Lynn v. Haybuster Mfg., Inc.

• Decision Date: 06 July 1993
• Docket Number: No. 14665,14665
• Citation: 627 A.2d 1288,226 Conn. 282
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Dennis LYNN et al. v. HAYBUSTER MANUFACTURING, INC.

Page 1288

627 A.2d 1288

226 Conn. 282

Dennis LYNN et al. v. HAYBUSTER MANUFACTURING, INC.

No. 14665.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 27, 1993.

Decided July 6, 1993.

Erin M. Kallaugher, with whom was Mark B. Seiger, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

Vincent M. DeAngelo, with whom was Michael L. McDonnell, Hartford, for appellees (plaintiffs).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BORDEN, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.

KATZ, Associate Justice.

The sole issue certified ¹ to this court is whether, in an action brought pursuant to the Product Liability Act (act); General Statutes § 52-572m et seq.; ² a claim for loss of consortium by the spouse of an injured party is barred. We conclude that it is not.

The record certified by the District Court discloses the following facts. On January 30, 1991, the named plaintiff, Dennis Lynn, allegedly sustained work related injuries while demonstrating an industrial grinder, the Haybuster Model I.G.10, that had been manufactured by the defendant, Haybuster Manufacturing, Inc. As a result of the accident, Dennis Lynn and his wife, Theresa Lynn, the plaintiff in this appeal (plaintiff), ³ filed an eight count complaint in the Superior Court for the Judicial District of Middlesex. Upon motion by the defendant, the case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiffs thereafter filed an amended complaint in two counts. The first count was brought on behalf of Dennis Lynn pursuant to the act. The second count alleged a loss of consortium by Theresa Lynn. The defendant subsequently moved to dismiss the second count of the amended complaint challenging the plaintiff's right to bring a loss of consortium claim. ⁴ The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, Covello, J., thereafter certified the issue to us.

The defendant maintains that the exclusivity provision of the act bars the plaintiff's claim for loss of consortium. ⁵ The defendant recognizes that at common law the plaintiff's claim for loss of consortium would have been permitted as derivative of her injured spouse's underlying claim. See Izzo v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 203 Conn. 305, 312, 524 A.2d 641 (1987); Hopson v. St. Mary's Hospital, 176 Conn. 485, 494, 408 A.2d 260 (1979). The defendant contends, however, that the language of General Statutes § 52-572n(a), which provides that "[a] product liability claim ... shall be in lieu of all other claims against product sellers ..." abolished Dennis Lynn's right to claim common law negligence and the plaintiff's right to claim loss of consortium. Relying on cases ⁶ wherein this court held that certain "exclusive" statutory schemes did not provide a right to claim a loss of consortium, the defendant argues that this derivative and dependent action is similarly prohibited by the act. We disagree because we conclude that prior to the enactment of the act the plaintiff could have brought, pursuant to the common law, a claim for loss of consortium for the negligent act of a third party, and because the act does not explicitly bar such action. We further conclude that "claim" as defined in the act continues to include a spouse asserting a derivative claim for loss of consortium.

Our analysis begins with several familiar principles. ⁷ Article first, § 10 of the Connecticut constitution protects "incorporated common law or statutory rights from abolition or significant limitation," if those rights existed in and prior to 1818. Sharp v. Mitchell, 209 Conn. 59, 64, 546 A.2d 846 (1988). Common law causes of action that emerged after 1818, however, are not afforded such protection and are susceptible to limitation and abrogation by the legislature. Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267, 283, 363 A.2d 1 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041, 96 S.Ct. 763, 46 L.Ed.2d 631 (1976). Although a husband was empowered to claim a loss of consortium prior to 1818; Marri v. Stamford Street R. Co., 84 Conn. 9, 14-17, 78 A. 582 (1911); the right of a wife to bring a loss of consortium claim was not recognized until well into the twentieth century. Hopson v. St. Mary's Hospital, supra, 176 Conn. at 487-95, 408 A.2d 260. We followed therein the growing majority of courts in recognizing a right of action for loss of consortium in either spouse, and held that a wife has a right to bring an action for loss of consortium arising from a personal injury to her husband caused by the negligence of a third person and claim, as elements of damage, loss of companionship, society, affection, sexual relations and moral support. Id., at 496, 408 A.2d 260. Because the husband's right to bring a loss of consortium claim existed prior to 1818, the legislature was not free to eradicate it where the underlying claim of negligence was against a third party who was not a municipality. Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, 219 Conn. 179, 199, 592 A.2d 912 (1991). The claim by a wife for loss of consortium, although not in existence prior to 1818, is now firmly rooted in our common law. Izzo v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., supra, and cases cited therein.

Interpreting a statute to impair an existing interest or to change radically existing law is appropriate only if the language of the legislature plainly and unambiguously reflects such an intent. "[W]hen a statute is in derogation of common law or creates a liability where formerly none existed, it should receive a strict construction and is not to be extended, modified, repealed or enlarged in its scope by the mechanics of [statutory] construction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ahern v. New Haven, 190 Conn. 77, 82, 459 A.2d 118 (1983). "In determining whether or not a statute abrogates or modifies a common law rule the construction must be strict, and the operation of a statute in derogation of the common law is to be limited to matters clearly brought within its scope." Willoughby v. New Haven, 123 Conn. 446, 454, 197 A. 85 (1937). Although the legislature may eliminate a common law right by statute, the presumption that the legislature does not have such a purpose can be overcome only if the legislative intent is clearly and plainly expressed. State v. Sanchez, 204 Conn. 472, 479, 528 A.2d 373 (1987). We recognize only those alterations of the common law that are clearly expressed in the language of the statute because the traditional principles of justice upon which the common law is founded should be perpetuated. "The rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly construed can be seen to serve the same policy of continuity and stability in the legal system as the doctrine of stare decisis in relation to case law." 3 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (5th Ed. Singer 1992 Rev.) § 61.01, pp. 172-73.

In accordance with these principles, we first examine the language of the act to determine whether it clearly abrogates the common law right to loss of consortium. The legislature's intent is derived "not in what it meant to say, but in what it did say." Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., 200 Conn. 562, 571, 512 A.2d 893 (1986). The act makes no explicit mention of whether a loss of consortium claim survives or is abrogated. ⁸ Consequently, there has been no expressed intent of the legislature "as found from the words employed" to eliminate a spouse's claim for loss of consortium in product liability cases. Park Regional Corporation v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 144 Conn. 677, 682, 136 A.2d 785 (1957). Certainly, the legislature is capable of providing explicit limitations when that is its intent. See, e.g., General Statutes § 52-555d ("[n]o action with respect to any claim or cause of action for loss of consortium shall be brought by one spouse against an employer of the other spouse if such other spouse is entitled to receive, is receiving or has received [worker's compensation benefits]"). In the absence of similar explicit language, we will not presume that the legislature intended the act to operate in derogation of this common law cause of action for loss of consortium.

On the contrary, we conclude that the broad definition of "claimant" as provided under the act encompasses a spouse claiming a loss of consortium. General Statutes § 52-572m(c), provides that " '[c]laimant' means a person asserting a product liability claim for damages incurred by the claimant...." A " '[p]roduct liability claim' includes all claims or actions brought for personal injury...." General Statutes § 52-572m(b). This court determined in Hopson v. St. Mary's Hospital, supra, 176 Conn. at 493, 408 A.2d 260 that a claim for loss of consortium includes "personal and compensable, though not physical, injuries as a direct result of the defendant's negligence...." Although "damages" is not defined in the act, we have held that damages includes a loss of consortium shown to arise from a personal injury to a spouse caused by the negligence of a third person. Id., at 496, 408 A.2d 260. Hopson v. St. Mary's Hospital, supra, was argued on November 14, 1978, and the decision was released on January 23, 1979. The act, General Statutes § 52-572m et seq., was effective on October 1, 1979. The House of Representatives approved the final version of the act on May 11, 1979, and the Senate approved the act on May 29, 1979. 22 H.R.Proc., Pt. 21, 1979 Sess., p. 7306; 22 S.Proc., Pt. 14, 1979 Sess., p. 4650. "Because the legislature is presumed to know the state of the law when it enacts a statute; State v. Dabkowski, 199 Conn. 193, 201, 506 A.2d 118 (1986); we can assume that, absent an affirmative statement to the contrary, it did not intend to change the existing law...." In re Ralph M., 211 Conn. 289, 300, 559 A.2d 179 (1989). Accordingly, we conclude that a spouse asserting a derivative claim of loss of consortium falls within the general definition of "claimant" in the act.

Even if the language of the act were deemed to be unambiguous or opaque, its legislative history demonstrates no...