Lynn Gas & Electric Co. v. Meriden Fire Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 04 April 1893
• Parties: LYNN GAS & ELECTRIC CO. v. MERIDEN FIRE INS. CO. SAME v. OTHER COMPANIES, (22 cases.)
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

158 Mass. 570

33 N.E. 690

LYNN GAS & ELECTRIC CO.

v.MERIDEN FIRE INS. CO.

SAME

v.OTHER COMPANIES, (22 cases.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

April 4, 1893.

Exceptions from superior court, Essex county; John W. Hammond, Judge.

Actions by the Lynn Gas & Electric Company against the Meriden Fire Insurance Company and 22 other insurance companies upon concurrent policies of insurance. Verdicts for plaintiff. Defendants except. Exceptions overruled.

Wm. H. Niles and Geo. J. Carr, for plaintiff.

John D. Bryant, (Solomon Lincoln, of counsel,) for defendants.

KNOWLTON, J.

The only exception relied on by the defendants in these cases is that relating to the claim for damage to the machinery used in generating electricity, and to the building from a disruption of the machinery. This machinery was in a part of the building remote from the fire, and none of it was burned. In his charge to the jury the judge stated the theory of the plaintiff as follows: “The plaintiff says the position of the lightning arresters in the vicinity of the fire was such that, by reason of the fire in the tower, a connection was made between them called a ‘short circuit;’ that the short circuit resulted in keeping back or in bringing into the dynamo below an increase of electric current that made it more difficult for this armature to revolve than before, and caused a higher power to be exerted upon it, or, at least, caused greater resistance to the machinery; that this resistance was transmitted to the pulley by which this armature was run through a belt; that that shock destroyed that pulley; that, by the destruction of that pulley, the main shaft was disturbed, and the succeeding pulleys up to the jack pulley were ruptured; that by reason of pieces flying from the jack pulley, or from some other cause, the fly wheel of the engine was destroyed, the governor broken, and everything crushed,-in a word, that the short circuit in the tower, by reason of the fire, caused an extra strain upon the belt through the action of electricity, and that caused the damage.” The plaintiff contended that the short circuit was produced by the fire, either by means of heat on the horns of the lightning arresters, or by a flame acting as a conductor between the two horns, or in some other way. The jury found that the plaintiff's theory of the cause of the damage was correct, and the question is whether the judge was right in ruling that an injury to the machinery caused in this way was a “loss or damage by fire,” within the meaning of the policy.

The subject-matter of the insurance was the building, machinery, dynamos, and other electrical fixtures, besides tools, furniture, and supplies, used in the business of furnishing electricity for electric lighting. The defendants, when they made their contracts, understood that the building contained a large quantity of electrical machinery, and that electricity would be transmitted from the dynamos, and would be a powerful force in and about the building. They must be presumed to have contemplated such effects as fire might naturally produce in connection with machinery used in generating and transmitting strong currents of electricity. The subject involves a consideration of the causes to which an effect should be ascribed when several conditions, agencies, or authors contribute to produce an effect. The defendants contend that the application of the principle which is expressed by the maxim, “In jure non remota causa sed proxima spectatur” relieves them from liability in these cases. It has often been necessary to determine in trials in court what is to be deemed the responsible cause which furnishes a foundation for a claim when several agencies and conditions have a share in causing damage, and the best rule that can be formulated is often difficult of application. When it is said that the cause to be sought is the direct and proximate cause, it is not meant that the cause or agency which is nearest in time or place to the result is necessarily to be chosen. Freeman v. Association, 156 Mass.----, 30 N.E.Rep. 1013. The active, efficient cause that sets in motion a train of events which brings about a result without the intervention of any force started and working actively from a new and independent source is the direct and proximate cause referred to in the cases. McDonald v. Snelling, 14 Allen, 290;Perley v. Railroad Co., 98 Mass. 414, 419; Gibney v. State, (N.Y.App.) 33 N.E.Rep. 142. In Railway Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 474, Mr. Justice Strong, who also wrote the opinions in Howard Fire Ins. Co. v. Norwich & N.Y. Transp Co., 12 Wall. 194, and in Western Mass. Ins. Co. v. Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co., Id. 201, note, which are much relied on by the defendants, used the following language in the opinion of the court: “The primary cause may be the proximate cause of the disaster, though it may operate through successive instruments, as an article at the end of a chain may be moved by a force applied to the other end, that force being the proximate cause of the movement, or as in the oft-cited case of the squib thrown in the market place. Scott v. Shepherd, 2 W.Bl. 892. The question always is, was there an unbroken connection between the wrongful act and the injury,-a continuous operation? Did the...