Lynch v. Southern Exp. Co.
| Decision Date | 20 October 1916 |
| Docket Number | 50. |
| Citation | 90 S.E. 527,146 Ga. 68 |
| Parties | LYNCH v. SOUTHERN EXPRESS CO. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
An assignment of error in a bill of exceptions from the municipal court of Atlanta to the Court of Appeals, on the direction of a verdict, as not being authorized by the evidence, is insufficient to bring into question the legal power of a judge of the municipal court of Atlanta to direct a verdict.
Under the act creating the municipal court of Atlanta (Acts 1913 p. 145) the judge of the De Kalb county section is without power to grant a nonsuit or direct a verdict; but in proper cases in the Fulton county section a judge may grant a nonsuit or direct a verdict.
(a) The foregoing ruling is based on the act creating the court, and not on the amendment of 1916 (Acts 1916, p. 199), which authorizes the judges of the municipal court of Atlanta to grant nonsuits and direct verdicts in the same manner as is exercised by judges of the superior courts.
The act creating the municipal court of Atlanta, in so far as it authorizes the direction of a verdict in cases where there is no conflict of evidence, and that introduced, with all reasonable deductions or inferences therefrom, demands a particular verdict, is not repugnant to the Constitution of this state, as impairing the right of trial by jury.
Where a certified question of law does not propound a distinct issue of law, but, in effect, calls for a decision of the whole case, this court need not, and in this case does not, answer it.
Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
The words "question of law," as used in Const. art. 6 § 2, par. 9 (Civ. Code 1910, § 6506), relating to certification by the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court of a question of law on which the Court of Appeals desires the instruction of the Supreme Court for proper decision considered abstractly or in connection with the context, were not intended to embrace questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact.
Certified questions from Court of Appeals.
Action between W. S. Lynch and the Southern Express Company. There was a judgment for the latter, and the former brings error. On questions certified by the Court of Appeals. Questions answered.
Edward L. Neufville and Frank L. Neufville, both of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
Robt. C. & Philip H. Alston, of Atlanta, for defendant in error.
In response to questions propounded by the Court of Appeals we answer:
1. An assignment of error to the direction of a verdict for the defendant that the evidence authorized the submission of the case to the jury, that the contract set up by the defendant was void, and that the verdict directed was contrary to the evidence does not bring in question the lack of power of the court to direct a verdict because the statute creating the court did not confer on the judges thereof the power to direct a verdict in any case.
2. The act creating the municipal court of Atlanta (Acts 1913, p. 145) provided for a system of courts having territorial jurisdiction over the city of Atlanta. The court was divided into two sections, one having jurisdiction over so much of the county of De Kalb as lay in the City of Atlanta, and the other section was given jurisdiction of so much of the county of Fulton as was embraced in the city. The jurisdiction, procedure, and practice of the De Kalb section is the same as that prescribed for justices of the peace. The jurisdiction, procedure and practice of the Fulton section is different from that of the De Kalb section. In the thirty-eighth section of the act it is provided:
"That [on] the trial of any civil action in the municipal court of Atlanta [[limited to the Fulton county section by section 10], the mode of conducting the trial, the rules of evidence and the examination and swearing of the jury, where a jury is used, shall be the same as now prevails in the superior courts of this state."
One of the questions propounded by the Court of Appeals concerns the power of the presiding judge to grant a nonsuit or direct a verdict in a pending case. With respect to the De Kalb section, the practice is the same as that prescribed in a justice's court, and the presiding judge cannot direct a verdict nor grant a nonsuit. This is so because a justice of the peace has no such power. Favors v. Johnson, 79 Ga. 553, 4 S.E. 925; Gunn v. Wood, 99 Ga. 70, 24 S.E. 407; Georgia Railway & Electric Co. v. Knight, 122 Ga. 290, 50 S.E. 124. In the Fulton section, however, the mode of conducting the trial is expressly declared to be the same as prevails in the superior courts; and the powers of the presiding judge are more ample. We think the declaration of the statute that the mode of conducting a trial shall be the same in the Fulton county section as that which prevails in the superior courts implies that the power to grant a nonsuit and to direct a verdict inheres in the presiding judge of the municipal court of Atlanta. This implication becomes more apparent when we consider the rationale of the rule which forbids a justice of the peace to grant a nonsuit or direct a verdict. An appeal in a justice's court is a de novo investigation, and, as was said in Favors v. Johnson, supra:
"The jury in a justice's court is designed to fill the magistrate's place, or rather to succeed him, in judging of the sufficiency of evidence."
This is not so in the procedure of the Fulton county section of the municipal court of Atlanta. The trial before a jury is one of first instance, and is not on appeal; and hence the reason for denying to the judge the exercise of powers usual to a trial in the superior court in the matter of granting nonsuits and directing a verdict is absent. We could further elaborate our position by an analysis of the statute creating the court, but forbear to do so, because we feel convinced of the accuracy of our construction, and for the further reason that since this case arose the General Assembly has settled the matter by enacting:
"That upon the trial of any civil case in the municipal court of Atlanta, the judge shall have the same power and authority to grant a nonsuit, or direct a verdict, or order a mistrial as is now conferred upon and exercised by the judge of the superior courts of this state." Acts 1916, p. 199.
3. This court is further asked, if the statute be...
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