Lynch v. Union Institution For Savings
| Decision Date | 21 June 1893 |
| Citation | 34 N.E. 364,159 Mass. 306 |
| Parties | LYNCH v. UNION INSTITUTION FOR SAVINGS et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
F.L Whipple, for plaintiff.
R.M Morse, for defendant.
After the decision in this case reported in 33 N.E. 603, a hearing was had in the superior court in regard to the decree to be entered, and the evidence tended to show that to restore the plaintiff's premises to their former condition would involve not only material and extensive changes in the different parts of the basement of the building, but would require the defendant to remove a vault inclosed in masonry in which were kept the books of the corporation, leaving unsupported its vault and safe in the banking room above, in which were kept its securities, bonds, notes, and stocks, representing a value of about $45,000,000. To do this would cost about $3,500, and would compel the defendant to find some other place of deposit for the contents of this safe while the work was being done. The portion of the plaintiff's premises occupied by this vault was an alcove or corner of the basement about 13 by 12 feet in area. This was but a small part of the space covered by the plaintiff's lease, all of which was in the basement. At the hearing the defendant asked for a decree which would permit it to retain the space occupied by its vault, and to build a brick wall across, inclosing the vault, and to give the plaintiff a space somewhat larger than this in the front part of the basement adjoining the portion covered by his lease, and which should also require it to restore to its original condition, so far as possible, all the remainder of his premises. The plaintiff objected. The court made a decree requiring the removal of the vault, and the case comes to this court on the question whether the defendant may be permitted to retain the small space occupied by its vault, and to restore to the plaintiff the remainder of his premises, and to enlarge them by the addition of an equivalent or larger space on the front.
When a plaintiff brings a bill to prevent a continuing trespass or a permanent injury to his real estate, the question whether he shall have a prohibitory injunction, or, if the work affecting the property has been done, a mandatory injunction, requiring the restoration of the estate to its former condition, depends on a consideration of all the equities between the parties. In general, where a defendant has gone on without right and without excuse in an attempt to appropriate the plaintiff's property, or to interfere with his rights, and has changed the condition of his real estate, he is compelled to undo, so far as possible, what he has wrongfully done affecting the plaintiff, and to pay the damages. In such a case the plaintiff is not compelled to part with his property at a valuation, even though it would be much cheaper for the defendant to pay the damages in money than to restore the property. The principal reason for this is that which lies at the foundation of the jurisdiction for decreeing specific performance of contracts for the sale of real estate. A particular piece of real estate cannot be replaced by any sum of money, however large; and one who wants a particular estate for a specific use, if deprived of his rights, cannot be said to receive an exact equivalent or complete indemnity by the payment of a sum of money. A title to real estate, therefore, will be protected in a court of equity by a decree which will preserve to the owner the property itself, instead of a sum of money which represents its value. One who has gone on wrongfully in a willful invasion of the plaintiff's right in real estate has no equity to set up against the plaintiff's claim to have his property restored to him as it was before the wrong was done.
Upon the evidence before us at the former hearing of the present case it was held that the plaintiff might have a mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to restore the premises to their former condition. Lynch v. Institution, 33 N.E. 603. See, also, Tucker v. Howard, 128 Mass 361, and cases cited; Attorney General v. Algonquin Club, 153 Mass. 454, 27 N.E. 2. On the other hand, where by an innocent mistake erections have been placed a little upon the plaintiff's land, and the damage caused to the defendant by removal of them would be greatly disproportionate to the injury of which the plaintiff complains, the court will not order their removal, but will leave the plaintiff to his remedy at law. Hunter v. Carroll, 64 N.H. 572, 15 Atl.Rep. 17; Low v. Innes, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 286; Aynsley v. Glover, L.R. 18 Eq. 544, 553. See,...
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