Lynn v. State, 48630

• Decision Date: 07 January 1974
• Docket Number: No. 3,No. 48630,48630,3
• Citation: 204 S.E.2d 346,130 Ga.App. 646
• Parties: Russell L. LYNN v. The STATE
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 346

204 S.E.2d 346

130 Ga.App. 646

Russell L. LYNN v. The STATE.

No. 48630.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 3.

Jan. 7, 1974.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 25, 1974.

Thomas R. Taggart, Savannah, for appellant.

Andrew J. Ryan, Jr., Dist. Atty., Howard A. McGlasson, Jr., Savannah, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

PANNELL, Judge.

1. 'An arrest for a crime may be made by an officer, either under a warrant, or without a warrant if the offense is committed in his presence, or the offender is endeavoring to escape, or for other cause there is likely to be a failure of justice for want of an officer to issue a warrant.' Code § 27-207. 'This applies to arrests for misdemeanors as well as for felonies; though as to arrests for felonies somewhat greater latitude may be allowed in certain cases. Porter v. State, 124 Ga. 297, 302, 52 S.E. 283; Thompson v. State, 4 Ga.App. 649(2), 652, 62 S.E. 99.' Piedmont Hotel Co. v. Henderson, 9 Ga.App. 672, 680, 72 S.E. 51, 55. 'We think that the words, 'in his presence' as used in the Penal Code (1910), § 917 (Code 1933, § 27-207), and the words 'within his immediate knowledge,' as used in Pen.Code 1910 § 921 (Code 1933, § 27-211) are synonymous. To justify the arrest without warrant, the officer need not see the act which constitutes the crime take place, if by any of his senses he has personal knowledge of its commission. Thus, if he hears shooting or other noises, and runs immediately to the place and finds the offender with evidence of the alleged crime on him of finds the offender running away as if in apparent flight from the crime, and in similar cases, the crime is considered as having been committed in the officer's presence or immediate knowledge.' Piedmont Hotel Co. v. Henderson, 9 Ga.App. 672, 681, 72 S.E. 51, 55, supra.

2. '(T)he constitutional validity of arrest without a warrant depends 'upon whether, at the monent the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it-whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the (defendant) had committed or was committing an offense.' Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142. 'In dealing with probable cause, . . . as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.' Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879. There is also a great 'difference between what is required to prove guilt in a criminal case and what is required to show probable cause for arrest or search.' Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311-312, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327. As Judge Learned Hand said in United States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105, 106 (C.A.2d Cir.): 'It is well settled that an arrest may be made upon hearsay evidence; and indeed, the 'reasonable cause' necessary to support an arrest cannot demand the same strictness of proof as the accused's guilt upon a trial, unless the powers of peace officers are to be so cut down that they cannot possibly perform their duties. " Peters v. State, 114 Ga.App. 595, 596, 152 S.E.2d 647.

Where, as in the present case, it appears that at a certain location (a fairgrounds) there had been trouble...