Lynch v. State, A18A1013
Decision Date | 06 September 2018 |
Docket Number | A18A1013 |
Citation | 347 Ga.App. 260,819 S.E.2d 54 |
Parties | LYNCH v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Gerard Bradley Kleinrock, Decatur, for Appellant
Sherry Boston, Decatur, Deborah D. Wellborn, for Appellee
Following a hearing during which Marvin Rosvet Lynch unsuccessfully attempted to fire his retained counsel, he entered a guilty plea to three counts of homicide by vehicle in the first degree, one count of hit and run, and one count of driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe for him to drive (DUI less safe) on the advice of the same counsel that he wished to fire.1 Lynch filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied. On appeal, Lynch contends that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it denied his request to fire his counsel and thus erred when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. For the following reasons, we reverse.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Gay v. State , 342 Ga. App. 242, 243, 803 S.E.2d 113 (2017).
Lynch was indicted on June 2, 2016, and his trial counsel filed an entry of appearance eight days later. Lynch's case was placed on a trial calendar and a pretrial hearing was held approximately six months after his indictment was filed.
Lynch's trial counsel began the pre-trial hearing by stating, "I think [Lynch] would like to address the court as far as replacing me, and once you make the decision either way, then if you decide to keep me in it, I will put on the record that I don't want to be replaced." Lynch then addressed the trial court and stated that he "want[ed] to fire [trial counsel] because of the lack of communication [they] have." Lynch went on to explain that he had concerns with the number of times that his trial counsel had met with him in jail and that, ultimately, "[trial counsel] doesn't seem to want to take this case as far as a defensive matter."
The trial court stated "[i]f the court feels that [trial counsel] is providing adequate representation for you and this case is on a trial calendar, then you're going to have to have [trial counsel] represent you." Inexplicably, in the open courtroom with the State present, trial counsel then began a long narration which included, among other things, all of the evidence against Lynch, the opinions of experts he had consulted with, speculation as to how high Lynch's blood alcohol level was at the time of the accident, as well as his opinion that the search warrant used to obtain Lynch's blood was sound, that the case against Lynch was "damning," and that Lynch was "not going to win." Trial counsel also cited to a previous DUI conviction that the State would be able to introduce, Lynch's lack of defense to the charges, conversations he had had with Lynch, and his opinion that while Lynch did not want to accept the State's plea offer, the situation "was not going to get better if we try it." Trial counsel concluded by explaining that he recommended that Lynch enter a negotiated plea, and that he "would prefer not to be taken off the case because I know at some point, if we lose or if he does a plea, they're going to file a complaint, but I'm doing my job."
Following the announcement that Lynch would be prohibited from firing his trial counsel, he and his trial counsel had an off-the-record discussion in the courtroom during which the State recognized the need for Lynch and trial counsel to speak privately, asked for them to be able to speak somewhere else, and expressed concern about potentially overhearing a privileged conversation. The trial court agreed to let Lynch and trial counsel speak somewhere else and then reiterated The record is unclear as to how long the discussion between Lynch and trial counsel lasted but, afterward, trial counsel announced that Lynch had decided to enter a guilty plea.
At the hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, trial counsel testified that he was informed prior to the date of the plea hearing that Lynch wished to fire him because he "wanted a defense to the case." Lynch testified, He further testified that, "I was even breaking down in tears there [during the plea] because I didn't know how that was possible to go with an attorney that you paid for and somebody could say that you have to s[t]ick with them."
In its order denying Lynch's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the trial court explained that The trial court found that Further, the trial court noted that "[i]t is also clear from the record that the State had a solid case against [Lynch] to establish the elements of each offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt if the case were taken to trial." The trial court concluded, "[a]s [Lynch] was represented by effective counsel and this [c]ourt did not preclude any other counsel of his choice from appearing on his behalf, [Lynch's] right to counsel was not violated."
On appeal, Lynch contends that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it denied his request to terminate his counsel and thus erred when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We agree.
"The Constitution of Georgia, Art. I, Sec. I., Par. XIV has been interpreted to confer upon every criminal defendant the right to be represented by counsel of his own selection whenever he is able and willing to employ an attorney, and uses reasonable diligence to obtain his services." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Alwi v. State , 331 Ga. App. 903, 904, 773 S.E.2d 387 (2015). And "[u]nder the Sixth Amendment [of the United States Constitution], a defendant who does not require appointed counsel enjoys both the right to effective assistance of counsel and the right to choose who will represent him." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) U.S. v. Jimenez-Antunez , 820 F.3d 1267, 1270 (III) (11 Cir. 2016). "The right to select counsel of one's choice has been regarded as the root meaning of the constitutional guarantee." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. Id. at 1271 (III). "The denial of the right to counsel of choice is structural error." Id.
However, "a defendant's right to counsel may not be insisted upon in a manner that will obstruct an orderly procedure in courts of justice, and deprive such courts of the exercise of their inherent powers to control the same." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Alwi , 331 Ga. App. at 904-905, 773 S.E.2d 387. "[A] trial court must balance the defendant's constitutional right to the counsel of his choosing against the need to maintain the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Legal Ethics
...Images, LLC, 349 Ga. App. 592, 826 S.E.2d 391 (2019); Hillman v. ALDI, Inc., 349 Ga. App. 432, 825 S.E.2d 870 (2019); Lynch v. State, 347 Ga. App. 260, 819 S.E.2d 54 (2018); Edward N. Davis, P.C. v Watson, 346 Ga. App. 729, 814 S.E.2d 826 (2018); Coen v. Aptean, Inc., 346 Ga. App. 815, 816 ......