Lynn v. State
| Decision Date | 03 February 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 369S63,369S63 |
| Citation | 266 N.E.2d 8,255 Ind. 631 |
| Parties | James A. LYNN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
R. D. Reading, Wabash, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen. of Indiana, William F. Thompson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
The appellant was indicted for murder in the first degree and found guilty as charged and given life imprisonment.
The homicide was the result of a controversy between the defendant and his estranged wife, Sandy. The evidence discloses that while Sandy was away from home with a female friend with whom she lived at the time, the defendant drove up in his automobile, compelled her to leave the car, and dragged her back to his car. He beat her with the butt of a revolver, threatened her companion and another person that he would kill them if they interfered, and then shot her in the head two or three times. Thereafter he drove away.
The first contention made by the appellant is that the court erred in giving Instruction Number 4 over the objection of appellant. Although appellant claims that the instruction misstated the elements necessary to prove insanity, the objection of the appellant to that instruction was more narrow, namely, that insanity 'does not require a destruction of the will power but merely a temporary cessation of the operation of the same.' We thus are limited by the objection as to whether or not the instruction was valid on the ground that it did not cover temporary insanity. This is the gist of appellant's argument. This issue may be easily disposed of without elaborate consideration for the reason that the court did give other instructions which in our opinion recognized and adequately covered the question of temporary insanity, to which the appellant made no objections at the time. There were two of these instructions given by the court, namely, numbers 8 and 12, which extensively covered the matter of temporary insanity.
The appellant makes some contention about the use of the words 'completely destroyed' with reference to a person's will power, but no objection was made on that specific ground. New York, Chicago, etc. R.R. Co. v. Henderson (1957), 237 Ind. 456, 146 N.E.2d 531.
Instructing a jury is most difficult and complex. Criticisms most often consist of super-refinements which have no substantial effect upon the ordinary and common meaning to be drawn from the instructions. Words at the best are imperfect means of precise communication. Their meaning will vary with the time, place or environment under which they are uttered. Far too often we, as courts, are prone to give over-emphasis to some slight shaded meaning in an instruction which we, as men. know could not have affected the jury in its deliberations. Courts have been criticized for such overrefinement in meaning. Noel v. State (1966), 247 Ind. 426, 215 N.E.2d 539; Woods v. State (1957), 236 Ind. 423, 140 N.E.2d 752.
We do not believe where a lawyer fails to perceive the claimed error, that the average layman or juryman could have been misled by the instruction. The purpose of an objection in the trial court is to give the trial court an opportunity, when attention is called to an alleged error, to make a correction. That could have been done in this case if it was of such importance that the attorney felt the court should make the correction. It has been said many times by this Court that an appellant must make a specific objection in the trial court, thus giving the trial court an opportunity to make a correction at the time, rather than failing to be specific and raise it for the first time on appeal. We find no error in the giving of Instruction Number 4 as presented to us.
Appellant next contends that the court erred in permitting the prosecution on redirect examination to go beyond evidence opened up by the defense on cross-examination. This occurred when a psychiatrist, Dr. H. Matheu, was asked on cross-examination if he was aware of the fact that the defendant had on at least one or two occasions been involved in an accident resulting in a head injury. The answer was:
On re-direct examination the prosecutor asked the following question:
'Q. Doctor, were you aware of the fact that Mr. Lynn here has on at least one and I think possibly two occasions been involved in accidents which resulted in head injury or possibly concussion?
A. Yes, Mr. Lynn told me at the time I was interviewing him. He told me that at one time he had an accident which resulted in a fracture but in my attempt to try to find more detail about it I was not able to because Mr. Lynn does not remember the hospital where he was taken care of, nor did he remember the doctor who took care of him.'
Thereupon, the prosecuting attorney, because the Doctor, on cross-examination and now on re-direct examination, said he did not remember the hospital, asked the Doctor the following question:
'Q. Dr. Matheu, did the defendant during this interview you went into with Mr. Morris ever state that he had been at Logansport before?
A. I don't recall now, but there was some talk that he was at Logansport and he was there but not as a patient.
Q. What was he there us?'
Thereupon the defendant's attorney made the following objection:
The court overruled the objection and then the Doctor made the following answer:
It seems to us that the prosecuting attorney had a right to find out from the Doctor on re-direct examination why the defendant was at Logansport Hospital, if it was not for treatment. Regardless of this question, however, it occurs to the Court that all of this testimony is pertinent and relevant with reference to the insanity issue which was raised by the appellant (defendant below) in this case. It is a well settled rule of law that once a defendant pleads insanity he opens the door to all the facts of his life that are relevant to that issue.
Ewbanks Indiana Criminal Law, Symmes Edition, § 254, p. 149 states that when the issue of insanity is raised by the court in a criminal case:
This passage is supported by ample authority. Therefore the fact that incidentally it was shown here in examining and cross-examining a witness who testified as to the sanity of the appellant that he had been in the State Farm at some time, appears to us to be under the general rule, and not to be error. Baker v. State (1921), 190 Ind. 385, 129 N.E. 468; Kallas v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 103, 83 N.E.2d 769.
The appellant next contends that the court erred in admitting into evidence conversations between the police officer and the appellant without the appellant being adequately apprised of his constitutional right to remain silent and have the assistance of an attorney, and that a printed card used by the police, stating his constitutional rights, was a duplicate of the one read and given to the appellant and therefore improperly introduced in evidence. The facts with reference to this matter, upon which the court made its determination as to the admissibility of this evidence, began with the arresting officer's testimony:
'A. At that point, I told him that I never had mistreated him,...
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