Lynch v. Roxbury Comprehensive Cmty. Health Ctr., Inc., 18-P-179.
| Decision Date | 30 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-P-179.,18-P-179. |
| Parties | Judy C. LYNCH & Others v. ROXBURY COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTER, INC., & Another. |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Christopher G. Clark, Boston, for Keith D. Crawford.
Andrew E. Goloboy, Boston, for the plaintiffs.
Present: Milkey, Desmond, & Wendlandt, JJ.
The plaintiffs are former employees of the Roxbury Comprehensive Community Health Center, Inc. (RCCHC), a now-defunct, nonprofit health care provider. Alleging that they were not paid wages owed to them, the plaintiffs brought the current action against RCCHC pursuant to the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, § 148. They also asserted that defendant Keith D. Crawford, M.D., the chairman of RCCHC's board of directors, personally was liable for the alleged Wage Act violations.3 Crawford moved for summary judgment, arguing that -- as a volunteer director of a nonprofit institution -- he enjoyed immunity from Wage Act claims. He asserted such immunity based on two separate statutes: the Volunteer Protection Act (VPA), 42 U.S.C. § 14503 (2012), and G. L. c. 231, § 85W. A Superior Court judge concluded that these statutes applied to Wage Act claims. However, the judge ultimately denied Crawford's motion for summary judgment on the ground that there was a dispute of fact over whether Crawford's conduct here fell within statutory exceptions to such immunity.4 After Crawford unsuccessfully pursued a motion for reconsideration, he appealed. We are now called upon to decide whether this appeal is properly before us. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that it is not, and we decline to exercise our discretion to reach the underlying merits. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
Background. We summarize the relevant facts set forth in the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the nonmoving party. Augat v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120, 571 N.E.2d 357 (1991).
The alleged Wage Act violations. By early 2013, RCCHC began to experience serious financial difficulties. At that time, Crawford served not only as chairman of RCCHC's board, but also held himself out as its "[p]resident" and "acting CEO." Crawford learned by February 25, 2013, that RCCHC did not intend to pay its employees for future work unless and until a Federal grant came through. He also learned that RCCHC likely would be unable to meet its payroll obligations on March 15, 2013. Nevertheless, he personally encouraged the employees to keep working and assured them that they would get paid. RCCHC did in fact miss its payroll on March 15, 2013, and it had not paid its employees by March 22, 2015 (the date by which Crawford alleges any Wage Act violation accrued). As documented by electronic mail messages (e-mails) sent a few days after that, once apprised of limited funds remaining in RCCHC's payroll account, Crawford suggested using that money toward paying off RCCHC's vendors instead of its employees.
The interlocutory rulings for which review is sought. The plaintiffs allege that with Crawford effectively having served as "president" of RCCHC, he personally is liable for the Wage Act violations. See G. L. c. 149, § 148 (). Crawford's principal defense was that because he was not paid for any roles he was serving at RCCHC, a nonprofit entity, he is immune from a Wage Act violation by operation of the VPA and its State counterpart, G. L. c. 231, § 85W.5
As noted, the judge denied Crawford's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs had raised a triable issue as to whether Crawford's conduct met the exceptions set forth in the two immunity statutes. With respect to the VPA, the judge concluded that "there is at least some evidence in the record from which a jury could conclude that Crawford engaged in ‘willful’ misconduct," which falls outside the immunity provided by the statute. With respect to G. L. c. 231, § 85W, the judge ruled that there was some evidence upon which a jury could conclude that Crawford's acts were "intentionally designed to harm" the plaintiffs, which would place them outside the scope of the immunity that statute provided.
In his motion for reconsideration, Crawford argued that the only real evidence that he might have engaged in disqualifying conduct was the e-mails that could be taken to indicate his preference to pay RCCHC's vendors over its employees. According to him, these e-mails could not be considered because of their timing, the e-mails having been sent only after any Wage Act violations already had occurred. The judge denied the motion for reconsideration, and Crawford appealed.6
Discussion. Whether an interlocutory appeal is proper. The initial question we face is whether the current interlocutory appeal is properly before us.7 The denial of a motion for summary judgment is a classic interlocutory ruling that typically cannot be appealed. See Elles v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Quincy, 450 Mass. 671, 673-674, 881 N.E.2d 129 (2008). There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule, including those that are denominated collectively as the doctrine of present execution (a venerable, if confusing, label). Id. at 674, 881 N.E.2d 129. In short, under that doctrine, immediate appeals are allowed "where the interlocutory ruling ‘will interfere with rights in a way that cannot be remedied on appeal’ from the final judgment, and where the matter is ‘collateral’ to the merits of the controversy." Id., quoting Maddocks v. Ricker, 403 Mass. 592, 597-600, 531 N.E.2d 583 (1988).
As relevant here, the question whether the doctrine of present execution applies comes down to whether the statutes at issue here confer immunity from suit, or merely immunity from liability. If the statutes confer immunity only from liability, a defendant who is compelled to defend himself at trial remains in a position fully to vindicate his rights in an appeal taken after final judgment has entered. Breault v. Chairman of the Bd. of Fire Comm'rs of Springfield, 401 Mass. 26, 31, 513 N.E.2d 1277 (1987), cert. denied sub nom. Forastiere v. Breault, 485 U.S. 906, 108 S.Ct. 1078, 99 L.Ed.2d 237 (1988). However, if the defendant is entitled to immunity from suit, then having to continue to defend himself in the litigation works a separate wrong that a deferred appeal cannot undo. Id. (). In that situation, the doctrine of present execution is said to apply, and an interlocutory appeal can be taken.8 See id.
Although the theory behind the case law is straightforward, difficulties abound in applying such principles in practice. A pair of relatively recent cases from the Supreme Judicial Court well illustrates this. In Maxwell v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc., 460 Mass. 91, 93-94, 950 N.E.2d 40 (2011), a workers' compensation insurer concluded that an employee of an insured may have filed a fraudulent claim, and it therefore referred that individual to the private investigatory body known as the Insurance Fraud Bureau (IFB). Based on that referral and related actions, the employee brought an action against the insurer alleging malicious prosecution and similar claims. Id. at 100, 950 N.E.2d 40. In defense, the insurer claimed qualified immunity pursuant to St. 1996, c. 427, § 13 (i ), the statute that created the IFB and the reporting system that insurers are mandated to follow.9 Id. at 98, 950 N.E.2d 40. After its motion for summary judgment claiming such immunity was denied, the insurer filed an appeal. Id. at 97-98, 950 N.E.2d 40. Even though the relevant statutory language speaks only in terms of insurers being protected from "liability," see note 9, supra, the court inferred a "legislative intent" to protect insurers from suit. Id. at 102, 950 N.E.2d 40. The court reasoned that "[r]eporting to the IFB might be chilled if protection could be secured only after litigating a claim through to conclusion, so we conclude that [the statute] should be interpreted as providing [insurers] immunity from suit rather than mere immunity from liability." Id. at 98, 950 N.E.2d 40. In other words, the court examined whether the overall purpose of the statute might be frustrated if an interlocutory appeal could not be taken. See id. Based on that approach, the court concluded that the doctrine of present execution applied and proceeded to reach the merits.10
A year after Maxwell was decided, the Supreme Judicial Court issued its decision in Marcus v. Newton, 462 Mass. 148, 967 N.E.2d 140 (2012). The plaintiff there was injured during a softball game on a public ballfield. Id. at 149, 967 N.E.2d 140. The defendant city asserted that it was immune based on the recreational use statute, G. L. c. 21, § 17C.11 Id. at 150, 967 N.E.2d 140.
That statute provides immunity to entities that make their land available for recreational or related uses without remuneration.12 Like the statute in Maxwell, see 460 Mass. at 98, 950 N.E.2d 40, the recreational use statute in Marcus provides only qualified immunity; land owners are immunized from liability for injuries arising out of their ordinary negligence, but not for "wilfull, wanton or reckless conduct." Marcus, supra at 153, 967 N.E.2d 140. See St. 1996, c. 427, § 13(i ) (); G. L. c. 21, § 17C. Also like the statute in Maxwell, the recreational use statute speaks only in terms of immunity from liability. See note 12, supra. Focusing on the statute's plain language, the court concluded that it did not provide immunity from suit and that the doctrine of present execution therefore did not apply.13 Marcus, supra. The court did not engage in the type of analysis on which Maxwell rests; that is, it did not examine whether the purpose of the...
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Lynch v. Crawford
...courts are not, without more, to infer an intent to provide immunity from suit." Lynch v. Roxbury Comprehensive Community Health Ctr., Inc., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 528, 535, 114 N.E.3d 1021 (2018). Consequently, the Appeals Court held that the doctrine of present execution did not entitle Crawfo......