any permits or approvals."
The last possible date for a closing under the contract was September 30, 1988. Lynch's obligation to close on the sale was contingent, however, on his ability to obtain permits and other approvals necessary for the construction of condominium units on the property. No closing was held by June 30, 1987. After Lynch failed to provide a letter of credit, the parties agreed that he would make a cash deposit of $30,000 in lieu of the letter. The parties agreed that the breach, the failure to provide the letter of credit, could be waived by Lynch's cash payment as well as his agreement to reimburse the Ouellettes for as much as $750 in additional legal fees they incurred as a result of Lynch's breach. Although Lynch eventually delivered the $30,000 deposit to the Ouellettes after failing to meet two successive deadlines, he did not pay the additional $750 in attorney fees. Lynch did not obtain the necessary permits and approvals for construction by September 30, 1988, the final deadline stipulated in the contract for the closing. The deadline never was extended, and no closing ever was held.
Lynch brought an action in the Superior Court to recover his $30,000 deposit from the Ouellettes. Lynch contends that his inability to secure the required approvals for construction excused him from any obligation to perform under the contract and entitles him to the return of his earnest money deposit. Both parties moved for a summary judgment. The court granted the Ouellettes' motion, denied Lynch's motion, and ordered the entry of a final judgment in favor of the Ouellettes on the complaint. This appeal followed.
We review the entry of a summary judgment for errors of law, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was entered. Gilder v. Mitchell, 668 A.2d 879, 881 (Me.1995). For a party to be entitled to a summary judgment, it must be determined that there are no issues of material fact and that the prevailing par...
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